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ABSTRACT
This study discusses the role of Supreme Court decisions in shaping the evolution
of Jim Crow and African American newspapers’ reactions to these decisions. The study
focuses on the period between the end of Reconstruction and the United States’ entrance
into World War I. It looks at several Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate how the
Court failed to act as a check on state legislatures’ reactionary undertakings and how
these legislatures interpreted the Court’s judgments. Several of the Supreme Court’s
decisions served to alert white legislators to the federal government’s limited actions to
protect the rights of African American citizens. The cases included represent most areas
of discrimination faced by African Americans during this period including participation
in the court system, Fourteenth Amendment protections, the Fifteenth Amendment,
public versus private segregation, transportation segregation, education segregation, and
housing segregation. White legislators viewed the Supreme Court as an indicator of the
state segregation that the federal government would allow.
African American newspapers failed to offer a significant response to many key
decisions. As the Court limited the protections of Reconstruction legislation, black
newspapers offered little guidance to the black community about how to salvage their
equal rights. The newspapers had the opportunity to reach large portions of the African
American community and to lead efforts to protest the Court’s potentially detrimental
decisions, but the press failed to bring attention to the cases white legislators viewed as
signals that the federal government would not interfere with state and local segregation.
Through the study of approximately twenty black newspapers, it becomes clear that the
newspapers’ editors often misread the importance of the Supreme Court’s holdings.
Cases that historians now recognize as key turning points in the status of African
Americans went virtually ignored by the press and cases that receive little more than a
footnote garnered extended attention from newspapers for being either a significant blow
to the black community or for being cause for hope. It is apparent that the Supreme
Court played a significant role in enabling Jim Crow to expand and the African American
press did little to counter its effects.
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Introduction

And thus goes segregation which is the most far-reaching
development in the history of the Negro since the enslavement of
the race.
~ Carter G. Woodson
The Mis-Education of the Negro
(1933)

In his 1933 work, The Mis-Education of the Negro, Carter G. Woodson discussed
what he viewed as the indoctrination of African Americans in public schools. Woodson
believed that African Americans had become too dependant on white America and too
accepting of inferior positions in society. The status of black Americans in the 1930s did
not reflect the expectations of the African American community following the ratification
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments during Reconstruction. Rather,
there had been a sense of excitement about the promise of equality that went unattained
by the majority of black Americans in Woodson’s generation.
Woodson stood out as a success among a generation of blacks who faced
increased challenges and increased segregation throughout their lifetimes. Born in 1875,
Woodson lived through the peak years of Jim Crowism and observed its effects on blacks
in both the South and the North. A graduate of Berea College, which later became the
focus of a key Supreme Court case about the segregation of whites and blacks in private
colleges, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University, Woodson wanted the role of
his people to be acknowledged and respected. Towards this goal, he co-founded the
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Association for the Study of African American Life and History in 1915 and began
publishing The Journal of Negro History in 1916.1 He also participated in the
Washington, D.C. branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People. Despite his education and his political activism, however, his belief that AfricanAmerican history was unique and deserved to be taught in addition to the “white” history
of the United States was not popular among other black intellectuals. In contrast, many
of them took the approach that all Americans, regardless of their skin color, had the same
history.
As Woodson and other African American leaders struggled to find the best way to
advance the status of the black community, state legislatures progressively limited
African Americans’ standing in society through a variety of segregation legislation.
Rather than creating far-reaching laws that established wholesale segregation, white
legislators periodically tested the legal waters to determine how much the federal
government would allow and where it would draw the line regarding discrimination
against blacks. Some of the laws simply codified segregation that already existed
through de facto means, but the majority of these post-war statutes worked to draw new
lines between blacks and whites in every aspect of their lives including transportation,
entertainment, education, and housing.
This study looks at several of the Supreme Court’s decisions during this period to
demonstrate how the Court failed to act as a check on the reactionary undertakings of
state legislatures and how these legislatures interpreted the Court’s judgments. It

1

The Journal of Negro History became The Journal of African-American History in 2002. The journal has
never missed a single issue despite the World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. The journal
has also survived numerous funding issues in its ninety-one years of publication.
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becomes evident that several of the Supreme Court’s decisions served to signal white
legislators about the limited actions the federal government would take to protect the
rights of African American citizens. Eleven cases receive the lion's share of discussion,
with supplemental information on more than twenty others. These cases taken together
cover most of the areas of discrimination faced by African Americans between the end of
Reconstruction and the United States’ entry into World War I. Among the issues
addressed in these cases are African American participation in the court system (Blyew v.
United States [80 U.S. 581 (1871)] and Strauder v. West Virginia [100 U.S. 303 (1879)]),
the protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act of 1870
(Slaughterhouse Cases [83 U.S. 36 (1873)] and United States v. Cruikshank [92 U.S. 542
(1875)]), the debate about public versus private segregation (Civil Rights Cases [109 U.S.
3 (1883)] and United States v. Harris [106 U.S. 629 (1883)], the protections provided by
the Fifteenth Amendment (Ex parte Yarbrough [110 U.S. 657 (1884)]), segregation in
transportation (Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537 (1896)]), segregation in education
(Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education [175 U.S. 528 (1899)] and Berea
College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky [211 U.S. 45 (1908)]), and segregation in housing
(Buchanan v. Warley [245 U.S. 60 (1917)]). The reactionary state legislation that
followed many of these decisions suggests that white legislators of the time viewed the
Supreme Court as an indicator of what types of segregation would be deemed
acceptable.2

2

One area of discrimination not discussed in great detail in this study is the disfranchisement of African
Americans. Although the subject is touched on briefly, the extent and scope of limitations placed on voting
rights during the period from 1871 to 1917 is so great that it deserves, and has received, individual
attention. Studies that discuss the issue more specifically include: Thomas Holt, Black over White: Negro
Political Leadership in South Carolina during Reconstruction (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979);
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On the other hand, perhaps because of the belief held by many African American
leaders that all Americans shared the same history regardless of their skin color, African
American newspapers failed to offer a significant response to key United States Supreme
Court decisions between 1871 and 1917. During this forty-six year period, the Supreme
Court heard cases that dealt with the rights of African Americans to testify against
whites, the ability of blacks to sit on juries, the segregation of public transportation and
public accommodations, education segregation, and housing segregation. As the Court
presented a train of holdings that increasingly limited the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment and other Reconstruction legislation, black newspapers offered little
guidance to the black community about how to salvage as much as possible of the equal
rights they had hoped to receive.
Although political activists and educated African Americans like Woodson,
W.E.B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett reacted to many of
these decisions, it was the newspapers that had the opportunity to reach large portions of
the African American community and to lead a mobilization of efforts to protest the
Court’s potentially detrimental decisions. For the most part, however, the press failed to
bring attention to key cases that white legislators viewed as signals from the Court that
the federal government would not interfere with state and local decisions to segregate
within their communities. Through the study of approximately twenty African American
newspapers headquartered throughout the United States, it becomes clear that the
Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New
York: Basic Books, 2000); Kent Redding, Making Race, Making Power: North Carolina’s Road to
Disfranchisement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003); Glenn Feldman, The Disfranchisement
Myth: Poor Whites and Suffrage Restriction in Alabama (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2004); and,
Michael Perman, Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1908 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2004).
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newspapers’ editors often misread the importance of the Supreme Court’s holdings.
Cases that are now recognized as key turning points in the status of African Americans
went virtually ignored by the press and cases that receive little more than a footnote by
today’s historians garnered extended attention from newspapers for being either a
significant blow to the black community or for being cause for hope. By studying these
reactions, paired with trends in state and local legislation, it becomes apparent that the
Supreme Court played a significant role in enabling Jim Crow to expand and the African
American press did little to counter its effects.
Previous works have studied in great detail the Supreme Court’s decisions in
several of the cases included in this study. Nevertheless, there has been little mention of
the reactions by the African American press. John R. Howard’s The Shifting Wind: The
Supreme Court and Civil Rights from Reconstruction to Brown, for example, offers
insightful analysis of the role of the Supreme Court in shaping race relationships during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the entirety of his study, however, Howard
only refers to reactions by the black press on twelve occasions. By ignoring this group of
sources, he fails to demonstrate fully the African American community’s understanding
of the Court’s decisions and their influence on black Americans. Other studies of the
period as a whole and of specific cases have similar gaps. Thus, the primary goal of this
study is to demonstrate that the African American press’s failure to react strongly to
many of the Supreme Court’s decisions likely contributed to the increase in Jim Crowism
along with the white lawmakers’ reactionary legislation.
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Chapter One: African American and White Struggles to Define
Their Position in Post-Reconstruction Society

In 1906, in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Ed Johnson stood accused of raping Nevada
Taylor. Johnson was a black handyman without a steady job, while Taylor was a twentyone-year-old single white woman who worked in downtown Chattanooga. Within
seventeen days of the attack, the Chattanooga police department and court system had
arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced Johnson to death by hanging. His white lawyers,
Lewis Shepherd, W.G.M. Thomas, and Robert Cameron, had been assigned to the case
by the judge because of Johnson’s inability to hire an attorney of his own. Their failure
to appeal the jury’s decision at the end of the trial prompted the defendant’s father,
Skinbone Johnson, to call on attorneys Noah Parden and Styles Hutchins to pursue an
appeal on his son’s behalf. Parden and Hutchins were black attorneys and partners who
represented a majority of the black litigants in Chattanooga.3
After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of representing Johnson in an
appeal, the partners agreed to do so and turned to one of Johnson’s original attorneys,
Lewis Shepherd, who was arguably the premier lawyer in Chattanooga at the time, for
support and assistance. Subsequent to being turned away in the local court by Judge
Samuel D. McReynolds for missing the deadline to appeal, after being forestalled by

3

Mark Curiden and Leroy Phillips, Jr., Contempt of Court: The Turn-of-the-Century Lynching that
Launched a Hundred Years of Federalism (New York: Anchor Books, 1999); and, Chattanooga Times,
“Law and Order Victorious Over Overwhelming Odds,” January 26, 1906.
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McReynolds the previous day, the three men pursued Johnson’s appeal to the
Tennessee Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court in Knoxville, and, finally, to the
United States Supreme Court. In an unprecedented move, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted a stay of execution for Johnson, pending his appeal.5
The day after word of the Supreme Court’s stay reached officials in Chattanooga
and was published in the local newspapers, a white mob assisted by Chattanooga’s
Sheriff Joseph Shipp and other county officials dragged Ed Johnson from his jail cell and
lynched him on the Walnut Street Bridge. This act of defiance by Shipp and other
community leaders resulted in unprecedented contempt of court charges being filed by
the Supreme Court. In the resulting case, Shipp was found guilty of contempt against the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he continued to be viewed as a respected leader and hero
in Chattanooga by his white constituency. The mob’s actions also gained support in
Georgia where many whites supported Shipp and where “publicists used the
‘Chattanooga lesson’ to ‘show’ Georgia negroes the drastic measures white men would
commonly take ‘to protect our women.’” Officials never filed charges against Shipp and
the other mob participants for the actual crime of murdering Ed Johnson.6
In many ways, the story of Ed Johnson is but one dramatic example of the
uncertain and often powerless and dangerous situation faced by blacks in American
society in the decades following the Civil War. On the one hand, Johnson himself
represented the vast majority of southern blacks who had little education, struggled for
4

The previous day, Judge McReynolds had told the attorneys to return the following day to file Johnson’s
appeal. When they returned the next day, he told them they had missed the deadline to appeal by one day.
5
Curiden and Phillips, Contempt of Court, 130-132, 137-139; and, Chattanooga Times, “‘God Bless You
All – I Am Innocent’ Ed Johnson’s Last Words Before Being Shot to Death By a Mob Like a Dog,” March
20, 1906.
6
Curiden and Phillips, Contempt of Court; and, Charles Crowe, “Racial Massacre in Atlanta September 22,
1906,” in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April 1969), 152.
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economic security, and faced recurrent discrimination at the hands of law enforcement
officials, the courts, and, all too often, lynch mobs. The case also demands our attention,
however, because of the story of two educated African American men who, despite
facing discrimination along their career paths, had come to excel in their profession and
attained what they believed was relative security socially, economically, and politically in
Chattanooga’s growing New South community. Nevertheless, as will be shown later,
fear for their lives and an inability to maintain the security they had known for several
years ultimately forced Parden and Hutchins to leave their homes in Chattanooga because
of their participation in Johnson’s case.7
Johnson, Parden, and Hutchins all suffered as a result of the inequalities of the
southern legislative system. Despite the granting of rights to African Americans through
the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress ultimately was unable, or
unwilling, to protect these rights as southern legislators tested the waters and increasingly
tightened their hold on black southerners. The passage of segregation acts throughout the
South contributed to the continued feeling of white superiority that made many white
southerners view the rushed trials of men like Ed Johnson as adequate. Although it did
not play a direct role in the passage of such legislation, the United States Supreme Court
repeatedly sent the message to white legislators that the federal government would take a
limited approach to protecting the civil rights of black Americans. This social and
political landscape also affected men such as Parden and Hutchins who were viewed with

7

Curiden and Phillips, Contempt of Court.
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respect even by the white community, until they dared to overstep the racial boundaries
and question the white system.8
Most important, however, Johnson’s case demonstrates that while there were
some advancements made by blacks after the Civil War, this progress often was shortlived and much of it was dependent on a judicial and law enforcement system that
repeatedly ignored the written law. Ed Johnson’s case clearly showed the inability, or the
lack of determination, of the courts and law enforcement officials to protect blacks from
mob violence. Furthermore, it was just one example of the Supreme Court’s
consideration of questions of race in the Reconstruction Amendments and subsequent
legislation. Although in this case the Supreme Court made its decision in favor of the
African American defendant, its inability to enforce its decision was devastatingly
apparent. It also became evident in news coverage of the case that the vast majority of
the white citizens of Chattanooga and its surrounding areas believed the Supreme Court
did not have the right to interfere in local issues. The national black press, however,
looked at the Supreme Court’s actions with a sense of hope that the federal government
would finally take a stronger stand against lynching and against the inequalities of the
legal system. Three decades after Congress had given African Americans citizenship, the
Supreme Court had still not clarified the extent to which the federal government – and
especially the federal court system – was committed to energetic enforcement of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. As we shall see, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the balance sheet was disheartening.

8

Curiden and Phillips, Contempt of Court.
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The Deteriorating Status of African Americans, 1877-1920s

In order to appreciate the significance of Ed Johnson’s case and what it tells us
about African Americans’ status at the start of the twentieth century and about the role of
the United States Supreme Court in shaping white relations with blacks, it is necessary
first to understand the changes that occurred for blacks following the end of the Civil
War. Unarguably, the Civil War and Reconstruction marked the most dramatic shift in
the legal, social, and political status of a single group in United States history. In a period
of less than two decades, African Americans went from being the property of others and
from being considered by many to be less than human to being equal citizens . . . at least
on paper. Nevertheless, between the Civil War’s end and the United States’ entrance into
World War I in 1917, African Americans experienced an often-bewildering rise and
simultaneous fall in their status within American society. The uncertainty of the period
came from the desires of African Americans to find a place of equality in society while
many white Americans tried to maintain a position of superiority. For both groups,
questions of “place” and “status” arose in all aspects of life forcing them to sort through
puzzling messages to figure out what American society considered acceptable behavior
by and towards blacks.9 The assortment of messages coming from national, state, and
local leaders led to the uncertain nature of African Americans’ state and, ultimately, to an
increase in extralegal violence exacted upon blacks by whites. Regardless of the initial

9

For a discussion of the role of gender in the development of behavior trends between whites and African
Americans during this period, see Glenda Gilmore’s Gender and Jim Crow (1996). For a collection of
essays that addresses the interactions of race, class, and gender in the post-Civil War South, see Local
Matters: Race, Crime, and Justice in the Nineteenth Century South (2001), edited by Christopher Waldrep
and Donald G. Nieman.
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improvements achieved by and for blacks during Reconstruction, laws were unable to
force changes in the long-held beliefs of many white Americans, both southern and
northern, about the inferiority of blacks. Evidence of this emerged in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries as American blacks faced a general decline, sprinkled with a
few bright spots of improvement, in their status. Their loss of political, legal, and social
rights, most clearly showed this decline, as did the disturbing rise in incidents of racial
violence.
Because African Americans did not immediately reach a status of full equality in
all spheres, but rather experienced gains and losses, there is no clear answer to the
question of when segregation began and how African Americans fared in society. In The
Strange Career of Jim Crow, C. Vann Woodward addressed the question of when
segregation truly developed with his thesis that during the period immediately following
emancipation de facto segregation existed as many blacks and whites voluntarily and
deliberately separated themselves, but that it was not until the 1890s that de jure
segregation took hold in the region. He argued that during the period of Redemption,
blacks and whites coexisted in a largely peaceful and pleasant manner until whites
decided to pass legislation restricting the rights of blacks.10 Woodward, however, had a
definite agenda in his writing and hoped to show through his evidence that segregation
was not an inevitability in the South. Because of his focus on class, he largely discounted
the effects of Supreme Court decisions from the 1870s through the 1890s on the
10

The period of Redemption refers to the period after Reconstruction when the Democratic Party regained
control of the U.S. South. The term was frequently used by white southerners to signify their region’s
efforts to redeem itself after being controlled by northerners and Republicans. Among the books that
discuss the period of Redemption are Stephen V. Ash’s Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 18601870: War and Peace in the Upper South (2006), John Hope Franklin’s Reconstruction after the Civil War
(1994), Donald G. Nieman’s African Americans and Southern Politics from Redemption to
Disfranchisement (1994), and Nicholas Lehmann’s Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War (2006).
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development of segregation as he halfheartedly dedicated less than two pages of his
landmark work to the topic. In actuality, many freed slaves did experience some
improvement in their position in the South, only to later experience devastating reversals
in their status. Many of these reversals came even before Reconstruction ended and in
the 1880s, and often they resulted from decisions made by the Supreme Court in what
proved to be key civil rights cases.11
Politically, blacks experienced unprecedented freedom and power from the late
1860s through the early 1880s. Many blacks participated in state constitutional
conventions in 1867 and 1868 by helping to write new laws, many of which repealed
existing black codes. Also, during Reconstruction and the 1880s, a number of blacks ran
for and won positions as U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, and state political
officers.12

11

C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow [Third Revised Edition] (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978).
12

In the Senate, both Hiram R. Revels (R-Mississippi, 1870-1871) and Blanche K. Bruce (RMississippi, 1875-1881) served. African American members of the U.S. House of
Representatives during the same period included Joseph Rainey (R-SC, 1870-1879), Jefferson
Long (R-GA, 1871), Robert Elliott (R-SC, 1871-1874), Robert De Large (R-SC, 1871-1873),
Benjamin Turner (R-AL, 1871-1873), Josiah Walls (R-FL, 1871-1877), Richard Cain (R-SC,
1873-1875; 1877-1879), John Lynch (R-MI, 1873-1877; 1882-1883), James Rapier (R-AL, 18731875), Alonzo Ransier (R-SC, 1873-1875), Jeremiah Haralson (R-AL, 1875-1877), John Hyman
(R-NC, 1875-1877), Charles Nash (R-LA, 1875-1877), Robert Smalls (R-SC, 1875-1879; 18821883; 1884-1887), James O'Hara (R-NC, 1883-1887), Henry Cheatham (R-NC, 1889-1893), John
Langston (R-VA, 1890-1891), and Thomas Miller (R-SC, 1890-1891). It is important to note that
only one African Americans congressman, John Lynch, came from a northern state. This
suggests that although many northerners pushed the South to accept blacks as political equals
they were not necessarily ready to do so themselves.
For more information on African American participation in Reconstruction politics, see
Monroe N. Work, Thomas S. Staples, et al., “Some Negro Members of Reconstruction
Conventions and Legislatures and of Congress,” in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 5, No. 1
(Jan. 1920), 63-119.
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Among the most well-known black politicians of the era were Hiram R. Revels
and Blanche K. Bruce of Mississippi. Revels was a native of North Carolina who was
born free, was educated in Indiana and Illinois, and became a minister in 1845. In 1870,
he became the first African American U.S. Senator. Bruce was born a slave in Virginia,
but was treated fairly well by his owner and father. During the Civil War, Bruce taught
briefly at Oberlin College in Ohio before moving to Missouri and establishing the state’s
first school for blacks. Although he was the second African American Senator, he was
the first to serve a complete term. One successful state officer was Styles Hutchins who
later became nationally recognized for his role in the Supreme Court case surrounding Ed
Johnson’s lynching in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in 1906. Hutchins served as a
Republican representative in the Tennessee General Assembly beginning in 1886.13
Other African Americans gained appointed positions in the government,
demonstrating that for at least some blacks the Reconstruction Amendments brought
improved status. For example, in 1880, Richard Etheridge became the first African
American appointed to command a major U.S. government installation when he became
the keeper of the Pea Island Life-Saving Station in North Carolina. The station was “the
first and only all-black station in the history of the U.S. Lifesaving Service,” which was
the precursor to the modern Coast Guard. Isaac Myers, a native of Baltimore whom
Frederick Douglass mentored, received a federal appointment to become a messenger for
the customs service in 1870, and in 1872 he became the supervisor of mail service to the
13

Information about the backgrounds and politics of both Hiram R. Revels and Blanche K. Bruce has been
frequently discussed throughout the twentieth century. Studies include Alrutheus Taylor’s “Negro
Congressmen a Generation After” (The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 7, No. 2 [April 1922]), Elizabeth
Lawson’s The Gentleman from Mississippi (1961), Samuel Shapiro’s “A Black Senator from Mississippi:
Blanche K. Bruce (1841-1898)” (The Review of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 [Jan. 1982]), Lawrence Graham’s
The Senator and the Socialite: The True Story of America’s First Black Dynasty (2006), and Willard B.
Gatewood’s Aristocrats of Color: The Black Elite, 1880-1920 (1990).
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southern states. Each of these men, whether elected or appointed, reflects the effect of
the Fifteenth Amendment that gave African Americans throughout the entire U.S. the
right to vote in 1870, although in some states, such as Tennessee, blacks were already
exercising this right. With the Amendment’s ratification, Congress seemingly opened the
doors of opportunity for the newly freed slaves to gain political equality.14
Although the Reconstruction Amendments drafted in the 1860s legally ended
slavery and presumably drew new legal guidelines for the treatment of African
Americans, the white South was determined to develop new means of organizing its
racially disparate society. Throughout the era, white southerners often perceived federal
legislation, such as the Reconstruction Amendments, as proof that northerners planned to
dictate to them how they should deal with the large southern black population. Isolated
state laws such as an 1865 Mississippi statute restricting first class rail transportation to
whites and an 1875 Alabama state constitutional provision for the establishment of
separate schools for whites and blacks demonstrated that white southerners did not intend
to abide by the spirit of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation or the postwar
Reconstruction Amendments. These examples also suggest a flaw in Woodward’s
argument that de jure segregation did not take hold until the 1890s. Rather the southern
states’ taste for segregation may simply have taken temporary cover, because these
southern states were not in a position to excessively challenge Congress and
Reconstruction leaders. Their vulnerability could be seen particularly in the requirements
set before the former Confederate states for readmission to the United States which
14

David Wright and David Zoby, “Ignoring Jim Crow: The Turbulent Appointment of Richard Etheridge
and the Pea Island Lifesavers,” in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Spring 1995), 67. Also
see Wright and Zoby’s monograph, Fire on the Beach: Recovering the Lost Story of Richard Etheridge and
the Pea Island Lifesavers (2000) for more details.
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included the stipulations that each state had to ratify the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments before it could be readmitted to the Union.
The first of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Thirteenth (1865), made slavery
illegal and went largely uncontested in the South because the conclusion of the Civil War
had already more or less ended the institution. Therefore, by the end of 1865 all but two
of the former Confederate states had ratified the amendment. The only two that had not
were Texas, which finally ratified it in February 1870, and Mississippi, which rejected
the amendment on December 4, 1865, two days before it gained the support of enough
states to become law.15
Over the next two years, several events demonstrated the inconsistent position of
African Americans in society. To start with, just weeks after the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, a group of Confederate veterans gathered in Pulaski, Tennessee,
to create the first Ku Klux Klan. An early organizational meeting with the group’s
eventual leader, Nathan Bedford Forrest, took place in the kitchen of Minor and Elizabeth
Avery Meriwether’s home in Memphis.16 The primary goal of the Ku Klux Klan was to
oppose Reconstruction, which meant they tried to establish their authority over
carpetbaggers and scalawags as well as southern blacks. Although they organized
themselves on the pretense of challenging Republicans on political issues, they quickly
turned to the use of violence and intimidation against their opponents. Given its purpose,
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the mere existence of the Ku Klux Klan signaled a challenge to African Americans’
efforts to achieve equality.17
Another indication that black Americans would not easily achieve full political
equality came in early 1866. On February 2, Frederick Douglass led a delegation of
black leaders in a meeting with President Andrew Johnson at the White House. The
delegation’s goal was to garner Johnson’s support for universal black suffrage. The
president, however, expressed his strong opposition to the idea and the meeting ended in
controversy. There were also multiple incidents of mass violence against African
Americans in 1866. In May, forty-six blacks died after white civilians and police officers
attacked them in Memphis. The white attackers also burned almost a hundred houses,
twelve schools, and four churches. Several months later, another massacre took place in
New Orleans where police officers raided a meeting of black and white Republicans and
killed more than forty of the participants. The officers also wounded more than 150
others.
Despite these setbacks for African Americans, there were also a few positive
events in the period after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification. First, Congress
overrode President Johnson’s veto and passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on April 9.
The primary purpose of the law was “to protect all Persons in the United States in their
Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication.” The Act declared that all
people born in the United States, regardless of their race or color, were citizens of the
country and should “have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
17
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States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.” The legislation also made it illegal for any person to subject a citizen
to laws or customs that violated the rights previously stated. Those convicted of violating
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could be fined up to $1000 or imprisoned for up to one year.
Two months later, Congress once again offered African Americans a sense of hope when
it approved the Fourteenth Amendment for consideration by the states. Finally, Congress
again went against President Johnson by overriding another of his vetoes and granted
African American residents of the District of Columbia the right to vote.18
From its proposal on June 13, 1866, to its ratification on July 9, 1868, the
Fourteenth Amendment faced stronger opposition from the South than its predecessor.
The amendment stated, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.” The amendment also made it illegal for states to limit the rights of United States
citizens or deprive these citizens of their rights to life, liberty, and property without the
due process of law. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed citizens equal
protection of the laws and gave Congress the ability to pass laws to enforce this
guarantee. Of the Reconstruction Amendments, this one became the most hotly contested
18
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in the courts because it essentially created a new group of citizens that was instantly
eligible for all of the rights, and the protection of these rights, previously afforded almost
exclusively to white Americans. When Congress originally presented the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states for ratification, President Andrew Johnson suggested that
southern states would not be required to ratify the amendment as a criterion for
readmission to the United States. Johnson’s opinion, however, ran contrary to that held
by Radical Republicans in Congress who made the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment a requirement for readmission. The only southern state to respond positively
to this criterion was Tennessee. Initially, all other southern states also ratified the
amendment, but they did so grudgingly and with a sense of frustration toward the
North.19
In between the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, African
Americans continued to experience both advances and setbacks in their quest for equality
and acceptance as American citizens. On the one hand, both the first black Senator and
the first black diplomat took their places in the government. Ebenezer Don Carlos
Bassett became the first African American diplomat when President Ulysses S. Grant
appointed him minister to Haiti on April 6, 1869. American presidents, both Republican
and Democratic, followed suit in appointing blacks as ministers to Haiti and Liberia for
several years afterwards. The following year, Hiram R. Revels took his seat as the first
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African American senator. Although he only represented Mississippi for one year, his
presence in Congress made many black leaders and citizens believe that political equality
was attainable. On the other hand, black Americans in the South continued to face
significant violence. Another massacre in Louisiana, the Opelousas Massacre, took the
lives of nearly two hundred African Americans in September 1868. Many of the whites
who participated in the massacre were Confederate veterans and prominent citizens of the
city. The events that led to the slaughter began when a small group of white men
attacked a young man named Emerson Bentley. Bentley, who was not a native of
Louisiana, edited the city’s Republican newspaper and taught for the Freedmen’s Bureau.
Although Bentley was white, several local blacks tried to help him during the attack. The
sheriff had twelve of them arrested, taken into custody, and hung that night. To make
sure blacks in the area did not react with violence to the event, armed white men searched
the area for the next several days as part of a “Negro hunt.” By the time both sides
settled down, there had been over two hundred black casualties.20
The federal government ratified the last of the Reconstruction Amendments on
March 30, 1870. The Fifteenth Amendment provided recently freed slaves with the right
to vote by making it illegal for this right to be limited by race, color, or previous status as
a slave. This amendment again faced opposition in some southern states, such as
Tennessee that rejected it on November 11, 1869. This was actually a step backwards for
black Tennesseans who had received the right to vote from the state in 1867 and
participated in statewide elections that August. One of the primary arguments against the
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Fifteenth Amendment was that it would inevitably take away the rights of states to pass
laws and regulate voting within their own borders. The southern perception that the
Reconstruction Amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, and other legislation of the
period were being forced upon them by the North led to increased resentment, but also
led to amplified efforts to exert racial control over blacks.21
The same year the Fifteenth Amendment gained enough support to be ratified,
Charles Sumner and Benjamin Butler proposed a new civil rights act to Congress.
Sumner and Butler, both of whom were Radical Republicans who had opposed Andrew
Johnson’s Reconstruction policies for being too generous to the South, believed the
federal government needed to do more to protect the rights of African Americans. The
proposed act was intended to grant all citizens equal access to accommodations in “inns,
public conveyance on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement.”
Sumner left Congress and then passed away on March 11, 1874, prior to the act’s
passage. Shortly before his death, he reportedly asked friends to “save my civil rights
bill.” Despite Sumner’s death, Butler continued to push the bill in Congress until it
gained enough support to be passed in February 1875. President Grant signed the new
Civil Rights Act into law on March 1, 1875. Although at the time of its passage the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 offered African Americans another reason for hope, it ended up being
the last real attempt by the federal government, until well into the twentieth century, to
protect the equality of black citizens.22
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In light of events in the latter half of the 1860s and the early 1870s, many
blacks in both the North and South became increasingly aware that social equality was
still a distant prospect. Although many freed slaves did experience some improvement in
their social position in the South following the Civil War, indicated by increased
enrollment of black children in public schools during the 1870s and by the establishment
of black institutions such as churches and colleges, it soon became clear that this too
would be limited. Black student enrollment in South Carolina rose from 33,834 to
72,853 between 1871 and 1880. During the same period, Mississippi black student
enrollment increased from 45,429 to 123,710. Although these numbers continued to
represent only a small percentage of school-aged children in these states, this upsurge of
black student enrollment suggested that a higher percentage of black children were able
to obtain an education as the decade progressed and, thus, were likely to be better
prepared to further improve their lives. Similar limited improvements were seen in black
land ownership statistics for the period and in the number of black officeholders.23
Despite these indications of limited improvements for black Americans, the lack
of true social equality soon became evident through African Americans’ daily
interactions with whites who refused to extend common courtesies to them and in the
frequent use of de facto segregation even where laws did not require it. Even before laws
required the separation of the races in most public spaces, such division was the accepted
custom in many areas. While blacks accepted, and even supported, separation in some
23
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areas of their lives, such as churches and parks, this does not suggest that they agreed
with the onslaught of restrictions placed upon them in coming decades by southern white
legislators. As is generally accepted today, the acceptance of traditionally black churches
and traditionally white churches should not be equated to agreement with a law requiring
such separation. Furthermore, black support of separation based on the social norms of
the times was not equivalent to endorsing restrictions that would affect their livelihood
and limit their security.
As Neil McMillen explains in Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of
Jim Crow, the color line in the New South was initially drawn by tradition more than it
was drawn by laws. The “traditional” segregation was visible throughout the region in
such issues as the use, or non-use, of courtesy titles. McMillen states, “In Mississippi, as
elsewhere in the South, good manners were emphasized from birth and even close friends
often addressed each other formally. Black Mississippians, on the other hand, were
generally called – even by much younger whites – only by their first names, nicknames,
or simply ‘boy’ or ‘girl.’” In Virginia, social segregation also remained the norm, as
white Virginians hoped to prevent the intermarriage and the “mongrelization” of the two
races. The existence of de facto segregation enabled white southerners to wield power
over African Americans without having to work directly within the ever-changing legal
system.24
Despite the continued development of de facto segregation, in the legal sphere,
African Americans experienced an initial flurry of new rights afforded them first by the
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Reconstruction Amendments and then by other federal, state, and local legislation
geared towards providing them with some of the basic rights of citizenship.
Nevertheless, many of these improvements in their legal standing were short-lived and
began to disappear as Reconstruction ended and white southerners regained control of
their state legislatures. The right to vote gained in 1870 with the Fifteenth Amendment
quickly disappeared in much of the South under limitations created by grandfather
clauses which often restricted voting rights to citizens who had been eligible to vote in
1867 and 1868, and to their descendents. In addition, after a short period where laws
supporting African Americans’ rights passed in some state legislatures, a shift away from
equality became increasingly apparent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as more and more laws passed restricting black usage of public transportation, public
facilities, and parks among other things. Boundaries were also progressively placed on
residential neighborhoods limiting where blacks could live.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, white southerners increasingly passed
Jim Crow laws meant to both intimidate and isolate blacks through legal segregation.
These legislative efforts show an attempt to push African Americans out of American
society similar to the long-term attempts to push Native Americans away. These new
laws applied to all blacks and gave authority in matters of race relations to cities and
states rather than to the federal government. Just as de facto segregation evolved and
became more complex over time, these de jure provisions appeared in cycles, as whites
tested the waters to determine what the courts and society would deem acceptable. As
the cycle of laws continued, it became clear that there was an assumption of black
inferiority in the courts that only led to an increase in the number of Jim Crow laws.
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Evidence of such an opinion in the United States Supreme Court became evident as
cases related to the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1875
reached the courtroom.
Mississippi was one of the first states to test the system to determine how far it
could go in limiting the rights of blacks. White leaders hoped to use individual pieces of
legislation to see exactly what the northern dominated Congress and Supreme Court
would allow. By testing the legislative and judicial landscape of the country in this
manner, they could slowly determine how much slack was available for them to
reestablish their dominant status in the region. White legislators in Mississippi passed the
first Jim Crow law in 1865, but it was repealed in 1870 as the state tried to gain
readmission to the Union. The law restricted the use of first class rail transportation to
whites. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, Mississippians passed additional pieces of
legislation addressing issues such as the segregation of polling places, the segregation of
health care in the state, and the segregation of education. Although there had been earlier
social segregation of the polls in Mississippi, usually enforced through fraud and the use
of force, the 1890 state constitution supported the legal segregation of the polls and
encouraged the disfranchisement of blacks by requiring a reading test for voter
qualification. The state constitution, which became a model for most other southern
states, also prohibited students with “one drop” of black blood from receiving an
education in the same classrooms as white students. Furthermore, the constitution
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specifically prohibited whites from marrying persons with one-eighth or more of black
blood.25
In other states, such as South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, laws dealing
with the segregation of railroad passengers emerged as a way to maintain the racially
inferior status of blacks. As Edward L. Ayers explains in The Promise of the New South:
Life after Reconstruction, “the railroads became the scenes of the first statewide
segregation laws throughout the South.” As the trains were often already divided into
two types of cars, a “smoking” car and a “ladies” car, many believed it would be a
relatively easy transition to “white” and “colored” cars. In South Carolina, the first law
restricting access of blacks to the railways was introduced in 1889. It was not until 1898,
however, that such a law actually made it through the South Carolina senate because
railway companies strongly opposed such a measure that would place additional burdens
on the already overtaxed railroads. According to Ayers, “railroad companies did not
want to be bothered with policing southern race relations and considered the division of
coaches into black and white compartments as irksome and unnecessary expense.” The
law that finally did pass “provided that separate first-class coaches or apartments
‘separated by a substantial partition,’ should be provided for passengers on all railroads
more than forty miles in length.” Just two years later, the state legislature passed another
law that placed the races in separate cars entirely. North Carolina passed a similar law in
1899 that also applied to steamboats and Virginia passed a railroad segregation law in
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1900. As more and more states passed legislation segregating the railroads, “most
interstate rail lines simplified their operations [in the South] by segregating all their
riders, interstate as well as local, through the use of their own Jim Crow regulations for
interstate travelers.”26
The increase in railroad segregation was a critical step in the ability of white
southerners to expand segregation as it led to segregation occurring even in places where
it was not required by law, thus making it even more difficult for black Americans to
attain equality. Once railroads were segregated in some states and the railroad companies
decided to simplify the process by segregating their entire routes, it was easier for whites
to call for segregated facilities, including restrooms and restaurants, at railway stations.
From there, the segregation spread outward to other areas of the towns. Whites often
claimed that although separate from whites, the accommodations available for blacks
were equal to those available for everyone else.
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, although many of these laws appear to have
been in violation of federal statutes, the Supreme Court continued a trend of limiting civil
rights protections for blacks when it upheld such company regulations with its decision
that company rules and regulations segregating the railways were reasonable in Chiles v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway (1910). According to the facts of the case, J. Alexander
Chiles, a black man, purchased a first-class ticket to travel from Washington, D.C. to
Lexington, Kentucky. In Ashland, Kentucky, he changed cars and was told he had to
move to a car “set apart for colored passengers.” Chiles argued that he was an interstate
26
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passenger with a valid first-class ticket that entitled him to passage in the car
designated for ladies and gentlemen. To the Supreme Court, he contended that his
removal to the segregated compartment for blacks was based on a Kentucky statute
which essentially violated interstate commerce laws. The defendant, the Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway Company, defended its actions against Chiles as being in line with
company regulations, not a state statute. In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Joseph
McKenna stated, “we must keep in mind that we are not dealing with the law of a state
attempting a regulation of interstate commerce beyond its power to make. We are
dealing with the act of a private person, to wit, the railroad company; and the distinction
between the state and interstate commerce we think is unimportant.” McKenna thus
demonstrated that the Court sided with the defendant regarding the central issue at hand.
McKenna concluded that as in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) the Court had considered the
reasonableness of legislation, the reasonableness of a carrier’s regulations should also be
considered because “[r]egulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the
community for whom they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be said to be
unreasonable.” To this end, the Court decided in favor of the railroad company with only
Justice John Marshall Harlan supporting Chiles.27
Segregation legislation soon swept throughout much of the South. In Tennessee,
for example, laws passed in the early 1900s affected blacks in nearly every aspect of their
lives. According to Lester C. Lamon in Black Tennesseans, 1900-1930, the first decade
of the century was particularly difficult, as
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the Maryville College Law of 1901 closed the one remaining loophole that
permitted interracial education; the Jim Crow streetcar law solidified
segregation on public conveyances in 1905; and politically, the growing
‘lily white’ forces in the Republican Party, the increased rigidity of the de
facto Democratic primary, and the trend toward the commission form of
municipal government between 1908 and 1913 eliminated blacks from
elective office and, in many cases, negated their opportunities for political
participation.
This legislative record in Tennessee reflected not only the move toward transportation
segregation, but also towards segregation in education and politics.28
The Tennessee Education Segregation Act of 1901, sometimes referred to as the
Maryville College Law, finalized efforts to segregate schools in the state at a time when
other states throughout the country were doing the same. The statute declared it unlawful
for any educational institution in the state to allow black and white students to attend the
same school. Violators of the law faced fines of $50 and imprisonment from thirty days
to six months. This law made it impossible for schools that practiced non-exclusionary
admissions such as Maryville College and Knoxville College, both in East Tennessee, as
well as Fisk University and Roger Williams College to continue without segregating. A
similar law passed in Kentucky in 1904 also prohibited schools from teaching both white
and black students. It did, however, allow private colleges to educate both races as long
as there were two branches of the school at least twenty-five miles apart from each other.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Kentucky law in Berea College v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky (1908) when the Court decided that state legislatures did have the right to force
private schools to segregate. This decision, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter
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Four, essentially negated the Court’s own standard of “separate but equal” facilities
established in its Plessy v. Ferguson decision only twelve years earlier.29
Both northern and western legislatures also encouraged the use of separate
schools for blacks and whites to varying extents. In New Jersey and Indiana, for
example, there were both segregated and integrated schools, while other states, including
Kansas, required segregation at the elementary school level. An Ohio state law gave
individual school districts the discretion to create segregated schools if they believed it
was in the best interest of their students. Historian John Hope Franklin explains that
although these states did not enforce segregation as strictly as did the South, “separate
schools . . . contributed to the perpetuation of a leadership that was devoted not only to
the idea of separate education but also to the maintenance of economic and political
inequalities between white and black populations.”30
With the segregation of railroads and schools relatively established, legislators
throughout the South also passed laws supporting residential segregation; the first of
these passed in Baltimore, Louisville, Richmond, and Atlanta between 1910 and 1913. In
Virginia, an act noting, "the preservation of the public morals, public health and public
order, in the cities and towns of this commonwealth is endangered by the residence of
white and colored people in close proximity to one another," made it possible for cities
and towns to create “segregation districts.” Such pieces of legislation became
increasingly popular as American cities grew. White urban residents believed it was
necessary to place restrictions on where African Americans could live in order to protect
their own families, jobs, and homes. Quite often, the restrictions began simply by
29
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designating “black blocks” and “white blocks” based on current residents. Officials
determined each area’s designation based on whether more blacks or more whites already
lived in the area. Then they restricted each group from moving to a block designated for
the other race. Eventually, with the resultant out-migration of the minority race on each
block, segregated white and black neighborhoods emerged. These ordinances often led to
unsanitary living conditions for many of the blacks living in urban areas because they
only had access to a small percentage of blocks. Their neighborhoods were also often
located in the less desirable and less convenient areas of the city. 31
Residential segregation did not take long to spread into other regions of the
country. By 1917, Wilmington, Delaware, city laws allowed real estate developers to
include restrictions against non-white buyers in their deeds. Following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Buchanan v. Warley, which is discussed in Chapter Five, a 1927
Chicago law allowed for racially restrictive housing covenants in the city – even though
the city was already largely segregated. Similar laws directed at Chinese residents of
California cities gained popularity beginning in the 1890s. Despite the existence of
similar laws throughout much of the country by the end of the 1920s, such residential
segregation remained surprisingly absent through many areas of South Carolina,
including Beaufort and Charleston, where blacks and whites often lived in close
proximity to each other.32
As African Americans faced a decline in their legal rights, they also noticed a
reduction in the political rights they had attained during Reconstruction. In particular,
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they faced efforts by several groups of whites to disfranchise them. Each group had
different reasons for wanting to limit black access to the polls, ranging from economics to
politics to racism, but regardless of their different motivations, each group contributed to
efforts that ultimately stripped blacks of their ability to participate actively in the political
process. By disfranchising African Americans, whites essentially guaranteed that black
representation in all levels of government would be severely limited.
Initial challenges to blacks’ political rights often came from southern legislators
struggling to redefine their own position in society whose efforts were bolstered by courts
that failed to uphold many of the civil liberties recently extended to African Americans.
These white legislators hoped to regain power and control they perceived as lost to
meddlesome northerners and opportunistic blacks who temporarily held positions of
power during Reconstruction. The 1890 Mississippi Constitution included a provision
that required would-be voters to pass a reading test and to prove payment of their taxes.
In 1898, the case of Williams v. Mississippi used the issue of the all-white jury to
challenge this provision on the grounds that it was a direct attempt to disfranchise blacks
and, thus, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint challenged both
the reading and tax conditions of the provision, but paid particular attention to the reading
requirement. The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioners, however, and said that
although there was little doubt that the officials carrying out the reading test for voting
qualification would misuse their power to disfranchise a higher proportion of blacks than
whites, the law was not specifically worded to support this action and, thus, was
constitutional. In his majority opinion, Justice Joseph McKenna wrote

32
It is not asserted by the plaintiff in error that either the constitution of the state
or its laws discriminate in terms against the [N]egro race, either as to the
elective franchise or the privilege or duty of sitting on juries. These
results, if we understand the plaintiff in error, are alleged to be affected by
the powers vested in certain administrative officials. . . . Besides the
operation of the constitution and laws is not limited by their language or
effects to one race. They reach weak and vicious white men as well as
weak and vicious black men, and whatever is sinister in their intention, if
anything, can be prevented by both races by the exertion of that duty
which voluntarily pays taxes and refrains from crime. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the denial of the equal protection of the laws arises
primarily from the constitution and laws of Mississippi; nor is there any
sufficient allegation of an evil and discriminating administration of them.
This case, among others, sent a message to both blacks and whites that the Supreme
Court did not intend to strictly enforce the Reconstruction Amendments; the door was
open for whites to further limit the political rights of blacks.33

The Rise of Extralegal Violence against African Americans

Once whites had in effect disfranchised blacks, African Americans were no longer
able to vote against segregation, thus ensuring white dominance in the New South for
decades to come. During the four decades from 1890 to 1930, every state in the South
passed legislation aimed at disfranchising blacks. Like the provision in the 1890
Mississippi Constitution, these laws often had the side effect of disfranchising poor
whites as well. Although most of the men in office viewed this as an acceptable
outcome, it contributed to poor white resentment of blacks that became one motivation

33

Williams v. State of Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Miller, The Petitioners, 132, 159, 299.

33
for white violence against blacks. Fear of violence against white women and children
by black men was another key cause of racial violence.
Such violence represented the most dramatic evidence of the power relationships
between blacks and whites as the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth century
began. Although lynching, defined as “the practice of citizens taking the law into their
own hands to end the lives of other citizens who stepped outside the social norms,”
remained more widespread in the South, the practice occurred throughout the country. In
1892 alone, over two hundred Americans, the majority of whom were African
Americans, fell victim to lynch mobs. Among the crimes attached to the victims were
murder, rape, arson, and theft [See Table 1: 1892 Lynching Record]. Quite often,
however, the lynch mobs could not prove the guilt of their victims for any crime, only
that they were black.34
In August 1904, a series of events occurred in Georgia that demonstrated the
extent to which lynching had become a common means of crowd justice in the South. In
a period of just fifteen days, eight people, all of them African Americans, lost their lives
at the hands of angry white mobs. While three of the lynchings, those of Rufus Leseure
for assault, Jason Glover for rape, and Scott for murder, appear to have occurred
independently of the other five, their occurrence alone would have been enough to
suggest that mob justice prevailed in the state. The other five cases, however, related to
each other in a way that revealed the unquestionable acceptance of mob justice in the
South.
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Table 1: 1892 Lynching Record

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New York
N. Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
S. Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
TOTAL

Blacks
19
0
19
1
8
16
0
0
2
9
22
1
15
1
0
1
3
2
0
5
17
10
5
0
5
1
162*

Whites
5
2
7
3
0
3
8
1
1
1
5
0
1
3
4
0
2
1
1
0
6
1
2
4
0
7
68

Murder
12
---10
3
4
5
------2
5
19
---4
2
------4
2
---3
8
1
4
4
5
---97

Rape
4
1
8
---1
9
------1
5
3
1
3
1
---1
1
---------11
6
3
---------59

Arson
3
---------1
---------------------2
------------------1
------------------7

Robbery
3
2
------1
3
8
---------------1
---4
------------1
2
------------5
30

Prejudice
------4
------1
------------1
---------------------------1
---------------7

Assault
1
---2
---------------------------------------------------------------------3

Unclassified
1
---2
1
1
1
---1
------4
---6
1
---------1
1
---1
4
---------3
28

Total
24
3
26
4
8
19
8
1
3
10
27
1
16
4
4
1
5
3
1
5
23
11
7
4
5
8
231

The December 31, 1904 edition of the Chicago Tribune recounted the events of
August 1904 in Georgia. The series of lynching incidents began on August 16 when
For the brutal murder of a white family (the Hodges family) at
Statesboro’, Georgia, Two Negroes, Paul Reed and Will Cato, were
burned alive in the presence of a large crowd. They had been duly
convicted and sentenced, when the mob broke into the courtroom and
carried them away, in spite of the plea of a brother of the murdered man,
who was present in the court, that the law be allowed to take its course.
None of the lynchers were [sic] ever indicted.
Reed and Cato were almost assuredly guilty of murdering Henry and Claudia Hodges as
well as their children, Kittie Corrine, Harmon, and Talmadge, who burned to death in
their home. Although lynching incidents like this one quite often occurred without any
further ramifications, in this case the population of Statesboro was not ready to let the
issue rest. One day after the lynching of Cato and Reed, two more blacks lost their lives.
The Tribune explained: “Because of the race prejudice growing out of the Hodges murder
by Reed and Cato and their lynching, Albert Roger and his son were lynched at
Statesboro’, Ga., August 17, for being Negroes.” Roger and his son died on August 17,
1904, not for committing a crime, but simply because they were black and in Statesboro
where racial tensions were running high.35
The aftermath of the Cato and Reed lynching also led to the whippings of several
blacks and to the continued presence of violence in the region for several weeks. Whites
justified their actions by accusing the blacks of everything from being a “smart nigger” to
riding a bicycle on the sidewalk to simply having the wrong color skin. The Cato and
Reed lynching influenced the emotions of many white Georgians, leading them to believe
that they needed to take justice into their own hands in order to guarantee their own
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safety and that of their families. A full fifteen days after the Cato and Reed lynching,
another man, Sebastian McBride, lost his life because the white citizens of Statesboro
were still determined to prove that they had control of the black population. On August
30, “On account of the race riots which grew out of the [Hodges] murder . . . and
lynching, McBride, a respectable Negro of Portal, Ga., was beaten, kicked and shot to
death for trying to defend his wife, who was confined with a baby, three days old, from a
whipping at the hands of a crowd of white men.” It became evident that neither McBride
nor his wife had committed any crime to instigate the attacks upon them and, in a rare
move, a small group of white men viewed the attack on them as criminal. As McBride
lay dying, they asked him to identify his attackers and later arrested four white men for
the assault, although the courts never punished them. As with Roger and his son, the
white Georgians who attacked McBride viewed him as a threat simply because of the
color of his skin and despite evidence that he had committed no discernible crime.36
In Following the Color Line: An Account of Negro Citizenship in the American
Democracy, well-known muckraker Ray Stannard Baker discussed the events of August
1904 in Statesboro, Georgia, in more detail. According to Baker, who was one of the
first American journalists to discuss the gap between the races, Statesboro was a town
that epitomized the New South in the way it developed “almost exclusively by the energy
of Southerners and with Southern money,” and in its population which he described as
“pure American.” On the afternoon of the Hodges murders, Henry drove to a neighbor’s
house to pick up Kittie Corrine and bring her home. According to Baker, “No Southern
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white farmer, especially in thinly settled regions like Bulloch County [where
Statesboro is located], dares permit any woman or girl of his family to go out anywhere
alone, for fear of the criminal Negro. . . . It is absolutely necessary to understand this
point of view before one can form a true judgment upon conditions in the South.” Henry
Hodges’s precautions went unrewarded, however, as two African Americans attacked
him upon his return home, then subsequently murdered his wife, and ransacked their
home before leaving the scene. Officials believed that later that evening the two
criminals returned to the Hodges’ home to cover up their crime when Kittie Corrine came
out from hiding, likely believing friendly neighbors had come to help. The two men beat
her to death and then burned the house with the bodies of Henry, Claudia, and Kittie
Corrine Hodges inside, as well as the other two children who were likely still alive at the
time. The crime struck at the nerves of a white society that placed ultimate importance
on its ability to protect their women and children. The day after the murders, officials
arrested Paul Reed and Will Cato, along with several other suspects, for the murders.37
Many citizens of Statesboro called for the “calm and proper enforcement of the
law,” but ultimately mob justice prevailed. During the preliminary phase of the legal
process, authorities transferred the black suspects to a jail in Savannah in an effort to
prevent a lynching; once indictments were made, the suspects were returned to Statesboro
for the trial. In the days leading up to and during the trial, several white members of the
community became increasingly vocal about their anger towards the suspects and about
their belief that “somehow the courts and the law were not to be trusted to punish the
criminals properly.” This was an emotion Baker claims to have seen often in towns in
37
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which lynchings had taken place. Although Cato and Reed received hanging
sentences, many observers believed actual punishment was uncertain. A mob then
overtook the courthouse, seized the two prisoners, and took them up the road where they
were bound to a stump and burned. Throughout the event, the mob allowed a
photographer to take pictures of themselves and the prisoners. Then, after Cato and Reed
burned, the mob participants fought for souvenirs.38
Baker concluded that “the law of the mob, [is] that it never stops with the thing it
sets out to do,” and that Statesboro was no different in this case. After the mob lynched
Cato and Reed, the white community continued to express its animosity against blacks in
the area. This hostility revealed itself in the days following the lynching as other blacks
were whipped or beaten for “offenses” such as riding a bicycle on a sidewalk and
“seeking legal punishment for the men who whipped his daughters.” Not only did white
mob violence affect blacks who were guilty of no apparent crime, but it also prevented
authorities from asking Cato and Reed for information about any others who may have
been involved in the Hodges’ murders. Finally, Baker demonstrated that “mob-law . . .
not only represented a moral collapse in this community, but it struck, also, at the
sensitive pocket of the business interests of the county” as African Americans fled the
county to escape the unpredictable actions of angry whites.39
The chain reaction of violent events that took place in Georgia in 1904 was
representative of the lynching justice that permeated the South, as well as other areas of
the country, from 1880 to 1930. From the end of the Civil War until well into the
38
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twentieth century, black Americans often feared extralegal punishment in the form of
lynching at the hands of angry white mobs. Although these mobs occasionally attacked
white victims, the majority of the lynching incidents during this period involved African
Americans. During this period, white mobs lynched over 3,200 blacks, primarily in the
South. The number of lynching episodes in the United States peaked in 1892 when more
than two hundred Americans, the majority of whom were black, died at the hands of
lynch mobs. The 1892 lynchings took place throughout the United States and victims
faced accusations of committing a variety of crimes, including murder, rape, arson, and
theft [See Table 1: 1892 Lynching Record]. Sometimes, however, reporters and
witnesses simply attributed lynching to “race prejudice” which suggests the victim died
not for committing a crime, but for being black.40
Because of both the legal and social means of segregation that developed in the
South throughout the period, lynching became a widely used, and generally accepted,
means of effecting justice. Lynching increasingly became a way for whites to define
acceptable social behavior for African Americans. As noted, lynch mobs killed over
3,000 African Americans in the fifty-year span from 1880 to 1930 [See Figure 1:
Lynchings in the United States, 1880-1930]. Defenders of lynching often argued that the
victims had committed crimes against women and, thus, deserved the severe punishment
given to them. As Arthur Raper notes in the preface to the 1969 reprint of The Tragedy
of Lynching, however, “alleged rape and attempted rape combined were not the primary
reported causes of lynching – less than a fourth . . . were so accused in the press notices.”
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Figure 1: Lynchings in the United States, 1880-1930

Rather, the charged offenses ranged from murder and felonious assault of men to theft to
the use of offensive language to simply acting “inappropriately.” Despite these statistics,
however, many whites convinced themselves that most lynching victims were guilty of
rape and other offenses against women.41
The lynchers, the majority of whom were white men, often went beyond just
doling out justice and executed their victims in ways that could only be described as
sadistic. While mobs often hung and burned the accused, images of which continue to be
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the common image of lynching even today, they also sometimes beat or shot their
victims. In September 1904, such a case occurred in Huntsville, Alabama. A black man,
Horace Maples, confessed to the murder of a while peddler named Waldrop when
Waldrop’s son confronted him in front of the mob that had just set fire to the jail. Upon
his confession, the mob took Maples and hung him from an elm tree and then shot him
multiple times. In many cases, after the victim died, there was a fight for souvenirs from
the event. Men, women, and children who watched scurried to get a piece of the charred
body remains or even a piece of the tree the victim hung from. Such a struggle occurred
after the Cato and Reed lynching in Statesboro, Georgia in August 1904 and again a
month later after the lynching of Maples in Huntsville when “they cut off one of his little
fingers and parts of his trousers for souvenirs.” Despite the brutality of these events, and
the fact that the participants often had an audience, only forty-nine lynchers were indicted
and four sentenced for their actions during this period. According to W. Fitzhugh
Brundage in Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930, quite often
those who were indicted for their participation in a lynching were part of private mobs
that “had offended local opinion by cavalierly resorting to summary justice to punish
crimes widely perceived to be better left to the courts.” This was not the generally held
opinion, however, in the lynchings of Ed Johnson, Cato and Reed, or hundreds of other
black victims.42
An even more extreme example of mob cruelty had occurred five years earlier in
Georgia after a mob lynched Sam Hose for murdering his employer after arguing over
wages and for raping his employer’s wife. Although Hose confessed to murdering his
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employer, he never confessed to the rape. Shortly after his capture, a crowd of nearly
2,000 gathered to watch Hose be burned to death at a stake. According to the New York
Tribune, “Before the torch was applied to the pyre, the Negro was deprived of his ears,
fingers and other portions of his body with surprising fortitude. Before the body was
cool, it was cut to pieces, the bones were crushed into small bits. . . . The Negro’s heart
was cut in several pieces, as was also his liver. Those unable to obtain the ghastly relics
directly paid possessors that were more fortunate extravagant sums for theirs. Small
pieces of bone went for 25 cents and a bit of the liver, crisply cooked, for 10 cents.”
Regardless of the severity of this case, no one was ever indicted for the cruel treatment of
Sam Hose.43
Many prominent African Americans of the period argued that the rise in lynching
and the reasons given to justify it reflected the increasing desire of whites to separate
themselves from blacks and to demonstrate their superiority after Reconstruction-era
legislation created the suggestion of equality. David Augustus Straker, who had himself
been a candidate for lieutenant governor in South Carolina and was a successful criminal
defense lawyer, suggested that the accusation of rape made in relation to lynching cases
was meant “to destroy [n]orthern sentiment in favor of the Negro by charging his with
committing, as a class, the most heinous offense, next to murder.” Others, including
Robert C. O. Benjamin, and lawyer and newspaper editor, and Frederick Douglass drew
similar conclusions.44
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In addition to an increase in lynchings, massacres like those of Memphis and
New Orleans in 1866 and Opelousas in 1868 continued to take place in the 1870s. One
such event, the Colfax, Louisiana massacre on April 9, 1873, eventually led to the
Supreme Court case United States v. Cruikshank, which is discussed in Chapter Two.
Once again, white citizens who were prominent members of the community participated
in the attack against blacks that resulted in more than a hundred deaths. In Clinton,
Mississippi, another twenty African Americans lost their lives in September 1875.
Perhaps the most disturbing example of how prevalent racial violence had become took
place in South Carolina in 1876. Rather than a single incident, the state experienced a
series of race riots from July through October in counties where there was a slight
majority of blacks. The first incident occurred in Hamburg where the local South
Carolina State Militia of black soldiers refused to turn over their weapons to attorney
Matthew C. Butler who represented white farmers who did not think the blacks should be
armed. The disagreement between the two groups resulted in the deaths of seven men.
During the next several months, conflicts arose between blacks and whites in Charleston,
Ellenton, Cainhoy, Edgefield, Mt. Pleasant, ad Beaufort. More than once, federal troops
helped to restore order. The ultimate outcome of the race riots was that white South
Carolinians became even more determined to establish control over African Americans in
their state.45
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The Supreme Court Sets the Stage

As African Americans struggled to gain equality in the political, legal, and social
spheres, and to protect themselves from white mobs determined to exact their own forms
of justice, one American institution had the opportunity to send a message to white
America that would help blacks in their struggle. This institution was the U.S. Supreme
Court. In many of these cases, however, the Court’s opinions merely reflected the
discriminatory nature of the legal system rather than offering a black Americans hope for
improvement in their situation. In cases such as the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873,
United States v. Cruickshank (1875), the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, and Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896), which will be discussed in more detail later, the U.S. Supreme Court
repeatedly handed down decisions that influenced the development of racial segregation
in the United States as much as the class issues that had been discussed by Woodward.
Even before legislative segregation took hold and became commonplace in the
late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court interpreted Reconstruction-era legislation in
such a way as to encourage state legislatures to increasingly test the limits of statesanctioned discrimination. Although the Supreme Court could not make or enforce law,
its decisions often served as indicators, or guidelines, of how African Americans should
be treated under the law. Such decisions were first seen in the 1870s, well before the
1890s when Woodward claimed de jure segregation first took hold.
The first civil rights case ever heard by the Supreme Court was Blyew v. United
States [80 U.S. 581 (1871)] in which the court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and set precedents for future judicial evaluations of the Act. The act passed by Congress
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in April 1866 had served as a follow-up to the Thirteenth Amendment and a precursor
to the Fourteenth Amendment. The facts of the case centered on the events of August 29,
1868, when the bodies of Jack Foster, his wife Sallie, and Sallie’s mother Lucy
Armstrong were found in their cabin. All three victims were black. Armstrong’s head
had been cut open with a broad-axe while both Jack and Sallie had been cut almost to
pieces. Jack’s son, Richard, was almost mortally wounded but managed to crawl to a
neighbor’s house almost two hundred yards away. The seventeen-year-old survived for
two days during which time he made statements indicating that John Blyew and Richard
Kennard were responsible for the atrocious crimes against his family. The family knew
the two men who had worked for their former owner and had invited them into their
home that evening. Thirteen-year-old Laura Foster, who testified against Blyew and
Kennard, had been asleep in a trundle bed in the cabin and escaped injury during the
attack. Her younger sister Amelia suffered non-mortal injuries but did not testify because
of her age46
Blyew v. United States dealt with a Kentucky law that prevented anyone of
African descent from testifying in a criminal proceeding against a white defendant.
Blyew and Kennard, were convicted of murder based on the testimony of Laura Foster, a
black girl. An averment had been made by the prosecutor to transfer jurisdiction to the
federal Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky on the grounds that Laura Foster was
denied the right to testify solely because of her race. The lawyers for Blyew and Kennard
46
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appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the state law preventing blacks from
testifying against whites had been violated by improperly granting jurisdiction to the
federal court. The Supreme Court determined that Laura Foster was simply a witness,
not an affected party of Blyew and Kennard’s crime and, thus, did not fall under the
protections provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. If Amelia Foster had testified, the
Supreme Court may have reached a different conclusion because she was a direct victim
of the attack. As it was, the end result was that Blyew and Kennard were freed because
Laura Foster had no right to testify against them under Kentucky law.47
Salmon Portland Chase held the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at
the time Blyew v. United States was heard. A former participant in the anti-slavery
movement and the Free Soilers Party, Chase took his position in the court in December
1864 after being appointed by President Abraham Lincoln. When arguments were
presented, however, Chase was not present and, thus, played no part in the case.
Ultimately, a 6-2 split with Justice William Strong delivering the majority opinion and
Justices Joseph P. Bradley and Noah H. Swayne dissenting decided the case.48
In his decision, Justice Strong focused on the question of whether the Circuit
Court for the District of Kentucky had jurisdiction in the case. In order to determine this,
the Court had to consider whether the case violated the third section of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 which granted such jurisdiction in cases “affecting persons who are denied,

47

Blyew v. United States [80 U.S. 581 (1871)]; Miller, The Petitioners, 88; Howard, The Shifting Wind, 46; Goldstein, “Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme,” 474; and, Victor B. Howard, “The Black Testimony
Controversy in Kentucky, 1866-1872,” in The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr. 1973), 158159.
48
Blyew v. United States [80 U.S. 581 (1871)]; Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice
Under Law, Constitutional Development, 1835–1875 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982); Charles Fairman
Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888, Part One (New York: MacMillen Publishing Company, 1971);
and, Jonathan Lurie, “Mr. Justice Bradley: A Reassessment,” Seton Hall Law Review 16 (1986): 343.

47
or cannot enforce in the courts of judicial tribunals of the State, or locality, where they
may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of the act.” Was Laura
Foster an affected person in the case who was denied the right to testify against Blyew
and Kennard? Or, was Laura Foster merely a witness who had no direct stake in the
case? The answer, in Justice Strong’s view, related to the crime itself and how it affected
Foster.49
Blyew and Kennard’s lawyers contended, “there was no [federal] jurisdiction
because, whether the enactment was constitutional and valid, or unconstitutional and
void, this case was not within it. This case did not affect negroes. It was a proceeding by
the State against white men.” Justice Strong concurred, arguing that if any possible
witness for either the prosecution or defense were considered affected parties to a case all
cases, both civil and criminal, could be under the jurisdiction of District and Circuit
Courts. According to the Kentucky statute in question, “that a slave, negro, or Indian
shall be a competent witness in the case of the commonwealth for or against a slave,
negro, or Indian, or in a civil case to which only negroes or Indians are parties, but in no
other case.” By Strong’s logic, granting federal jurisdiction in the case to enable Laura
Foster to testify was akin to granting federal jurisdiction for all criminal cases because it
was always possible to claim that an African American “was or might be an important
witness [in] any suit between white citizens.”50
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bradley pointed out that the first section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 explicitly stated that per the Fourteenth Amendment all persons
born in the United States are citizens and, thus, “shall have the same rights, in every State
49
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and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties,
and give evidence; to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.” Although this section addressed several issues, the issue in question in
Blyew v. United States was the legality of state laws preventing African Americans from
testifying in cases where white persons were involved.51
Bradley dissented on the basis not that Laura Foster would have been denied the
right to testify under the Kentucky law, but that Lucy Armstrong, the elderly woman
murdered by Blyew and Kennard, would have been unable to give testimony. He
explained that if the attack had been less severe and the charges against the defendants
were only assault and battery the Kentucky law would have prevented Armstrong from
exercising her right to testify against her attackers. By Justice Strong’s logic, Laura
Foster was not an affected party, but Lucy Armstrong was most certainly affected and
would, therefore, fall under the protection of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866. Based on
this, the federal Circuit Court would have been able to obtain undisputed jurisdiction over
the case. Lucy Armstrong, however, did not survive the attack and could not testify
against her assailants.52
Bradley concluded that if the Civil Rights Act protected Lucy Armstrong had she
survived the attack it should only seem logical that she would be protected in death.
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Otherwise, attackers would have more incentive to murder than to only injure. Bradley
stated, “If mere violence offered to a colored person (who, by the law of Kentucky, was
denied the privilege of complaint), gives the United States court jurisdiction, when such
violence is short of being fatal, that jurisdiction cannot cease when death is the result.
The reason for its existence is stronger than before.”53
Bradley, a native of New York and former Unionist candidate for the United
States House of Representatives, was joined in his dissent by Justice Swayne. Swayne
was originally from Virginia but moved to Ohio in 1824 because of his anti-slavery
beliefs. Despite the similar backgrounds of the other justices, Bradley and Swayne stood
alone in their dissent. Even if Chief Justice Chase had been present and supported their
opinion, they still would have been outnumbered. The apparent willingness of their
colleagues, including Strong, Samuel Nelson, Nathan Clifford, Samuel F. Miller, David
Davis, and Stephen J. Field, to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, suggested their unwillingness in 1871 to force white Americans to
recognize African Americans as equals under the law.54
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blyew v. United States not only indicated the
ineffectiveness of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in protecting the civil rights of African
Americans, but also sent a message to law enforcement officials and white citizens that
the federal judiciary was not necessarily committed to the protection of equal rights for
black Americans. From this first civil rights decision through the first two decades of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court continued to tackle questions of civil rights,
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segregation, and equal rights through a number of cases surrounding federal, state, and
local laws. As will be shown, at no point did the Supreme Court take a consistent stand
on these issues, but rather sent mixed messages with its decisions which inevitably
contributed to the deteriorating status of African Americans and to the rise of extralegal
violence against them.
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Chapter Two: Privileges, Enforcement, and Juries

The passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 resonated throughout the
country. Many northern states stood in support of the Amendment as further evidence of
the Union’s victory in the Civil War. Meanwhile, many white southerners strongly
opposed the Amendment that they viewed as proof that the northern Congress was trying
to control their lives and limit the power of their state legislatures.
Within the African American community, the Amendment’s passage could hardly
go unnoticed. In many ways, blacks agreed with both northern and southern views of the
Amendment as proof that the North had been victorious and, thus, had the ability to limit
the power of the South in legislative decisions. Black Americans could only hope that
the Fourteenth Amendment signaled a future of increased rights and equality for
themselves, their friends, and their families. It did not take long, however, before
challenges to the Amendment reached the courts, forcing African Americans to wait to
see whether their newly attained rights would be upheld.

Limitations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
In the late 1860s, citizens of New Orleans lived in a city rife with filth and
disease. By March 1869, when the Louisiana legislature passed the “Act to Protect the
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Health of the City of New Orleans,” efforts to regulate New Orleans’ slaughterhouses
had already been attempted several times over the previous seven decades. The first such
effort occurred in 1804 when the U.S. territorial government required that all butchers
move their operations to the west bank of the Mississippi River. As Michael A. Ross
explains in Justice of Shattered Dreams: Samuel Freeman Miller and the Supreme Court
during the Civil War Era, “As the city grew . . . the butchers’ political and economic
clout increased; after persistent complaints about the inconvenience of shuttling back and
forth across the river, they forced their way back to the opposite [east] bank upstream
from the city.” With the continued growth of New Orleans, it was not long before the
slaughterhouses were again surrounded by businesses and houses, leading to renewed
outrage by New Orleans citizens who wanted the abattoirs forced out of their
neighborhoods. The 1869 law arose from attempts by the Louisiana legislature to deal
with these harmful and offensive slaughterhouses of New Orleans. Similar to the 1804
law, the primary requirement of the 1869 legislation was that all of the city’s butchers
would move to the other side of the Mississippi River where they would work at a new
top-of-the-line facility. The Act created the Crescent City Live Stock and Slaughterhouse
Company. Under the legislation, this company received a twenty-five year monopoly
over the operation of the new facility. To further improve the situation in the city, the
law also required that all livestock brought to New Orleans for slaughter would be taken
directly to this new facility. Once meat was processed, it had to pass the inspection of a
public health official before the abattoirs could send it to the market to be sold. 55
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In the opinion of many New Orleans residents and visitors, such an attempt to
clean up the city by regulating the slaughterhouses was long overdue. While other
factors (including the lack of a public sewer system, unpaved roads, and a tendency to
empty toilets in open gutters and to toss garbage into vacant lots) also contributed to the
city’s infamous squalor, the slaughterhouses that spotted the city’s landscape were an
easily identifiable problem with an apparent solution. In many neighborhoods
slaughterhouses were located next door to schools, crowded apartment buildings, and
hospitals. In order to get animals from the river to their facilities, butchers often drove
sheep, cattle, and pigs through neighborhoods where the animals raced “wildly and madly
through the streets endangering the limbs and the lives of men, women and children.”56
The spectacle of animals running scared through the streets of New Orleans was
only a precursor to the vulgar, bloody, and foul process that took place inside the
slaughterhouses themselves. The butchers used primitive means to kill the animals
before skinning and gutting their carcasses. Once dead, the animals were placed on
hooks where they sometimes remained, unrefrigerated, for days. The butchers’ waste
management systems consisted of tossing the animals’ gory remains either directly into
the Mississippi River or onto the streets. In testimony before a legislative committee,
New Orleans physician E. S. Lewis stated, “Barrels filled with entrails, blood, urine,
dung, and other refuse, portions in an advanced stage of decomposition are constantly
being thrown into the river, poisoning the air with offensive smells and necessarily
contaminating the water near the bank for miles.” To make matters worse, large amounts
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of the gore disposed of by the slaughterhouses could be seen collecting around the
intake pipes used to gather the city’s water supply.57
In the shadow of protests from citizens and of diseases including cholera and
yellow fever, Louisiana legislators passed the March 1869 “Act to Protect the Health of
the City of New Orleans.” The act was not a rash move by a biracial legislature, nor was
it a unique act for the time. Not only had there been previous attempts to regulate the
slaughterhouses in New Orleans, but since before the Civil War, the nation had been
responding to a sanitary reform movement with passage of slaughterhouse acts from New
York City to San Francisco to Philadelphia to Milwaukee. The new law passed in New
Orleans closely imitated an 1866 New York “regulation that required all butchers located
below 40th Street to use a centralized slaughterhouse [that] operated away from the
crowded downtown neighborhoods and allowed for efficient inspection of the city’s meat
supply.” While the New York law did not go wholly unopposed by the affected butchers,
it was generally popular among the residents of New York City.58
In New Orleans, the reaction to the slaughterhouse legislation was much stronger
and much more negative. The butchers’ complaints were obvious: they believed the law
took away their right to pursue their livelihood. Other New Orleans residents, however,
also protested the law. Despite having asked the government just a few years earlier to
help clean up the slaughterhouses, many of the residents now cried foul at the apparent
monopoly and corruption created by the act. In actuality, “the charges of monopoly and
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corruption served as useful rhetorical devices for white editors and lawyers intent on
thwarting every effort, beneficial or otherwise, of a legislature that contained black
elected officials.” White citizens were grasping for stability and to maintain the power
they were accustomed to and, thus, were susceptible to the rhetoric against the
slaughterhouse law. Therefore, while the Slaughterhouse Cases themselves did not
directly deal with issues of race, there was an underlying current of racial tension
surrounding them well before they reached the U.S. Supreme Court.59
White resentment of the biracial legislature in Louisiana originated with General
Philip H. Sheridan’s enforcement of Reconstruction voting laws prior to the selection of
the state’s constitutional convention delegates. The result of this was that many white
voters were disfranchised while nearly 83,000 black voters celebrated their new right at
the polls. The newly elected delegates proceeded to create a state constitution that
guaranteed the right to vote for black men, eliminated black codes passed in 1865,
promised blacks equal access to public services, and required the integration of the public
school system. Perhaps most importantly, the new constitution included the state’s first
bill of rights that guaranteed the right to trial by jury, protected to right to assemble
peacefully, protected freedom of religion, and guaranteed freedom of the press, and
outlawed slavery. In light of the circumstances leading to the constitution’s passage,
many of Louisiana’s white citizens resented it. One New Orleans newspaper declared the
new constitution to be the “work of a few white men who were elected to the convention
by the votes of ignorant negroes, and by means of disenfranchising those who by their
ownership of the soil, their birthright as free men, and their education as citizens ought to
59
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be [Louisiana’s] masters and its law givers.” Obviously, opponents believed that the
framers of such a constitution could not be trusted to create the fair and constitutional
laws necessary to regulate the slaughterhouses and to create a healthier city for all New
Orleans residents.60
It was in the shadow of this resentment that the butchers and white citizens of
New Orleans reacted to the slaughterhouse act and set into motion the case that would
give the U.S. Supreme Court its first opportunity to interpret the meaning and scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In a group of three lawsuits collectively known as the
Slaughterhouse Cases [83 U.S. 36 (1873)], the Supreme Court took the first step in
limiting the protections of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.61 The primary
case involved a group of independent butchers from New Orleans who claimed that the
granting of a twenty-five year monopoly to the Crescent City Company violated the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in four ways: it created a system of involuntary
servitude, unlawfully deprived them of liberty and property, discriminated against them
in favor of members of the Crescent City Company, and limited their privileges and
immunities. The butchers who challenged the law were no longer allowed to operate
outside of the Crescent City Company’s facilities and had to pay for the right to operate
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within the facilities. Thus, they argued that the law was depriving them of their
livelihood.62
The butchers in the Slaughterhouse Cases were members of the Butcher’s
Benevolent Association. The Association had about four hundred members who were
small, independent butchers responsible for filing dozens of cases in both state and
federal courts. In general, the butchers were not popular among the citizens of New
Orleans because they contributed to the filth throughout the city. Also, for decades the
city’s butchers had schemed with each other to drive up meat prices. Nevertheless, their
“grievances became intertwined with Louisiana whites’ opposition to the Reconstruction
government.”63
The butchers turned to John Campbell, a former Supreme Court justice himself
who had resigned when his home state of Alabama seceded in 1861, to be their attorney.
There was no lack of irony in their choice – “the former Supreme Court justice who had
risked death on the battlefield in defense of slavery drew on the amendments intended to
protect former slaves in devising a Constitutional argument on behalf of the beleaguered
butchers.” Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1853, Campbell represented
Alabama at an 1850 Nashville convention “convened to protect southern rights in the
face of what they saw as northern encroachment, especially on the slavery question.”
Before the Civil War broke out, he actually attempted to broker an agreement between
the states threatening to secede and the Lincoln administration. Once Alabama seceded,
however, his loyalties to the South took precedence and he moved to New Orleans.
During the war he served as assistant secretary of war in charge of administering the
62
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conscription law for the Confederate government. After the war ended, he stayed in
New Orleans to establish and build up his law practice.64
By most accounts, John Campbell’s arguments before the Supreme Court in the
Slaughterhouse Cases were masterful. He argued that the Reconstruction-era balance of
power between the national government and the states was very different than the balance
that had existed before the Civil War. Central to his argument was the claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment made it unconstitutional for a state law to limit or encroach on
the rights guaranteed to citizens by national legislation. He believed that citizens of the
United States are guaranteed the right to pursue their respective occupations and to
support themselves and their families. Thus, no state law should be allowed to interfere
with this federally granted right. He also sought to portray the butchers as patriotic
citizens being punished by the Louisiana law.65
Although all of the butchers Campbell represented were white and, thus, the case
had nothing to do directly with race, Campbell’s arguments before the Court made it
apparent that he feared a new democratic system where African Americans would be
allowed equal access. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was written at a point
in history when “more than three millions of a population lately servile, were liberated
without preparation for any political or civil [life]. Besides this population of
emancipated slaves, there was a large and growing population who came to this country
without education in the laws and constitution of this country and who had begun to exert
a perceptible influence over our government.” Ultimately, Campbell viewed the
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Fourteenth Amendment as a tool that could be used to keep the newly freed African
Americans and newly arrived immigrants in check because although it protected these
groups from state restrictions on their constitutional rights it ultimately strengthened the
rights of white Americans and of business in its dealings with the government as well.
He argued, therefore, that the Supreme Court had an obligation to the country to declare
laws such as the Louisiana slaughterhouse statute unconstitutional. Campbell believed
that this law, and others like it, were the result of northern white efforts to control the
economy and the politics of the South and he asked the Court to use the Fourteenth
Amendment as grounds to nullify Louisiana’s Slaughterhouse law.66
Despite the fact that Campbell was a former Confederate arguing in front of a
Supreme Court appointed by Abraham Lincoln, and the fact that Campbell was asking
the Court to support the most expansive reading possible of the Fourteenth Amendment,
he nearly succeeded. Four of the justices, Noah H. Swayne, Stephen J. Field, Salmon P.
Chase, and Joseph P. Bradley, supported his arguments. Nevertheless, with a slim 5-4
majority, the Court’s April 1873 decision against the petitioners severely limited the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Amendment.
In the majority decision, Justice Samuel F. Miller wrote that based on the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of
a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a
citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an
important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He
must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only
necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a
citizen of the Union. It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the
United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each
66
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other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the
individual.

The establishment of this distinction was crucial to the forthcoming conclusion of the
Court. Because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the amendment relied so heavily
on by John Campbell in his arguments only spoke of citizens of the United States, the
different nature of citizenship had to be considered. The clause stated, “No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States” and, thus, according to Miller, does not protect citizens of a state from
the state. He finally stated, “it is useless to pursue this branch of inquiry, since we are of
opinion that the rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are
not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the
clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration.”67
By focusing on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the distinction between
state citizenship and United States citizenship, the Supreme Court again set the stage for
increased restrictions of the rights of African Americans. Rather than guaranteeing
protection of all rights for blacks, Miller narrowly interpreted the Amendment and its
protections. By arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevented states from
limiting certain federal rights, which he did not define, but did not protect the basic civil
rights of all American citizens, Miller in essence left the fate of former slaves and their
families in the hands of the southern states’ governments. As long as states did not
directly limit the rights of U.S. citizens as explicitly spelled out in the Constitution, they
could safely define citizenship and the rights of citizenship within their own borders.
67
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Unfortunately, former slave owners and former Confederates were increasingly
controlling these governments. Miller justified this limited interpretation by stating that
otherwise the Court was destined to become “a perpetual censor upon all legislation of
the states, on the civil rights of their own citizens.”68
Despite the emphasis placed on the Slaughterhouse Cases by legal historians and
champions of African American civil rights, as well as the judicial system itself, there
was very little contemporary public reaction to the case outside of the New Orleans area.
National and regional newspapers, both white and black, that frequently ran columns
about the legislative and judicial activities in the nation’s capital deemed this decision
unworthy of the ink it would take to print it. This lack of coverage is significant,
however, because it suggests that African American editors and leaders did not yet
recognize some of the subtler challenges they would face in the courts. Additionally, it
demonstrates a lack of awareness of the far-reaching effects this decision could ultimately
have on their lives.
Miller, a native of Richmond, Kentucky, had no judicial experience when
Abraham Lincoln nominated him for the Supreme Court in 1862. He was, however, a
strong supporter of Lincoln and a supporter of the gradual emancipation of slaves. He
had moved to Iowa, a free state, after Kentucky’s 1849 constitutional convention
strengthened slavery in the state. In Iowa, Miller denounced slavery as evil “to both
white men and the black [calling it] the most stupendous wrong, and the most prolific
source of human misery, both to the master and the slave, that the sun shines upon in his
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daily circuit around the globe.” Before ever meeting Chief Justice Roger B. Taney,
Miller expressed his extreme disgust for the man who had written the majority opinion in
the Dred Scott case declaring that blacks were not citizens of the United States. Although
the two men quickly became mutually respected and friendly colleagues, Miller’s distaste
for the Dred Scott ruling and his background in favor of emancipation suggested he
would decide cases in a more favorable light for African Americans. Nevertheless, the
most significant opinion of his career in the Slaughterhouse Cases provided, most likely
unintentionally, southern states with an opening to deprive blacks of many of the rights
they had hoped were guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.69
In response to Miller’s majority decision, there were three dissenting opinions.
Justice Stephen Johnson Field wrote the primary dissent, which was supported by Chief
Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley. Justice Field, a native of Connecticut
who later moved to California and was nominated for his seat on the court by Abraham
Lincoln, declared that he was “unable to agree with the majority of the court in these
cases [because]. . . . the act of Louisiana presents the naked case, unaccompanied by any
public considerations, where a right to pursue a lawful and necessary calling, previously
enjoyed by every citizen, and in connection with which a thousand persons were daily
employed, is taken away and vested exclusively for twenty-five years, for an extensive
district and large population, in a single corporation, or its exercise is for that period
restricted to the establishments of the corporation, and there allowed only upon onerous
conditions.” The essence of his dissenting opinion was his belief that the slaughterhouse
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law enacted by Louisiana’s state legislature encroached on the rights of all citizens to
pursue the profession of their choice.70
Field began by describing the key points of the case as he saw them. He
explained that the slaughterhouse law affected the approximately 1154 square miles
covered by the New Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes and that this area had a
total population of between 200,000 and 300,000 citizens. The plaintiffs in the case, the
butchers represented by John Campbell, argued that the law granted a monopoly to the
Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company at the expense of the
approximately one thousand residents of the parishes engaged in the business of landing,
housing, and slaughtering animals for the market in New Orleans. According to the
majority decision of the Supreme Court, the law was defensible because the creation of
the Crescent City Corporation was part of an exercise of the police power of the state to
protect the health and welfare of the citizens of New Orleans. Field, however, argued,
“under the pretense of prescribing a police regulation the State cannot be permitted to
encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to
secure against abridgment.” He expressed his belief that if a corporation of seventeen
named men can safely slaughter animals in a designated area outside of the city, any
qualified butcher could also do so. He also articulated his concern that if the state
government was allowed to create a seventeen-person corporation at the expense of the
privileges and rights of other citizens there was no guarantee that the same government
would not later grant privileges to a single person at the expense of all others.71
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The most critical question at issue in the Slaughterhouse Cases, according to
Justice Field, was the question of the government’s responsibility to protect the “equality
of rights among citizens in the pursuit of ordinary avocations of life, and a declaration
that all grants of exclusive privileges, in the contravention of this equality, are against
common right, and void.” While the Court’s majority decision discounted the plaintiff’s
claim based on the conclusion that rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were
violated or abridged by the law in question, Field concluded otherwise. He argued that
the equality of right among citizens to pursue their profession of choice is the
distinguishing right of United States citizens. The state, therefore, has the right to
regulate every profession, but it must leave all professions open to all citizens who can
conform to those regulations. In his closing, Justice Field expressed his profound regret
that the majority of the Court found it appropriate to support the Louisiana law which he
believed so clearly violated the equality of right he found to be central to citizenship.72
Although Field was a Democrat, he had been nominated for the Supreme Court
by Abraham Lincoln and unanimously recommended by the Californian and Oregonian
congressional delegations faced with the task of supporting a nominee for a new seat on
the Court to represent the western district. His dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases likely
had more to do with his consistent opposition to government interference in private
business than with his views on race and the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment
for African Americans. In fact, his dissenting opinion made absolutely no mention of the
racial issues that brought rise to the need for the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately,
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Field viewed the Reconstruction Amendments in broad terms related to the protection
of citizens’ economic and property interests, but in narrow terms related to racial
discrimination. In reviewing Field’s opinion, it is obvious that he was more concerned
with protecting economic, property, and private enterprise rights over civil, social, and
political rights.73
Although they both concurred with Justice Field’s dissenting opinion, Justice
Joseph P. Bradley and Justice Noah H. Swayne both chose to add additional comments in
disagreement with the majority opinion. Bradley opted to reiterate the argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected all individuals from the limitation of the privileges and
rights as granted under the Constitution. According to Bradley, “If a man be denied full
equality before the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship of the
United States. . . . [and] in [his] judgment, the right of any citizen to follow whatever
lawful employment he chooses to adopt (submitting himself to all lawful regulations) is
one of his most valuable rights, and one which the legislature of the State cannot invade,
whether restrained by its own constitution or not.” Again, like Field, Bradley focused
primarily on the economic and private enterprise issues raised by the Louisiana
slaughterhouse law, but he did mention his recognition that the original intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the rights and liberties of African Americans.
Nevertheless, he declared, “It is futile to argue that none but persons of the African race
are intended to benefit from this amendment. . . . Its language is general, embracing all
citizens, and I think it was purposely so expressed.” Likewise, Justice Swayne
acknowledged the original catalyst for the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment but
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argued that in the case before the court and in regards to the issue of personal
pursuance of profession, race and color should not be considered. Swayne, the son of
antislavery Quaker parents, originally lived in Virginia but moved to Ohio in the 1820s
due to his opposition to slavery. Despite his downplaying of race as an issue in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, his concluding sentence, “I earnestly hope that the consequences
to follow may prove less serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will be,”
indicated that he and the other dissenting justices were aware that the court’s decision
may have an adverse affect on the lives of African Americans and other Americans
seeking protection from state limitations on their rights.74
The immediate consequences of the decision did turn out to be less serious than
Swayne and his associates feared. As explained, there was virtually no immediate
response to the decision and there was no national coverage of the decision, particularly
in the nascent African American press. Just as the justices viewed race as a peripheral
issue in the Slaughterhouse Cases, so too did the apparent majority of American citizens.
Nevertheless, as could be seen after the fact, the decision did open the door for increased
limitations on African American rights as state and local legislatures recognized the
narrowing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause under the
Court’s interpretation.
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Limited Enforcement
While the full effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse
Cases were yet to be seen, another case dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Enforcement Act of 1870 came before the Court. In United States v. Cruikshank (1876),
white leaders of a massacre of African Americans, which occurred in Grant Parish,
Louisiana the same month as the Slaughterhouse decision was handed down, faced
charges of violating the Enforcement Act. Congress had passed the Enforcement Act of
1870 in response to crimes committed against African Americans after the ratification of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The law spelled out several possible crimes
that could by committed against potential voters and established the mechanism for
federal prevention of such crimes through the Department of Justice. The case before the
Supreme Court tested the constitutionality of the federal government’s intervention into
criminal matters and could have potentially provided a legal foundation for federal
intervention when state and local law enforcement failed to protect the rights of blacks.
On Easter Sunday, 1873, 105 African Americans and three whites lost their lives
in front of the Grant Parish courthouse in Colfax, Louisiana. After gaining a slight
majority of votes in just one of many disputed 1872 elections in the state, the local
Republican candidates and their supporters attempted to take occupancy of the
courthouse. In January 1873, the outgoing governor, Henry Clay Warmoth, declared the
white Democrat candidates as winners, only to have the incoming governor, William Pitt
Kellogg, declare the Republican candidates victorious at the beginning of April. The
blacks who climbed through a window at the courthouse included many former slaves
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who feared that the Democrats would seize control of the Grant Parish government,
despite their victory, and who were led by black Civil War veterans. Some, but not all, of
the members of the group were armed. A well-organized group of more than three
hundred whites, most of whom were armed and disputed Kellogg’s interpretation of the
election results, confronted the African Americans at the courthouse. Most were also
members of the White League, a group similar to the Ku Klux Klan that was active in
Louisiana at the time. Among the leaders of the mob was Columbus Nash, the defeated
Democratic candidate for sheriff.
Inflamed by a recent event in which a black mob had raided the home of
Republican attorney William Rutland and dumped the body of his recently deceased
daughter from her casket, local whites believed that blacks were dangerous. Although no
one was hurt in the incident, the desecration of the daughter’s body was evidence enough
for whites to fear the congregation of blacks at the courthouse. As leader of the white
mob, Nash tried unsuccessfully to convince the blacks to leave the courthouse on their
own. He then asked the women and children who were camped outside the courthouse to
clear out within the next thirty minutes. Once they were gone, Nash ordered the whites to
fire on the African Americans in the courthouse. After several hours of gun fighting with
only a few casualties, the situation took a turn for the worse. Nash and his men placed a
cannon behind the courthouse, which meant that the blacks faced gunfire from the front
and cannon fire from the back. As many as sixty of them ran into the nearby woods
where they were chased down and killed. Under threat of death, Nash and his men
convinced an older black man to reenter the courthouse and set it on fire. Faced with this
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blaze as well as gun and cannon fire, the remaining black occupants of the church
exited the courthouse waving makeshift white flags.
This group of African Americans surrendered themselves to the white aggressors
and laid down their arms. Then, James Hadnot, another of the white leaders, was
wounded by gunfire. Some witnesses claimed a black man shot him while others argued
one of the armed white men shot him from behind. Regardless of the facts, the outcome
was the same. The white mob swarmed on the now-unarmed blacks and massacred them.
The whites chased down, beat, and mutilated the blacks; approximately fifty of the black
men survived the initial massacre and were taken prisoner only to be executed later that
night. The following day, under orders from President Ulysses S Grant, federal troops
arrived from New Orleans to restore order. Despite the participation of hundreds in the
massacre, only about one hundred were initially indicted, of which eight went to trial, and
three were convicted on charges of violating the Enforcement Act of 1870. Among the
convicted men was William J. Cruikshank.
The convicted men faced thirty-two counts of indictment, but were convicted only
on the first sixteen. The indictments charged them with banding together and conspiring
with the intent of preventing two African American U.S. citizens, Levi Nelson and
Alexander Tillman, from exercising their right to peaceable assembly, preventing them
from exercising their right to bear arms, depriving them of life and liberty without due
process of law, depriving them of the full rights and privileges enjoyed by white citizens
under the law, preventing them from enjoying their full privileges and immunities as
citizens of the U.S. and of Louisiana, hindering their right to vote, causing them to fear
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bodily harm and injury because they had voted, and preventing their enjoyment of
rights and privileges as granted them by the United States Constitution.
In their appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the three men cited six grounds for
opposing the judgment against them. First, they argued that the charges against them did
not constitute crimes against federal laws and did not fall under the true intent of the
Enforcement Act. Second, their lawyers claimed that, because they had not violated any
U.S. laws their indictments did not fall under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Furthermore, the basis of the sixteen counts, Section 6 of the Enforcement Act, was not
constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts and should have been under the
purview of the state courts. Fourth, the plaintiffs contended that the Enforcement Act in
fact violated the Constitution by both defining offences and imposing penalties, which
was an infringement on the rights of the states. Fifth, they asserted that the sixteen counts
on which they were convicted were too vague for them to have properly pleaded and
prepared their defense. Finally, based on all of their claims, they concluded that the
jury’s verdict was not warranted and supported by law. The appellate judges were unable
to reach a decision on the case and, because of their division the case came before the
Supreme Court.75
The primary focus of the indictments, and, thus, of the appeal, was the sixth
section of the Enforcement Act [16 Stat. 141] enacted on May 31, 1870. As mentioned,
the primary purpose of the Enforcement Act was to describe possible crimes that could be
committed against African Americans and establish the mechanism within the
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Department of Justice to enforce the rights and privileges granted by the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Section 6 of the Enforcement Act declared
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in
disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with
intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise
and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the
constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
exercised the same, such persons shall be held guilty of felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion
of the court,-the fine not to exceed $5,000, and the imprisonment not to
exceed ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and
disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created
by the constitution or laws of the United States.76

Chief Justice Morrison Waite presented the majority decision of the Court on
March 27, 1876. The Court found in favor of the defendants and overturned their
convictions. In his decision, Waite explained that he agreed that the right to assemble
peacefully is a constitutionally protected right which, when infringed upon on the basis of
race, could be protected under the Fifteenth Amendment. He also mentioned that while
the First Amendment protects the right, that protection was meant as a limitation on the
federal government, not on state governments. Likewise, he explained that the
indictments regarding infringement upon the black citizens’ right to bear arms were
unfounded because the Second Amendment was meant only to prevent Congress from
limiting this right of citizenship. He further supported the rights of states to regulate their
own citizens in his critique of the indictments based on the failure to secure due process
of law for the victims. He stated, “The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this
76
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adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.” This conclusion foresees
future arguments of the Court, which significantly limit the protections for African
Americans from Jim Crow legislation. The bulk of the indictments, therefore, were not
based on charges enforceable in the federal courts because they were not in violation of
constitutional protections.77
In the remaining handful of indictments, the charges dealt with the accused
conspiring to impinge upon the rights and privileges of the victims. The charges,
however, did not identify any specific right limited by the accused. Because there was no
clarification of what rights they were accused of denying the victims, the charged men
were not informed enough to be able to develop their defense. On that basis, Waite
concluded that the charges “lack the certainty and precision required by the established
rules of criminal pleading . . . . that they are not good and sufficient in law. They are so
defective that no judgment of conviction should be pronounced upon them.”
Additionally, he declared that the indictments filed against the three convicted men were
not sufficient for conviction under the Enforcement Act because they did not indicate that
the men’s intent was to violate the victims’ rights because of their race. He concluded,
“We may suspect that race was the cause of the hostility, but it is not so averred.”78
This decision fell in line with much of Waite’s activities on the Court despite the
fact that he publicly worked to improve the lives of African Americans. Waite was a
native of Connecticut who, after briefly living in Europe, moved to Ohio where he
believed he would have better opportunities. He was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1839
and focused primarily on business law until his surprise nomination to the position of
77
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1874. Prior to his nomination, Waite was a
strong pro-Union voice during the Civil War and served as president of the Ohio
Constitutional Convention in 1873. He had also garnered the attention of President Grant
in 1871 when he served and counsel for the United States in arbitration negotiations in
Geneva. The Alabama claims case against Great Britain centered on claims by the
United States that the British had enabled the Confederates to utilize British ports during
the Civil War. At the end of the negotiations, in large part because of Waite’s skill, the
United States received a $15.5 million settlement. Nevertheless, his nomination from
Grant came as a surprise not only to himself but also to several members of the Court.
Despite his success in the Alabama negotiations, Waite had never held a judicial position
and had never practiced before the Supreme Court, making him one of the most
inexperienced justices ever nominated.79
Throughout his time with the Court, Waite tended to go along with the majority,
dissenting in only 54 of the nearly 3,470 cases heard in his tenure. His majority decision,
therefore, was not unexpected. His personal views of race issues and of African
Americans in general were in line with the views of moderate white northerners.
Furthermore, he agreed with many white Americans that in order for African Americans
to succeed in the future they had to have the opportunity to receive a reasonable
education. In support of this belief, he supported the Peabody Fund and the Slater Fund,
both of which were northern charities focused on providing money to southern black
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schools and colleges. Additionally, Waite approached Congress to approve similar
funds from the government, although he was never successful in this goal.80
The sole dissenter in the Cruikshank case was Nathan Clifford who explained that
although he agreed with the result of reversing the convictions, he did not agree with
Waite’s reasoning. He referred to both Section 6 and Section 5 of the Enforcement Act
in his opinion. According to Clifford the effect of Section 5 was that, “persons who
prevent, hinder, control, or intimidate, or who attempt to prevent, hinder, control, or
intimidate, any person to whom the right of suffrage is secured or guaranteed by [the
Fourteenth] amendment, from exercising, or in exercising such right, by means of bribery
or threats; of depriving such person of employment or occupation; or of ejecting such
person from rented house, lands, or other property; or by threats of refusing to renew
leases or contracts for labor; or by threats of violence to himself or family,-such person so
offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
fined or imprisoned, or both, as therein provided.” He expressed his agreement with
Waite that several of the charges filed against the three men were not in the purview of
the federal courts and did not violate the intent of the Enforcement Act. He further
agreed that other charges were too vague to justify the men’s convictions. The remainder
of Clifford’s opinion, however, focused on declaring the unconstitutionality of the
Enforcement Act because of its objective of both defining crimes and penalties – a power
not granted to Congress by the Constitution.81
Clifford was another northerner sitting on the Supreme Court in the post-Civil
War years; however, he differed significantly in his views from many of the other
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justices. When he received his nomination from President James Buchanan in 1857
opponents expressed concern over his “southern” views on politics. As a staunch
Jacksonian Democrat, he was significantly outnumbered in the Court. Following the
disputed presidential election in 1876, Clifford argued that Rutherford B. Hayes was an
illegitimate president and refused to enter the White House during the entirety of his
tenure. Although he was the sole dissenter in the Cruikshank case, his opinion signaled
the future of limited rights for African Americans in the United States. This was the case
even more so in another decision released the same day as the Cruikshank opinion.
As with the Slaughterhouse decision, the Court’s decision in the Cruikshank case
drew little attention at the time from the growing African American press. Although this
case clearly dealt with issues of race in a more direct manner than the earlier case, the
African American community was apparently unaware of the impact such a decision
could have on their future status in American society. Alternatively, perhaps they were
focused more on local issues than on the larger national picture that was fast emerging.
In either case, another decision deemed significant by nearly every race historian and
civil rights lawyer for the precedent it set managed to go virtually unnoticed by the
African American community.
In U.S. v. Reese [92 U.S. 214 (1875)], Waite again issued the majority opinion
and Clifford, this time joined by Justice Ward Hunt, again dissented. This case centered
on the conviction of two Kentucky election inspectors who had refused to allow an
African American citizen, William Garner, to vote. While Waite and the majority
overturned the convictions arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment did not grant the right
to vote to anyone, rather it declared that the right could not be denied on the basis of race.
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He concluded that the Kentucky statutes under consideration by the Court did not give
preference based on race. Again, Clifford agreed with the outcome of the case, but he
expressed different reasoning for his opposition to the convictions. Clifford argued that
the Fifteenth Amendment expressly dealt only with limitations to voting based expressly
on race. Other limitations, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, were constitutional in his
opinion. This opinion again foreshadowed the future of Jim Crowism and of judicial
limitations on the rights of African Americans.82

A Jury of Your Peers
At the end of the decade, in a rare case showing the Court’s apparent support of
black citizens and upholding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided in Strauder
v. West Virginia [100 U.S. 303 (1879)] that a state law limiting jury service to “white
male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this state” denied
black citizens of the states equal protection as promised by the amendment. Cases such
as this, however, were not the norm during the late-1800s as the courts increasingly
handed down decisions weakening the Fourteenth Amendment and other post-Civil-Warera legislation.
At the center of this atypical case was Taylor Strauder, a black man, who faced
charges in Wheeling, West Virginia, for the murder of his wife, Annie Sly Strauder, on
April 18, 1872. The two former slaves were married in 1871. Shortly afterwards, friends
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began to tell Taylor stories about his wife’s infidelity. The couple began to fight and
Annie sometimes sought police protection from Taylor. As the stories about Annie
increased, Taylor eventually lost control and brutally murdered his wife with a hatchet.
Despite his obvious guilt in the case, Strauder pled not guilty to the charges. The only
witness to the crime was Annie’s four-year-old daughter, Fannie. On May 9, 1873, the
jury of his first trial declared him guilty of first degree murder. This decision, however,
was appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court which granted him a second trial. On
November 5, 1874, a second jury reached the same verdict and again convicted Strauder
of first degree murder. In response to the words of the jury, Strauder “seemed
unconscious of their fearful meaning, and wore the same indifferent expression on his
face that [had] characterized him since his arrest and imprisonment. Strauder’s attorney,
George O. Davenport, again motioned for a new trial.83
Davenport’s motion was finally taken under advisement by the Circuit Court two
months later, in January 1875. As the motion was considered, rumors of Strauder’s
impending execution by hanging spread throughout Wheeling and the surrounding
communities. In early March, the case had gained so much attention that “a party of well
known young men met at an office [and discussed] the probabilities as to the Court of
Appeals interfering in [Strauder’s] behalf, [and] one of the gentlemen in the party offered
to bet ten dollars that Strauder would not be executed on the 26th of March. The bet was
promptly taken up by another of the party.”84
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A week after the wager on Strauder’s prospects and just two weeks before his
scheduled execution, Judge Alpheus F. Haymond of West Virginia’s supreme court of
appeals granted Strauder a stay of proceedings. The Wheeling Daily Register reacted to
the stay with a report that they “presume[d] that the ground upon which the stay was
granted, was that there were no negroes on the jury which convicted Strauder, the law of
West Virginia preventing negroes from sitting on juries, and being in direct violation of
the Fourteenth amendment; and now palpably so, since the passage of the Civil rights
bill.”85
Prior to his trial, Strauder had filed a petition to remove his case from the state
court to the Circuit Court of the United States on the grounds that in the state of West
Virginia African Americans were prohibited from sitting on juries and he, therefore, did
not believe that he could receive a fair judgment from a jury of his peers. Strauder’s
attorneys based their motion on a state law passed on March 12, 1873, which declared
that all adult white males who were citizens of the state would be responsible for serving
as jurors. The law made no mention, however, of African American citizens of the state.
The state court denied his petition and the case went to trial.86
Among the questions considered by the Supreme Court were whether every
citizen had the right to be tried in front of a jury impaneled without discrimination against
members of his race and, if he does have this right, if his case can be moved to the federal
courts if his right is apparently being violated in the state courts. Based on these
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questions, the focus of the Court was directed at the Fourteenth Amendment and its
application to the selection of juries.
In the majority opinion, Justice William Strong declared that the intent of the
Reconstruction Amendments was to “secure[d] to a race recently emancipated, a race that
through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior
race enjoy.” Referring back to the Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, Strong
reiterated the justices’ belief that the intent of the amendments can only be understood in
consideration of the times in which they were adopted. He explained that at the time the
amendments were adopted there was no doubt that the blacks were inferior because of
their race and because of their background as subordinates; therefore, it was expected that
states would pass laws to discriminate against the blacks and the federal government
would have to step in to protect the African Americans who “as a race, [were] abject and
ignorant, and in that condition [were] unfitted to command the respect of those who had
superior intelligence.” Based on this understanding of Congress’ intent, he maintained
that states were supposed to treat blacks and whites equally under the law. Therefore, to
deny the rights of citizens to participate in the justice system simply because of their race
was "practically a brand upon them, affixed by law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."87
To strengthen his conclusion, Strong continued to explain that if the tables were
turned there would be no doubt as to the discriminatory nature of such a statute. He
stated that if a state with a majority black population were to pass a law limiting jurors to
87
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African American citizens, he suspected there would be no end to the claims that such
a statute violated the constitutional right to equal protection of the law. He further
supported his explanation with a hypothetical example of a similar law directed at
naturalized Celtic Irishmen. He also questioned the logic of arguing that such a law was
not a violation of African Americans’ civil rights, stating “how can it be maintained that
compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel
from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal
protection?” Based on this interpretation, Strong and the concurring majority agreed with
the plaintiff that the case should be moved to the U.S. Circuit Court for the purpose of
protecting the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.88
On the surface, the Strauder decision appeared to favor protecting the rights of
African Americans, but it in fact “signals the white South of ways to work around
unconstitutional laws limiting juries.” The Court recognized the need to overturn the
state law limiting jury participation to white citizens, but it did not preclude the
possibility of restricting jury participation in other manners. While race could not be a
limiting factor, even Strong suggested that more indirect limitations could be instituted
by the states with much the same effect. Among the possibilities would be to limit jurors
to a particular gender, to certain ages, to property owners, or to citizens with specific
educational qualifications. In doing so, a state would be able to limit significantly the
number of blacks eligible to serve on juries without directly discriminating against them
on the basis of race. While the Court’s decision was a victory for Strauder, the wording
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of the decision laid the framework for the continuing removal of African Americans
from state juries throughout the country.89
Justice Strong had also written the majority decision in Blyew v. United States less
than a decade earlier. At the time, Strong concluded that a case could not be moved to
federal jurisdiction simply to enable a black witness to testify against white defendants.
He did not view this as a constitutionally guaranteed right and did not believe that it was
a violation of this Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prevent and unaffected party to testify.
Although his two decisions appear significantly different on the surface, one allowing the
federal courts to claim jurisdiction over a state case and the other disallowing such a
move, they are very similar at their core. In both cases, Strong advocated the protection
of rights for African Americans as Congress had intended them at the time a piece of
legislation was adopted. He did not believe that the intent of Congress in passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to guarantee that all criminal cases that might involve a
black witness should be moved to federal jurisdiction. On the other hand, he did believe
that the intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment was to guarantee African Americans
that same protection and treatment under the laws as whites received. He decided both
cases accordingly. At the core of both opinions was his apparent belief that while
constitutionally protected rights could not be denied African Americans simply because
of their race, there was no legal basis for not developing other manners of restriction.
Justice Field, who had written the majority decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases,
dissented simply by referring to his opinion in Ex Parte State of Virginia which was
another case dealing with African Americans and juries decided on the same day as the
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Strauder case. His primary argument is that the federal District Court had no
jurisdiction in the cases before the Court and, therefore, should not be allowed the limit
the rights of the states to pass and enforce laws regarding their own citizens.
While this case received a significant amount of coverage in the local paper, The
Wheeling Daily Register, the interest dealt more with the crime committed and the
repeated delays in Strauder’s conviction than with the constitutional issues presented to
the Supreme Court. As with the other significant cases of the decade, this case received
no mention in the prominent African American newspapers again suggesting that the
African American community was either unaware of the pending crisis in their legal
status or was preoccupied with matters of more local and more immediate concern.

Implications for the Future
As the 1870s ended, the stage had been set for the rise of discriminatory
legislation that African Americans were soon to face. Through a series of critical yet
largely ignored decisions, the Supreme Court set the stage for white Americans to be able
to increase the restrictions on blacks’ political and social lives. In doing so, the justices
severely limited the protections granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Enforcement Act of 1870. While African Americans expressed
little recognition of the potential impact of these decisions on their lives, the feeling of
hope created by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s was
undoubtedly beginning to fade. On the horizon were the Civil Rights Cases and the Ku
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Klux Klan cases that would continue to shape the status of African Americans in the
United States.

84

Chapter Three: Civil Rights and the Ku Klux Klan

At the start of the 1880s, the African American population in the United States
had reached just over 6.5 million, many of whom expected to face another decade of
challenges because of their race. The decade began with the passage of a new
transportation segregation law in Tennessee that Ida B. Wells challenged by the middle of
the decade. In addition to new segregation laws, black Americans also faced continued
violence at the hands of whites. In 1882, at least forty-nine African Americans, including
eleven in Louisiana, were lynched. Although some of the victims in Louisiana faced
accusations of attempted rape or murder, David Lee lost his life on November 8, 1882,
for stealing a hog from a white farmer. In Alabama, Jack Turner was lynched for
allegedly planning a massacre of whites. And, in Madison County, Florida, two black
men faced a lynch mob for being Republicans.90
On a more positive note, Booker T. Washington became the first principal of the
Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in Alabama. Under his leadership, Tuskegee
became the premier vocational-education training institute for African Americans in the
country. Although many black opposed the idea of having students do manual labor to
pay their tuition, “with a great deal of persuasion and by setting the example of clearing
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the fields himself . . . Washington manage[d] to persuade most of the students that
there was a dignity in common labor. Many white Alabamians questioned the need for
an African-American school, but were more accepting of Tuskegee because of its focus
on industrial training and manual labor. Washington also required his students to dress
neatly and behave well which meant they appeared to be the “polite blacks” white
southerners preferred. Ultimately, Washington’s policies at Tuskegee faced opposition
from other prominent blacks who were embarrassed and angered by his decision to
present “a deferential, almost obsequious public image to whites, going so far as to tell
racist ‘darky’ jokes and to join in the ridicule of the ‘absurd’ policies of Reconstruction
that had given political power to ignorant field hands.” Nevertheless, at the time of its
opening in 1881, the Tuskegee Institute and its gifted leader offered a glimmer of hope to
black Americans.91

State versus Private Discrimination
After a decade of precedent setting legal decisions, which went largely ignored by
the African American press, the 1880s quickly took on a different intensity. The
Supreme Court continued to hand down decisions that would inevitably lead to increased
discrimination against black Americans, but now African Americans recognized the
importance of vocalizing their discontent with such decisions and the need to rally what
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little influence they had in efforts to protect the liberties and rights they had not yet
lost. Unfortunately, the mainstream white press also began to take more notice of the
Supreme Court’s decisions and increasingly vocalized its support of decisions that stuck
down legislation geared at protecting the rights of blacks. Two cases, in particular, raised
significant response and debate in the African American community. First, in the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883, the Supreme Court eliminated African Americans’ rights when it
declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. The following year, the Court
further reduced the protection of African Americans when it negated a law geared at
preventing the activities of the Ku Klux Klan. These two cases exemplified the
deteriorating legal status experienced by African Americans in the 1880s.
A key issue in both of these cases was the difference between private action and
state action. The Supreme Court also considered whether Congress had the ability to
limit both. In the wake of Blyew v. United States, the Slaughterhouse Cases, and U.S. v.
Cruikshank, which had opened the doors for increased discrimination of blacks, new Jim
Crow laws were passed throughout the country placing limitations on blacks’ rights to
equal education, voting rights, equal privileges on public carriers, equal access to public
accommodations, and marriage. Examples of such restrictions appeared in Alabama’s
1875 constitution requiring separate schools for children of African descent; an 1877
Delaware statute establishing a separate tax on blacks to fund schools for African
American children; an 1879 Missouri law declaring it illegal for anyone with one-eighth
or more black blood to marry a white person, claiming that “A jury could determine the
amount of Negro blood from appearance;” and, an 1875 Tennessee statute which gave

87
anyone who ran a place of amusement, a hotel, or a passenger train, the right to limit
access to their business the same as “any private person over his private house.”92
At the same time, however, several state and local governments also passed laws
that appeared to protect the rights of African American citizens. Although by the end of
the 1870s the majority of states had laws providing for or requiring separate schools for
the races, a handful of states, including Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, made such segregation illegal. The 1876 Colorado
constitution, for example, prohibited school districts from classifying students in public
schools by race and an 1877 statute in Minnesota made it illegal to prevent students from
attending public schools based on “color, social position, or nationality.” Likewise, a
handful of states and localities passed anti-miscegenation laws (Kentucky 1870 and
Mississippi 1871), laws barring segregation of public carriers (Arkansas 1873), and laws
barring segregation of public accommodations (Florida 1873).93
With the clear differences emerging in protection of African Americans’ civil
rights and liberties, challenges in the courts became a virtual inevitability in the 1880s.
Whites in some states sought to establish further their superiority over blacks through
legislation while blacks began to recognize that limitations of their rights were spreading
out of the Deep South into states such as Delaware, Ohio, Montana, and California,
where a tradition of slavery could not be pointed to as reason for continuing accepted
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social norms. Therefore, when the Supreme Court presented its decision in the Civil
Rights Cases on October 18, 1883, both white and black Americans responded.
Nine months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Civil
Rights Cases, the decision in United States v. Harris [106 U.S. 629 (1883)] served as an
indicator of what was to come. The case originated in Tennessee where R.G. Harris and
nineteen other white men were accused of violating Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States when they forced their way into the Crockett County prison and
attacked four black prisoners. During the attack, prisoners Robert R. Smith, William J.
Overton, and George W. Wells, Jr., were severely injured and P. M. Wells was mortally
wounded. The charges against Harris and the other white men centered on their apparent
conspiracy to deprive four black men of “the equal protection of the laws” of the state of
Tennessee. Following the lower court’s inability to reach a consensus in the case, the
Supreme Court considered Harris et al’s claims that Section 5519, which had been passed
by Congress to help enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, was in fact a violation of the
Tenth Amendment rights of the state of Tennessee and its residents.94
Central to the defendants’ argument in the case was that the offenses defined in
Section 5519 were not within federal jurisdiction and, therefore, the statute itself was
unconstitutional. According to Section 5519, often referred to as the “Ku Klux Law,”
If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire or go in disguise
upon the highway or on the premises of another for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under
the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any state or territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such state or territory the equal protection of the laws, each said
persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 nor more than
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$5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less than six
months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Harris and the other defendants contended that the Tenth Amendment95 protected states’
rights from federal dominance in its declaration that states would retain all powers “not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States.”
Therefore, the federal government should not have had jurisdiction over their case and
they should not have faced the charges and penalties created by Section 5519.96
In an eight-to-one decision, the Court found in favor of Harris and his codefendants. According to the majority decision, written by Justice William Burnham
Woods, the case revisited issues already addressed in U.S. v. Cruikshank and Virginia v.
Rives [100 U.S. 313 (1880)].97 Woods concluded that because Section 5519 addressed
only private actions, not state actions, it was not a constitutional enforcement of the
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This conclusion, however, came
from his interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment and his belief that “the provisions of
that section [5519] are broader than the thirteenth amendment would justify. . . . [because
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a] law under which two or more free white private citizens could be punished for
conspiring or going in disguise for the purpose of depriving another free white citizen98
of the right accorded by the law of the state to all classes of persons, – as, for instance,
the right to make contract, bring a suit, or give evidence, – clearly cannot be authorized
by the amendment which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.”99
Although United States v. Harris determined there was no constitutional
grounding for Section 5519, the impact of the decision was relatively limited for several
reasons. First, the direct scope of the case was limited and, thus, drew little attention.
Second, Justice Woods was one of the quieter justices of the period who tended to side
with the majority. Thus, his majority decision in the case, which was notably short and to
the point, did not draw a great deal of immediate attention from either supporters or
opponents. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the sole dissenter in the case, Justice
John Marshall Harlan, did not present an explanation for his dissent. It was not until later
in the year when he was again the sole dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases that he
vocalized his disagreement with the majority’s limiting interpretation of the
Reconstruction Amendments and became a hero to the African American community.
The lack of attention given this case can again be explained by the lack of coverage by
both the African American press and the white press. Again, there was no noticeable
reaction by the increasing number of black newspapers. The white press, on the other
hand, did note the case, but only in passing, as seen in a January 23, 1883, article in the
The Atlanta Constitution. According to the article titled “5519 Reversed,” the case of
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United States v. Harris was an important constitutional case, but the article continued
on to simply summarize Justice Wood’s decision with no additional comment, either
positive or negative, on the significance of the case.100
Unlike the fairly narrow scope of United States v. Harris, the Civil Rights Cases
consisted of five separate cases grouped together by the Supreme Court. The five cases
hailed from Kansas, California, Missouri, New York, and Tennessee and thereby
represented a good cross-section of the states in the Union. The central issue addressed
by all five cases was the constitutionality of the first and second sections of the Civil
Rights Act passed on March 1, 1875. More specifically, the cases addressed the power of
the federal government to regulate under the Fourteenth Amendment the actions of
private citizens and institutions. The cases on hand dealt directly with the rights of
African American citizens to equal accommodations and privileges in inns, hotels,
theatres, and on railroads. Or, depending on one’s perspective, the cases addressed the
rights of white business owners to determine who should or should not have full access to
their facilities based on any criteria they deemed appropriate, including race.101
In two cases, United States v. Stanley and United States v. Nichols, indictments
were filed against the defendants for “denying to persons of color the accommodations
and privileges of an inn or hotel.” In United States v. Singleton, the race of the person
denied full accommodations at the Grand Opera House in New York was not disclosed.
Solicitor General Phillips, however, explained on behalf of the plaintiff, the United
States, that “said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of
100
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every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” Each of
these cases came before the Supreme Court because the judges involved were split upon
the question of the constitutionality of the first and second sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875.102
In the fourth case, United States v. Ryan, an indictment had been filed against
Ryan for failing to permit an African American to have a seat in the formal section of
Maguire’s Theatre in San Francisco. The basis of this case reaching the Supreme Court
was a “writ of error to the judgment of the circuit court for the district of California
sustaining a demurrer to the information.” In other words, the appellate court requested
that the trial court provide the trial records related to the lower court’s decision to dismiss
the case for the plaintiff on the grounds that no legal claim had been asserted.103
In the final case, Robinson and wife v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad
Company, Mr. and Mrs. Robinson took action against the Memphis & Charleston
Railroad Company for denying Mrs. Robinson accommodation in the ladies’ car because
“she was a person of African descent.” In the original case, a jury found in favor of the
railroad company after the judge allowed evidence that a young white man accompanied
Mrs. Robinson and she, therefore, must have been an unsavory person. According to the
judge’s instructions for the jury, “if this was the conductor’s bona fide reason for
excluding the woman from the car, they might take it into consideration on the question
of the liability of the company.” The Robinsons appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court on a writ of error that the judge’s instructions to the jury assumed an inappropriate
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connection between Mrs. Robinson and the white man and, therefore, unduly
influenced the jury.104
The Court’s focus in the cases settled on the first two sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875. Section 1 provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of
servitude
Section 2 of the Act further provided:
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any
citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment
of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said
section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for every
such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person aggrieved
thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall,
also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less that $500 nor more than
$1000, or shall be imprisoned not less than 30 days nor more than one
year: Provided, that all persons may sue for the penalty aforesaid, or to
proceed under their rights at common law and by statutes; and having so
elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in
the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to
criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal law of any state:
And provided, further, that a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party
aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either
prosecution respectively.105
Advocates of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was one last effort by a
Republican-dominated Congress to secure equal rights for African Americans, believed
that it furthered the steps towards equality taken with the passage of the Thirteenth and
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Fourteenth Amendments. They took the view that once the Thirteenth Amendment
made slavery illegal and the Fourteenth Amendment defined citizenship in the United
States that Congress had received the power to pass legislation which would prevent
African Americans from losing their rights of citizenship through the discriminatory
actions of others. Opponents of the legislation, on the other hand, believed that white
superiority was accepted by Americans throughout the country and contended that no
civil rights legislation would be able to change such attitudes. Albion Tourgée, who
would later argue the case of Homer Plessy before the Supreme Court, told a friend, “The
bill with all respect to its author [Sumner], is just like a blister plaster put on a dozing
man. . . . If it becomes law, it will constantly be avoided. . . . It will utterly destroy the
bulk of our common schools in the South. . . . It simply delays – puts back – the thorough
and complete rehabilitation of the South ten or twenty years.” The result, therefore,
would simply be a piece of legislation that allowed Congress to impose minority held
opinions on the majority.106
In the Court’s majority decision, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who had dissented in
the Slaughterhouse Cases, described the majority’s reasoning in great detail. He began
with a discussion of the pertinent sections of the Fourteenth Amendment and ended not
only with a decision in favor of the defendants, but a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. A mere
eight years after its passage, the last great piece of Reconstruction legislation meant to
assist in the development of racial equality was no more.107
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Justice Bradley began his explanation of the Court’s decision with a brief
summary of the two sections under consideration. He contended that the first section of
the law did not allow all persons to receive equal access and privileges in theatres and
public conveyances but, rather, only that such access could not be based solely on a
citizen’s race or previous condition of servitude. The second section of the law then
made it a punishable offense to prevent someone from gaining equal access solely based
on his or her race. The question then became whether the recent Reconstruction
Amendments gave “[C]ongress constitutional power to make such a law.”108
In this case, the justices focused on the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
which declared that “no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This section, which had been
lauded by African Americans and by white supporters of equal rights at the time of the
Amendment’s ratification, now faced a new interpretation in the hands of the Supreme
Court. In line with the majority decision in United States v. Harris, Bradley and the
concurring justices claimed, “It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.” As
such, Bradley concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment nullifies all state legislation
geared at limiting equal access to inns, amusements, theatres, and railroads for African
Americans solely because of their race. The Amendment also invested Congress with the
power to enforce the prohibition of such state laws. In other words, Congress did have
108

Civil Rights Cases.

96
the constitutional power to legislate against state actions that infringed upon African
Americans privileges and immunities as United States citizens.109
What the Fourteenth Amendment did not do, Bradley claimed, was grant
Congress the constitutional power to legislate against private actions that limited blacks’
privileges, immunities, and rights to equal access. Bradley referred back to the Court’s
decision in United States v. Cruikshank in which Chief Justice Morrison Waite had
argued, “The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another.” The earlier case, which the growing African American press
at the time had virtually ignored, now served as further justification for Justice Bradley’s
stance in the Civil Rights Cases.110
To clarify his argument further, Bradley provided examples of constitutional
provisions regarding contracts and congressional powers to enforce contracts.111 This
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Bradley wrote, “An apt illustration of this distinction may be found in some of the provisions of the
original constitution. Take the subject of contracts, for example. The constitution prohibited the states
from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This did not give to congress power to provide
laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with
jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in these courts. It did, however, give
the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by state legislation might be
counteracted and corrected; and this power was exercised. The remedy which congress actually provided
was that contained in the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, giving to the supreme court of
the United States jurisdiction by writ of error to review the final decisions of state courts whenever they
should sustain the validity of a state statute or authority, alleged to be repugnant to the constitution or laws
of the United States. By this means, if a state law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract, and
the state tribunals sustained the validity of the law, the mischief could be corrected in this court. The
legislation of congress, and the proceedings provided for under it, were corrective in their character. No
attempt was made to draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally, and no such
attempt would have been sustained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might
have been provided in that case. Probably congress had power to pass a law giving to the courts of the
United States direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a state law; and, under the broad
provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, giving the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the
constitution and laws of the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists. But under that or
any other law, it must appear, as well by allegation as proof at the trial, that the constitution had been
110
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move likely had two motivations. First, it enabled Bradley to use an issue that had
been dealt with in the Constitution from the beginning and, thus, had greater established
precedent. Moreover, it gave him the opportunity to use an example that was in no way
based on the emotional issue of race or the question of civil rights to demonstrate his
point. He explained, “The constitution prohibited the states from passing any law
impairing the obligation of contracts. . . . [which gave Congress] the power to provide
remedies by which the impairment of contracts by state legislation might be counteracted
and corrected.” Congress exercised this power by establishing the means for cases
regarding state impairment of contracts to be remedied by the Supreme Court. In order
for this to occur, Bradley concluded that “Some obnoxious state law passed . . . is
necessary to be assumed in order to lay the foundation of any federal remedy in the case,
and for the very sufficient reason that the constitutional prohibition is against state laws
impairing the obligation of contracts.” There was no allowance in the Constitution for
federal remedies against private entities that impede the function of contracts.112
Likewise, in the Civil Rights Cases currently before the Supreme Court, Bradley
claimed that until a state law was passed requiring theatres, inns, and railroads to deny
the privileges, immunities, and rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress could not act. He allowed that Congress could, and should, pass
legislation in advance to protect against such state laws, but “Such legislation cannot
properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty, and property,
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defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of
municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society.”113
Finally, Justice Bradley explained that to claim it was equal to slavery to deny a
person access to a theatre or equal accommodations in an inn or on the railroad was
absurd and was not the intent of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He argued
“It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act
of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or
as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.” Bradley concluded that
at some point black Americans must stand and progress on their own without constantly
looking to the government for assistance and protection. With that, Justice Bradley and
seven concurring justices declared the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
unconstitutional and void.114
The sole dissenting voice came from Justice John Marshall Harlan. Harlan, a
native of Kentucky, joined the Supreme Court on December 10, 1877. Nominated by
President Rutherford B. Hayes to replace Justice David Davis, who had joined the
majority in Blyew v. United States, the Slaughterhouse Cases, and United States v.
Cruikshank, Harlan served until his death on October 14, 1911. The Civil Rights Cases
was just one instance of his tendency to go against the majority and dissent on key civil
rights cases. His father was a Whig politician whose commitment to nationalism passed
on to his son. During the Civil War, John Marshall Harlan had supported the Union but
opposed rapid emancipation. He went so far as to condemn the Thirteenth Amendment
113
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“as an unrepublican assault on the property rights of white slaveholders.” After the
war, however, his political focus began to shift away from the Whig Party toward the
Republican Party. Coupled with this shift was an antislavery stance. Although he
ultimately embraced the Republican support for legal equality over the Democrats’ white
supremacist leanings, Harlan never quite rid himself of paternalistic views of race in
America. Nevertheless, for the next three decades, Harlan became the closest thing to a
friend the black citizens of the United States had on the Supreme Court.115
His first significant dissent came in the Civil Rights Cases. He began his
dissenting opinion with a declaration that “The opinion in these cases proceeds . . . upon
grounds entirely too narrow and artificial.” He argued that in the majority decision
Justice Bradley went against the tradition of the court by considering only the language of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the intent of their framers. Harlan
contended that the intent of the amendments’ authors was to adopt “in the interest of
liberty, for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights
inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship.” He summarized
the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as intending to prevent racial
discrimination and to punish those who committed such discrimination. In these
interpretations, Harlan agreed with the Court’s majority. Where Harlan disagreed with
the majority was in his interpretation of what power the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments grant to Congress to enforce the two sections under consideration. While
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Justice Bradley discussed only the language of the Fourteenth Amendment in his
determination that it was meant only to deal with state actions, Harlan considered the
context in which the amendment was written and ratified to determine the intent of
Congress.116
Using a more historical interpretation of the Constitution than Bradley’s textual
interpretation, Harlan considered as far back as 1793 in his dissent. Harlan discussed the
fugitive slave law and its consideration before the Supreme Court. The 1793 law
established processes for fugitive slaves to be returned to their owners and for penalties to
be prescribed against those who impeded the return of such fugitives. Speaking for the
majority in Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania [41 U.S. 539 (1842)], Justice Joseph Story
judged the 1793 act to be constitutional on the grounds that
The fundamental principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem
to be that when the end is required the means are given, and when the duty
is enjoined the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of
the functionary to whom it is entrusted. . . . It would be a strange anomaly
and forced construction to suppose that the national government meant to
rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper duties, and the rights which it
intended to secure, upon state legislation, and not upon that of the Union.
A fortiori, it would be more objectionable to suppose that a power which
was to be the same throughout the Union should be confided to state
sovereignty which could not rightfully act beyond its own territorial limits.
Despite the claims by Pennsylvania’s attorney general in the case that upholding the 1793
act would limit state sovereignty, the Supreme Court still determined that Congress, not
the individual states, had the primary legislative power to protect the master’s right to
ownership of the slave.117
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Harlan then discussed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which, he argued, also
relied upon congressional power to protect the master’s rights to ownership of slaves.
Unlike the previous act, however, this updated version essentially put the resources of the
nation in the hands of masters who utilized commissioners, posses, and other citizens to
assist them in finding their runaway slaves. Again, in Ableman v. Booth [62 U.S. 506
(1858)], Harlan explained that the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to
legislate the matter.118
Finally, Justice Harlan discussed the critical case of Dred Scott v. Sandford [60
U.S. 593 (1856)] in which Dred Scott attempted to claim citizenship for himself and his
family in the state of Missouri. Harlan explained that according to Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney’s majority decision in the case, under the language of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution the terms “people of the United States” and “citizens”
were meant to refer to a specific body of people in the country who made up and
controlled the government. This specific group did not include people of African descent
who had been brought to this country and sold into servitude. Therefore, Taney
concluded they could “claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States,” rather “they were at that time
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority,
and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government
might choose to grant them.”119
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It was in the context of these cases, and others like them, as well as the Civil
War, that the Thirteenth Amendment gained passage, according to Harlan. Although he
had once opposed the amendment, as a justice Harlan now viewed the piece in terms of
both its words and its intent. In Harlan’s view, there was no doubt about the meaning of
the amendment or of its all-inclusive nature. He declared that the terms of the
amendment “are absolute and universal [and] embrace every race which then was, or
might thereafter be, within the United States.” Because of the universal nature of the
amendment, he concluded that the intent of Congress in its passage was to guarantee all
rights and privileges for all races in the United States. He further concluded that in light
of the precedent set by the fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850, Congress was expressly
granted the power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Pointing to the majority
decisions in Strauder v. West Virginia and United States v. Reese, in which the court
judged that Congress has the ability to protect all rights granted and guaranteed by the
Constitution, he did not think the other members of the court should now reverse that
stance.120
Unlike Justice Bradley, who appeared to focus heavily on the issue of actual
slavery, Harlan viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as doing more than ending the
institution of slavery. Rather, Harlan contended that the second section of the
amendment addressed not only the institution of slavery but also the continuing stigma of
slavery and the potential of American society to impose the degradations of slavery upon
African American citizens even after they were no longer held in actual servitude. He
stated
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I do not contend that the thirteenth amendment invests congress with
authority, by legislation, to regulate the entire body of the civil rights
which citizens enjoy, or may enjoy, in the several states. But I do hold
that since slavery, as the court has repeatedly declared, was the moving or
principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and since that
institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in
bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and
protection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race,
in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.
In Harlan’s viewpoint, Congress did have the constitutional authority to enact legislation
that would protect African American citizens not only from state action, but also from “at
least, such individuals and corporations” who acted either with the authority of or in the
name of the state.121
Harlan then looked to cases in which the court set the precedent of considering
railroads and steam carriers as public conveyances that operated with the authority of the
state, if not its direct support. He noted that in Munn v. Illinois [94 U.S. 113 (1877)] the
court ruled that because the state held the responsibility of creating and maintaining
highways for public use and “that no matter who is the agent, and what is the agency, the
function performed is that of the state; that although the owners may be private
companies, they may be compelled to permit the public to use these works in the manner
in which they can be used.” He noted several additional cases, including Township of
Pine Grove v. Talcott [86 U.S. 666 (1873)], Town of Queensbury v. Culver [86 U.S. 83
(1873)], and Erie & N. E. R. Co. v. Casey [26 Penn. St. 287], which further supported his
argument that because the railroads were supported by the state for public use, owners of
private railroad companies were still serving the public needs with authority granted to
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them by the state and, therefore, could be subject to congressional legislation under
the Thirteenth Amendment. 122
Regarding inns, Harlan drew similar conclusions. He delineated a distinction
between private boarding houses and inns, as defined in the 1875 Civil Rights Act.
Again based on judicial precedent, Harlan demonstrated that innkeepers exercise a public
service meant to benefit all travelers. As with private railroad company owners, the
innkeeper’s public responsibility makes him subject to any congressional legislation
written in support of the Thirteenth Amendment.123
Finally, Justice Harlan addressed places of public amusement. While he
understood the arguments of his opponents that owners of such establishments have no
clear public responsibilities, he again disagreed with their assessment. He declared, “My
answer to that argument is that places of public amusement, within the meaning of the act
of 1875, are such as are established and maintained under direct license of the law. The
authority to establish and maintain them comes from the public. The colored race is part
of that public.” Although not grounded in the same degree of judicial precedent as his
other conclusions, this view of places of public amusement fell clearly in line with his
overall viewpoint.124
Having established his opinion of the intent and purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment, Harlan proceeded to discuss the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment on
congressional power. He argued that the intent of the amendment was to guarantee basic
rights of national citizenship for the new freedmen and their descendants. Referencing
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the Slaughterhouse Cases, he noted that the Supreme Court had previously
determined that the common component of all the Reconstruction Amendments was the
freedom of the slaves and their protection from “the oppression of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over” them. Based on the language of the first
and fifth sections of the Fourteenth Amendment, he explained that in Strauder v. West
Virginia and Ex parte Virginia the Court declared that the amendment secured certain
rights and privileges.125
At question, and where he disagreed with the majority in the Civil Rights Cases,
was when Congress could legislate enforcement of the amendment. Harlan summarized
the majority opinion as resting upon the reasoning that “the general government cannot,
in advance of hostile state laws or hostile state proceedings, actively interface for the
protection of any of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the fourteenth
amendment.” He countered that the affirmative language of Section 1 of the amendment,
which declares “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they
reside,” made all African Americans who descended from slaves instant citizens of the
country and of their states of residence. This affirmative statement of citizenship could
be protected by congressional legislation, as well as by judicial power.126
The most clear right, privilege, or immunity granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Harlan contended, was the right to be free from race discrimination that
would deny a black citizen any civil right granted to white citizens of the state. He
quoted the Court’s majority in U.S. v. Cruikshank that “the equality of rights of citizens is
125
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a principle of republicanism.” Furthermore, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court
referred to the Fourteenth Amendment as “one of a series of constitutional provisions
having a common purpose, namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that
through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior
race enjoyed.”127
Finally, Harlan concluded that the Court itself determined in U.S. v. Cruikshank
that the protection from discrimination on the basis of race was a newly secured
constitutional right. Being a right recently granted by the federal government, Harlan did
not understand how the majority of Supreme Court justices could argue that the federal
government did not have legislative power to protect this right. Arguing as much was the
same as abandoning the court’s traditional broad interpretation of the Constitution, which
Harlan was not prepared to do. He concluded that the majority’s opinion was
“repugnant” and that it ignored the well-known understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to protect citizens not only from state discrimination, but from
private and corporate discrimination as well.128
Despite agreeing that the intent of the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1875 was to prevent racial discrimination and punish those who carried out such
discrimination, Harlan and Bradley differed in their interpretations of how the
Reconstruction Amendments should be applied to law and, thus, disagreed in this
precedent setting case. The differences in their interpretations came down to historical
interpretation versus textual interpretation.

In his detailed discussion of the evolution of

the fugitive slave acts as well as his understanding of the intent of the Thirteenth
127
128

Civil Rights Cases; United States v. Cruikshank, and, Strauder v. West Virginia.
Civil Rights Cases.

107
Amendment, Justice Harlan clearly demonstrated his dedication to a historical
interpretation of the Constitution. He believed that honoring the intentions of the
Constitution’s authors was as important, if not more so, than simply reading the text. On
the other hand, Justice Bradley offered a textual interpretation of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments in which he looked “to the meaning of the words of the
Constitution alone, as they would be interpreted by an average contemporary American.”
Such conflicts of interpretation became common in future decades as the Supreme Court
attempted to determine what role the federal government should have in legislating the
emotional issue of racial discrimination. For now, the differences in interpretation drew a
line in the sand between an increasingly vocal African American community that now
viewed John Marshall Harlan as a potential hero and the white majority that favored a
narrow interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments in order to best protect their
position of superiority in American society.129

Black America Reacts to the Majority
The public response to the Civil Rights Cases, compared to the cases discussed
earlier, was enormous. This was particularly true in the African American press that had
continued to grow throughout the 1870s and early 1880s. By August 1883, the Cleveland
Gazette declared that there were 127 legitimate black newspapers in the country. In
response to an “often asked” question of whether these newspapers had any actual
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influence and whether they benefited the African American community, the paper
responded “It is a fact capable of demonstration that the public mind, in making up its
judgment upon many questions, is influenced to a considerable extent by the colored
press; for these papers are read not only by colored men, but also by white men. . . . The
colored press will be aggressive – it will be vigilant – it will insist in season and out of
season upon all the rights of the Negro being granted him.” Furthermore, the newspaper
noted, “Colored newspapers reflect the opinion of colored men, and, be it remembered,
the colored people number more than six millions in this country – surely no insignificant
part of the population. . . . [and] Colored men think more than they did a generation ago.”
With the printing of such statements, it is evident that the African American press had
begun to recognize an increase in its own influence. There was also an increase in the
understanding of the black community that they would have to fully consider the issues at
hand and express their opinions to realize change. 130
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases became
public, the African American press reacted. On the one hand, reporters and editors
expressed dismay and outrage at the majority opinion, but, on the other hand, they noted
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion as offering their community a glimmer of hope that
not all white Americans agreed with the decision. In two articles in its October 20, 1883
issue, the Cleveland Gazette summed up the reactions of most blacks in the United States.
First, the paper pointed out that “no decision of this [Supreme] Court has for a long time
so pleased the [white] South as generally as this,” making the editors believe that “the
Court is toadying to the South in establishing the Calhoun theory of ‘States Rights,’ as it
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does by this shameful decision.” Second, the paper voiced its concern that the
decision would affect not only southern blacks, but blacks and other minority groups
throughout the country as it would “close hundreds of hotels, places of amusement and
other public places” not only to the African American community, but also to Jews and
Catholics. Finally, the newspaper acknowledged that even these threats of additional
restrictions on African Americans’ rights to access public transportation and
accommodations are minor if they “reflect on the unlimited power possessed by the
Supreme Court, for the good or evil of our people, and the evident willingness on the part
of the judges to use that power, to prejudice and jeopardize our interests in this our native
land, [causing] a shudder to pervade us, and we intuitively ask, ‘What next?’” Thus, the
Cleveland Gazette addressed both the immediate and long-term consequences of the
decision.131
Regarding the first concern raised by the Cleveland Gazette, that the Supreme
Court was playing to the goals of southern whites, black citizens and other black
newspapers recognized the potential problem as well. In a letter to the editor of the
Cleveland Gazette, a citizen wrote, “In my opinion this decision sets forth the principles
that Calhoun [and] Vallandingham . . . contended for. Surely they are not the principles
that Abraham Lincoln, Garrison and Sumner contended for. They are the principles
which Lee and Jackson fought for, they are not those principles that Grant and Sherman
fought for.” On the same day, the Huntsville Gazette reported that ex-Senator Blanche K.
Bruce declared, “It is a most unfortunate decision. . . . and grieves me and thousands of
others very much. I think its effect will be to carry the country backward fifteen years, at
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least. It does not reflect the people’s will as a court decision ought to do, and it is, in
my opinion, the revival of Calhoun’s theory of State rights.” As the first African
American to serve a full term in the U.S. Senate, Bruce was currently serving as the first
black Register of the Treasury. Based on his positions of respect and influence, many
African Americans viewed Bruce as a man to listen to and to follow. Two weeks later,
the Washington Bee echoed the sentiments expressed in many other black newspapers
regarding the Court’s decision. Moreover, the editors declared, “We shall follow the
leadership of Hon. Blanche K. Bruce because we believe him to be one of the wisest and
most judicious leaders of the colored race.” In addition to Bruce, African American
newspapers expressed their respect for and trust in Frederick Douglass in whom they
recognized “the elements of true manhood.”132
Evidence that the effects of the decision were expected to be felt in all regions of
the country was seen in a column published on November 10, 1883, in The Washington
Bee. The column, titled “Our Colored Exchanges,” printed segments of articles from
black newspapers in Ohio, Kentucky, Arkansas, West Virginia, Mississippi, and New
York. Each newspaper expressed concern over the Civil Rights Cases decision and how
both whites and blacks might respond. While some, such as the Arkansas Herald and
New York City’s The Progressive American, voiced hopes that white Americans would
rise “above prejudices [and protect] the colored people in the enjoyment of every civil
right” and that “the Republicans [would] plant themselves squarely upon their avowed
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principles and retain the colored man’s vote,” others called on members of their own
race to stand strong and take action.133
These calls for action within their own community varied from basic requests that
black Americans not encourage the continuation of racial discrimination themselves, to
calls for the black community to continue to support the Republican party, to more
elaborate calls for mass meetings and efforts to gain passage of a constitutional
amendment that would spell out blacks’ civil rights once and for all. Some journalists
feared that even mass protests and political organization against the Court’s decision
would fail if the black community did not demonstrate to whites in daily settings that
they were unified in their fight for civil rights. The Louisville Bulletin spoke out against
one such divisive group, writing, “The colored men who have barber shops exclusively
for white persons stand in the way of progress. How can colored people expect to obtain
their civil rights if colored persons make distinctions in their business? The caste barbershops must go. Mr. colored-only-white-man-shaving barber go into some other kind of
business.”134
A greater concern among many journalists was that black Americans would view
the decision by the Republican dominated Court as evidence that the Republican party
had abandoned the cause of African Americans. This sentiment emerged in some
newspapers, such as the Cairo Pilot which proclaimed, “It would have scarcely
occasioned a ripple of excitement if a Democratic supreme bench had bridged our civil
rights with a shadow – phantom – a technicality – but when our best friends, our Brutus
dons the judicial garb of a Taney, with the hand of an adverse sentiment raises the dagger
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– we say with Caesar of old and ‘Thou too Brutus.’” Along the same lines, the AfroAmerican in Baltimore maintained “If the Republican continues to be the champion of
Federal supremacy over citizens and over States, it must couple with its assertion of
supremacy the complementary idea of the defence [sic] and regulation of the rights of
citizens. If this last power is not found in the Constitution, and the Supreme Court says it
is not there, then it must demand that it be placed there. If the Republican party has not
the nerve to take this position, then its mission is ended.” These assertions, however,
represented a minority opinion in the African American press of the period.135
It was more common for newspapers to publish pleas for blacks to not make such
rash decisions. Just weeks after the Supreme Court’s decision, The Washington Bee
declared,
We appeal to the colored men of this country to beware. If freedom is
appreciated, if liberty is desired, and a free exercise of the rights which
have been guaranteed by the constitution are what we want, then work
unceasingly for a republican president in 1884. . . . We shall to the end
support the republican party. There is no other party to which the negro
should go. Our safety is in our God and the republican party and to look
to any other source will be dangerous and to the detriment of the colored
men.
Furthermore, the newspaper explained that blacks should not be swept up by any
promises made by Democrats at this time or turmoil, because their party had proven over
time that its principles would lead to even fewer rights and less respect for African
Americans. The Cleveland Gazette also encouraged continued black support for the
Republicans. On November 3, the newspaper’s front page carried an article excerpted
from a lecture given by John Mercer Langston. According to Langston, who had served
as inspector general of the Freedmen’s Bureau and helped to establish Howard
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University’s law school, “The leaders of the Republican party have taught that our
Constitution is based on equality before the law. They are men who gave us the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments of the Constitution . . . Several of these
noble men have gone to their rewards; but their spirits, found in the words and sayings
left us, animate us in the present effort to save and conserve our liberty, re-energizing the
Republican party, and infusing into it a new purpose, thus lead it unto victory as of old in
its glorious days of the past.” Although this support for the Republicans was partially
framed as opposition to the Democrats and was lightly tainted by an understanding that
the Republican party’s support for the cause of civil rights appeared to have faltered, it is
clear that these newspapers wanted the black community to remain unified and on a track
most likely to end in success.136
Despite concerns that some members of their race were contributing to their lack
of civil rights and that others would be drawn away from the political party that had
demonstrated repeated dedication to furthering their civil rights, the most prominent
focus in black newspapers in the weeks following the Supreme Court’s decision was on
rallying the African American community together. Journalists encouraged their readers
“to work for a constitutional amendment that will embody the good features of the Civil
Rights bill and many additional ones” and to “discard the motive of the acts of the
Democratic party and look at the principle.” The most vigilant calls, however, were for
African Americans to gather at meetings where they could discuss the significance of the
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Court’s decision and determine how their community could work to improve their
situation.137
One such meeting was held in Washington, D.C. just days after the decision.
Among the African American leaders present at the gathering were: Frederick Douglass;
Blanch Bruce; the first African American graduate of Harvard College, Richard Greener;
Presbyterian pastor John F. Cook; and, Francis J. Grimké,138 a well-known minister and
activist. As a show of support, white allies including Robert G. Ingersoll, Reverend John
Rankin, former congressman Samuel Shellabarger, and Howard University president
William W. Patton also attended the meeting. According to press reports, nearly 2,000
people attended the meeting with another 4,000 having to leave when they found Lincoln
Hall was too full to accommodate them.139
Presiding over the meeting, Professor James M. Gregory of Howard University
opened the meeting with a statement of their goals to discuss the effects of the Civil
Rights Cases decision and to develop a plan of response. Following his greeting and a
prayer led by Reverend Grimké, Lewis Douglass read a series of eight resolutions to the
crowd, all of which they unanimously adopted. First, they resolved that speaking with
“words of indignation or disrespect aimed at the Supreme Court of the United States
would not only be useless as a means for [their] main object – namely, the protection due
to [their] manhood and citizenship, but, on the contrary, would tend to alienate [their]
friends and all who have faith in the honesty and integrity of that august and learned
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tribunal.” Second, they called on Americans who truly loved their country, regardless
of their race or political ties, to support full equality of rights for both whites and
blacks.140
In their next resolutions, the participants turned their attention specifically toward
the Republican and Democratic political parties and their responsibilities to support the
protection of African Americans’ civil rights. In the third resolution, they brought
attention to the Republican party, demanding that it back its own mandate from the 1872
Republican Convention in Philadelphia. According to its platform, the party declared
“That complete liberty and exact equality in the enjoyment of all civil, political, and
public rights should be established and effectually maintained throughout the Union by
efficient and appropriate State and federal legislation; and that neither the law nor its
administration should admit any discrimination in respect to citizens by reason of race,
creed, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Next, the attendees focused on the
Democratic party, reminding it of its own “declaration in the National Convention of
1872, ‘that we recognize the equality of all men before the law, and hold that is the duty
of Government in its dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of
whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political.’” Although there was
general agreement within the African American community that if either of the two major
political parties truly supported equal rights for blacks it was the Republicans, the
participants of this meeting clearly wanted to draw the attention of all potential
supporters to their cause.141
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In the next resolutions, the focus turned toward the black community. To
begin with, they resolved “That it is the paramount duty of the colored voter to give his
aid and support to that party or coalition of parties that will give force and meaning to the
utterances, pledges and demands of the Republican and of the Democratic party in their
platform [sic] in 1872 in respect of the protection of colored citizens in their manhood
rights.” Furthermore, they resolved that in light of the progress African American
citizens had made in recent years regarding “morals, education, frugality, industry, and
general usefulness,” it simply made sense for the nation as a whole to work for the
protection of their civil rights. Their general goal was that black Americans continue to
make wise and informed decisions regarding politics and that they continue to improve
themselves as individuals and as a community.142
In their final two resolutions, the gathered supporters called first on states to pass
legislation protecting the rights granted by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and, second, on
“the co-operation of all good men and women in securing such legislation as may be
necessary to complete our freedom.” Most notably, however, was the final segment of
their eighth resolution which called for “the immediate organization of civil rights
associations throughout the country, through which proper agitation and earnest work for
our cause may be inaugurated and carried out.” Such a public call was a bold statement
by this group as it made clear its recognition that action needed to be taken on a national
level. Furthermore, the resolutions as a whole established their hope that blacks, whites,
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Republicans, and Democrats would all be able to come together in support of African
Americans’ civil rights.143
Following the reading and adoption of the resolutions, the focus of the meeting
turned to speeches by several of the evening’s respected guests. The first speaker,
introduced by Gregory as “the one leader to whom the colored people had always looked
in every emergency, and who had always been found equal to every emergency,” was
Frederick Douglass. Following lengthy applause, Douglass read a prepared speech he
had written so he would be sure to remember everything he wanted to say. He claimed
that this decision by the Supreme Court was as significant as the passage of the Fugitive
Slave Law, the events of Bleeding Kansas, the disintegration of the Missouri
Compromise, and the fateful Dred Scott decision because it “had inflicted upon seven
millions of colored people in this country, and had left them naked and defenseless
against the action of malignant, vulgar and pitiless prejudice.” Moreover, he decried the
decision as presenting the United States to rest of the world as a country that was
apparently unable and unwilling to protect the rights of all of its citizens.144
Other speakers following Douglass included Colonel Ingersoll, Judge
Shellabarger, and Reverend Rankin. All three expressed their sympathy for their black
compatriots and their support for the resolutions of the evening. Ingersoll, who spoke the
longest of the three, expressed his belief that the decision was “unworthy of the Supreme
Court” and his belief that “the only recourse for the colored people was in the ballotbox.” He also hoped that black Americans would not hastily turn their backs on the
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Republicans until the party had an opportunity to show whether it would support the
Court’s decision or act out against it.145
While the large meeting in the nation’s capital understandably garnered more
attention than meetings held elsewhere, it was not the only such gathering. In Columbus,
Ohio, a public meeting of colored citizens took place at the Board of Trade rooms. Plans
for a similar meeting in Cleveland’s Halcyon Hall were announced in the Cleveland
Gazette. The organizers’ hope was “that the people will attend en masse and consider the
best course to be pursued . . . since the Civil Rights law has been decided
unconstitutional.” One speaker at the meeting, Mr. J. T. Hamilton, “tried to impress upon
those present the great importance of unity – in his own language, ‘we must stick
together.’” At a meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a large crowd cheered speakers
who asked blacks to show continued support for the Republicans and listened to those
who denounced the Supreme Court’s decision. In Chicago, Reverend W. A. Polk
declared at a mass meeting, “This decision is an insult to our race.” He continued to
encourage the audience to use their votes to elect representatives who would work to
protect their rights. In Keokuk, Iowa, participants of a mass meeting resolved to ask their
state legislature to adopt the portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 found
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. And, in Memphis, black citizens decided to ask
their state legislature to “repeal all its acts discriminating against colored people.” These
meetings and hundreds like them held throughout the country, signaled that African
Americans everywhere finally recognized the significance Supreme Court decisions
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could have on their lives, and the increased coverage by the African American press
helped to guarantee they would remain informed.146

Black America Reacts to the Dissenter
Despite the harsh reactions to the Supreme Court’s decision in African American
newspapers, one hero did emerge – Justice John Marshall Harlan. Alongside articles
damning the Court for reviving Calhoun’s states rights mentality, for disappointing black
Americans who had believed progress was being made, and for betraying those who had
believed the Court supported the ideals of the Republican party, editors ran articles
lauding Harlan for his interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments and for his
dedication to protecting the rights of black Americans. Although this was not the first
time Harlan had dissented in a case significant for blacks’ rights – he had done so just
months earlier in United States v. Harris – it was the first time his dissent gained such
widespread acknowledgement from the African American populace.
Harlan’s dissenting opinion gained its initial attention simply because of its
anticipated delivery. Although he announced his dissent on the day Justice Bradley read
the majority decision, Harlan informed those present that “under ordinary circumstances
and in an ordinary case he should not hesitate to set up his individual opinion in
opposition to that of his eight colleagues, but in view of what he thought the people of
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this country wished to accomplish, what they tried to accomplish, and what they
believed they had accomplished by means of [the Civil Rights Act of 1875], he must
express his dissent from the opinion of the Court” and would take the time necessary “to
prepare a statement of the grounds of his dissent.” His desire to take extra time to
develop his dissenting statement gave those waiting to hear it time to anticipate his
thoughts, which could have led to further disappointment or to elation.147
Just on the basis of his dissent, before his detailed explanation for it was made
public, African American newspapers pointed towards Harlan as a ray of hope.
According to The Cleveland Gazette, “Judge Harlan, of the Supreme Court, a
Kentuckian, will ever be held in high regard by our race. He was not party to that
infamous decision.” Meanwhile, The People’s Adviser out of Jackson, Mississippi
declared, “Justice Harlan, of Kentucky, alone stood the colored man’s friend, and should
the occasion ever present itself, we feel satisfied that the negroes of this country will
show to him that we are not ungrateful.” Such sentiments were echoed in black
newspapers across the country.148
After he released his opinion, Harlan received even more respect from the African
American community. Many argued that his “opinion of civil rights ought to be read
intelligently by every citizen in the United States” and that his words, along with those of
Colonel Ingersoll and Frederick Douglass, provided African Americans with a “vast
amount of good matter and food for thought.” Discussion also emerged about Harlan’s
potential strength as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1884.
Reacting to sentiments repeatedly expressed in black newspapers, The Atlanta
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Constitution noted, “A new presidential star has appeared in the political firmament. .
. . Its name is Harlan, the justice of the supreme court, whose dissenting opinion in regard
to the civil rights law has attracted toward him so much attention and especially
influenced the colored vote so much in his favor.” A general opinion held in both black
and white newspapers was that, if there was a fair vote, Harlan could save the Republican
Party despite initial feelings among African Americans that a Republican Supreme Court
had betrayed them.149
From this point until the end of his judicial career, Justice John Marshall Harlan
drew the attention of black Americans. While it was not always necessary for him to
dissent from the majority in cases related to the Reconstruction Amendments, as was to
be seen in his vote with the majority in Ex parte Yarbrough [110 U.S. 651 (1884)], there
was a constant hope that he would present opinions supporting African Americans’
rights. Just over a decade later, in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537
(1896)], he did not disappoint.

The Court and the Ku Klux Klan
In the months following the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases
other events that drew the attention of black Americans included a conflict between white
conservatives and a popularly elected integrated local government in Danville, Virginia,
and the arrest of Ida B. Wells in Tennessee for violating the public transportation
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segregation law passed at the start of the decade. Each of these events represented a
continuing struggle faced by African Americans. First, the Danville riot demonstrated
the difficulties blacks had in attaining political equality in a society that traditionally
viewed them as inferior and unsavory. Then, following her arrest. Wells challenged the
Tennessee segregation law and became the first African American to file such a suit since
the Supreme Court’s declaration that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional.
In Danville, Virginia, the roots of the conflict came from a victory for the
Readjuster Party in 1882. The Readjusters were a biracial political party that gained
political success in Virginia between 1879 and 1883. Their two primary goals were to
break the hold of the politically privileged and wealthy on the state’s government and to
promote public education. In the summer of 1882, the Readjusters won a majority of
seats in the Danville Common Council. With eight Readjusters, four white and four
black, on the Council, they easily outvoted the council’s four white Democrats. The
Common Council then elected four black city councilmen and appointed a black police
officer. While still completing the Common Council’s traditional responsibilities, the
group now focused more attention on providing better neighborhoods and schools for the
town’s African American population.150
As the statewide elections of November 1883 approached, Danville’s Democrats
increased their efforts to defeat the Readjusters. In October, they “published a pamphlet
entitled Coalition Rule in Danville. . . . designed to lay before that rural white,
predominantly Readjuster population [of southwestern Virginia] ‘a few facts from which
150
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you can form some idea of the injustice and humiliation to which our white people
have been subjected and are daily undergoing by the domination and misrule of the
Radical or negro party, now in absolute power in our town.’” The pamphlet raised issue
with the presence of blacks as police officers, as weigh master of the public scales, and as
magistrates to the police court. Ultimately, the Democrats’ primary complaint was that
the “presence [of African American men] in public and official settings served as a
constant reminder of the political participation of black men and may have . . .
encouraged other forms of African American assertion and outspokenness.”151
Another issue raised in the pamphlet was that Danville’s blacks were no longer
giving whites the respect they deserved. Black men and women allegedly forced white
ladies and gentlemen off sidewalks. As Jane Dailey explains in her article “Deference
and Violence in the Postbellum Urban South: Manners and Massacres in Danville,
Virginia,
both whites and blacks in Danville [interpreted] sidewalk shoving matches
as political statements. When "leading white men" in Danville later
recalled witnessing altercations between the races on the sidewalks, they
associated the disputes with Readjuster rule. William N. Ruffin, a real
estate agent, insisted that black-white relations had not always been so
highly charged and asserted that only since Danville's black population
had been "under Readjuster dictation or training" had such incidents
occurred. Black narratives of public altercations in Danville also linked
them with politics but put the blame on white shoulders. Walter Gay, a
black Danville resident, reported being shoved off the sidewalk by white
Democrats.
The Democrat’s pamphlet also complained that Danville’s black citizens had taken it
upon themselves to refer to other blacks as “ladies” and “gentlemen.” As Neil McMillen
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discusses in Dark Journey, the use of such courtesy titles was an important aspect of
de facto segregation in the South.152
The result of the racial tensions in Danville was a riot on November 3, 1883, in
which the white men of the city regained control of the city with violence. The white
men reestablished “the boundaries of black ‘place’ in a bloody confrontation on Main
Street.” The immediate cause of the riot was an exchange between a young white man,
Charles Noel, and a young black man, Hense Lawson, on the sidewalk of Main Street,
but the clash escalated because of the tensions between the Readjusters and the
Democrats in the city. After Noel tripped on Lawson’s foot, Lawson explained that he
had stepped in Noel’s path to get out of the way of a white lady. Noel responded in a
way that angered Lawson’s companion, Davis Lewellyn, who declared that Lawson did
not need Noel’s pardon. Noel and Lewellyn exchanged punches before the two black
men left the scene. That same afternoon, Danville’s Democrats had gathered to discuss
the Readjusters. After fighting with Lewellyn, Noel went to the Democrats’ meeting
where he got two friends to go with him to confront the black men. The three white men
came up behind Lawson and Lewellyn, who had been joined by a friend of their own, on
the street. A fight ensued between the two groups and continued until a black police
officer broke it up. Things appeared to be calming down when a black bystander
attacked one of Noel’s friends who pulled a gun and shot towards his attacker. At this
point, a black crowd gathered and the white Democrats came out of their meeting.
Ultimately, the white men opened fire on the blacks. The first victim of their volley was
a young white Democrat, Walter Holland. Three black men died on the scene and
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another died later from his wounds. After the African American fled to avoid being
shot, the white men organized patrols that traversed the streets for the next two days to
signal black citizens who was in control. Three days later, the Democrats declared
victory for themselves at polls throughout the state.153
The following year the arrest of Ida B. Wells in Tennessee represented the legal
struggle of African Americans just as the Danville riot represented their social and
political struggle. On May 4, 1884, Wells purchased a first-class ticket on the
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company’s train from Memphis to Woodstock,
Tennessee where she had a job teaching the first grade. The train’s conductor asked
Wells to leave the ladies’ car and to take a seat in the smoking car. She refused to give
up her seat and three men had to remove her physically. Rather than take a seat in the
smoking car, Wells got off the train at the next stop. She returned to Memphis, hired a
lawyer, and filed suit against the railroad company for denying her the right to use the
ladies’ car despite having a first-class ticket. The district court found in favor of Wells
and order the railroad company to pay her $500 in damages. The company appealed the
decision, however, and the Tennessee Supreme Court held in 1887 that under the 1881
Tennessee law requiring the segregation of public transportation, the company had the
right to require black passengers to sit in the smoking car. Despite this decision against
her, Wells was invigorated by the entire experience and an article about the event for
black church weekly. This article started her illustrious career as a journalist.154
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Although the 1880s appeared to be a decade full of steps backwards for black
Americans, there were occasional bright spots. One had been Justice Harlan’s dissenting
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. A second one came in the year after the Supreme
Court declared that Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional and after the Supreme
Court determined in United States v. Harris that Section 5519 did not apply to private
acts of discrimination. On March 3, 1884, in the case of Ex parte Yarbrough, the
Supreme Court justices, for all practical purposes, demanded that the right to vote for
African Americans be upheld.
Ex parte Yarbrough, which revolved largely around the Fifteenth Amendment,
dealt with Jasper Yarbrough and seven of his relatives who were Ku Klux Klansmen and
members of the “Pop and Go Club.” This group, a Democratic paramilitary organization,
beat Berry Saunders, a former Georgia slave, to prevent him from casting his vote in a
federal congressional election. Unlike thousands of similar incidents throughout the
South, “Justice Department officials speedily managed to arrest and indict Yarbrough and
then successfully prosecuted him in federal court” before sending him “to prison in
upstate New York for two years of hard labor.” In the petition to the Supreme Court,
Yarbrough requested a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of their
conviction.155
According to the facts of the case presented to the Court, Yarbrough and the other
defendants did
Combine, conspire, and confederate together, by force, to injure, oppress,
threaten, and intimidate Berry Saunders . . . on account of his race, color,
and previous condition of servitude, in the full exercise and enjoyment of
the right and privilege of suffrage in the election of a lawfully qualified
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person as a member of the Congress of the United States of America, and
because the said Berry Saunders had so exercised the same, and on
account of such exercise, which said right of privilege and suffrage was
secured to the said Berry Saunders by the constitution and the laws of the
United States, the said Berry Saunders being then and there lawfully
entitled to vote in said election; and, having so then and there conspired,
the said [defendants] did unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully beat,
bruise, wound, and maltreat the said Berry Saunders, contrary to the form
of the statute is such case made provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the United States of America.
Furthermore, the defendants faced charges of conspiring to “feloniously go in disguise on
the highway” in their efforts to prevent Saunders from lawfully casting his vote.156
Although Yarbrough and the other defendants did not deny beating Saunders to
prevent him from voting in the congressional election, they questioned whether the
statutes they had been charged and convicted under were constitutional. Similar to the
case of United States v. Harris, this petition raised questions about two sections of the
Revised Statutes of the United States passed for the purpose of protecting the rights
granted by the Reconstruction Amendments. The petitioners argued that if the Supreme
Court found Section 5508 and Section 5520 to be invalid, the court that sentenced them
would have had no jurisdiction to do so, and, thus, the Supreme Court should discharge
their convictions.157
Section 5508, which addressed conspiracies to infringe upon rights and privileges
guaranteed by the Constitution, was the first statute questioned by the petitioners.
According to Section 5508,
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the constitution or laws of the United States, or because
of his so having exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in
156
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disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent
or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right of privilege so
secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and
imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter
ineligible to any office of place of honor, profit, or trust created by the
constitution or the laws of the United States.
Furthermore, Section 5520 specifically addressed the punishment of those who attempted
to prevent citizens from exercising their right to vote. The statute declared,
If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire to prevent, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, towards or in favor
of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for president
or vice-president, or as a member of the congress of the United States, or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy, each such persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than
five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment,
with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
The petitioners believed that Congress did not have the authority to establish penalties for
private citizens. 158
In light of the Court’s decision in United States v. Harris, Yarbrough and his
fellow petitioners almost surely were confident that their convictions would be
overturned. In a unanimous decision, however, the Court determined that the federal
government had the power to punish private actions meant to impede an individual’s
right to vote. In the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel F. Miller, the panel of
judges held that there were sufficient clauses in the Constitution, in particular in the
Fifteenth Amendment, which guaranteed the right to vote for black Americans. Miller,
who had previously represented the Court’s majority opinion in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, explained that the conspiracies described in the charges against Yarbrough and the
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other petitioners were exactly the type of actions meant to be “embraced within the
provisions of the Revised Statutes” under consideration. He contended that if the
government of the United States was to survive as an essentially republican government
made up of elected legislators, “it must have the power to protect the elections on which
its existence depends, from violence and corruption.” He further explained that the
petitioners’ claim that Congress had no right to legislate this issue because it was not
expressly granted such power was a fallible argument based on Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 18 of the Constitution.159
As an example of the absurdity of the petitioners’ claim, Miller turned to the issue
of the United States Treasury. He presented the questions of whether, since Congress
was not expressly granted the power to punish theft or burglary of the treasury, “the mails
of the United States, and the money carried in them, [should be] left at the mercy of the
robbers and of thieves who may handle the mail.” He concluded that if this was the case,
and, thus, the petitioners’ claim about protection of voting rights was also true, then there
must not be any need for criminal jurisdiction in the federal courts. He drew similar
conclusions based on laws regarding counterfeiting, piracy, and the protection of
government officers. Moreover, Miller demonstrated that during the later years of the
Civil War it was necessary for Congress to pass laws protecting officers who had to enter
hostile neighborhoods to enforce congressional draft requirements. Although Congress
did not have express permission to pass these enforcement laws, when a man was
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“It was never suggested that

congress [sic] had no power to pass the law under which he was convicted.” Similarly,
the decision by Congress to set dates for the election of electors for president and vicepresident, as well as for members of Congress, was not a power expressly granted by the
Constitution. Nonetheless, states did not challenge it because it was an understood
necessity to guarantee that elections were properly carried out and, in most cases, the
states scheduled their own elections for the same dates to simplify the process.161
Miller continued with the contention that there was no question that regarding
federal elections, Congress had the power to “protect the act of voting, the place where it
is done, and the man who votes from personal violence or intimidation, and the election
itself from corruption or fraud.” Thus, although they do not have the direct power to
guarantee these protections at state elections, when both state and federal ballots were
considered on the same day, federal authorities could not be expected to ignore the rights
of federal voters. This meant, according to Miller, that Berry Saunders did have a
guaranteed right to vote at the election in Banks County, Georgia. Although Saunders
was not an officer of the United States, Miller concluded that the responsibility of the
government to provide safe and free elections “does not arise solely from the interest of
the party concerned, but from the necessity of the government itself that its service shall
be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practiced on its agents, and that the
votes by which its member of congress and its president are elected shall be the free votes
of the electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice of those who
have the right to take part in that choice.” Furthermore, Miller argued that, contrary to
160
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the beliefs of some state government officials and citizens, the right to vote in federal
elections was dependant on the Constitution rather than being directly dependant on state
regulations. He explained that the Constitution says, “The house of representatives shall
be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states;
and the electors in each state shall have the same qualifications requisite for electors in
the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” This meant not that the states
determine voting qualifications for federal elections, but that the Constitution adopts the
qualifications determined by the states. Although this distinction may appear miniscule
at first glance, it supports the Supreme Court’s overall conclusion in this case that
Congress did have the authority to define the charges and punishments Yarbrough and
the other defendants faced.162
Miller further supported this conclusion by referring to the Fifteenth Amendment,
which he argued “by its limitation on the power of the states in the exercise of their right
to prescribe the qualifications of voters in their own elections, and by its limitation of the
power of the United States over that subject, clearly shows that the right of suffrage was
considered to be of supreme importance to the national government, and was not intended
to be left within the exclusive control of the states.” Although the Supreme Court had
previously declared in U.S. v. Reese et el [92 U.S. 214 (1876)] that the Fifteenth
Amendment did not specifically grant the right to vote to African Americans, Miller
explained that in instances where legislators in former slave-holding states had not yet
deleted the words “white man” from their constitution’s voting qualifications, the
Amendment had, in fact, granted such a right. Thus, Congress had the power to protect
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this right when it was threatened. As for the petitioners’ claims that Congress did not
have such power regarding private actions, Miller again disagreed. He explained that the
Court’s previous distinctions between public and private actions, including his own
majority decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, related directly to the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Fifteenth. Miller, along with many of the Court’s justices, believed
that the Fifteenth Amendment could safely be interpreted more broadly than the
Fourteenth. The former included language “explicitly limited . . . to matters involving
race and voting rights” while the latter could be used inappropriately against state
regulations if interpreted too broadly. In order to ensure free and fair elections, therefore,
the Fifteenth Amendment had to be applied to both public and private actions. Thus, the
Supreme Court denied Yarbrough’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.163
Although this case had the potential to affect the lives of African Americans
throughout the United States, particularly in the South, there was again no apparent
notice of it in the nation’s black newspapers. The outrage and despair seen after the Civil
Rights Cases was not called for, but there was also no praise offered to Miller and the
other justices who had unanimously upheld the conviction of a known member of the Ku
Klux Klan for violating the civil rights of a black man. The vocal and largely unified
voice presented by the black press just months earlier disappeared as African American
journalists reverted to their silence of the 1860s and 1870s.
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Conclusion: The Supreme Court’s Influence on Jim Crow in the
1880s
Again, the Supreme Court spent a decade sending mixed messages to Americans
about the status of civil rights for black citizens and the role the federal government
would play in protecting these rights. In the key civil rights cases of the 1880s, the
Supreme Court had first determined that Congress did not have the authority to limit
private actions in its efforts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, second declared the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional, and third interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment
broadly enough to allow Congress to regulate private actions as well as public actions in
relation to federal elections. The first two decisions suggested to Americans that the
federal government would not be allowed to override the traditions of both de facto and
de jure segregation in the South. And, while the third decision offered a small semblance
of hope that the rights granted by the Reconstruction Amendments might be protected by
the Supreme Court, its scope was so narrow as to include only federal voting rights.
In response to the mixed message from the Court, the states of the Union
responded with diverse reactions through the mid-1890s. Many states responded by not
making any significant changes to their segregation laws while others passed legislation
to either enforce the Reconstruction Amendments within their state borders or to execute
the state’s rights to legislate civil rights. Among the states with no significant new
segregation laws between 1885 and 1895 were Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
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The majority of states that passed laws offering equal access to public
accommodations during this period were in the northeastern, midwestern, and western
sections of the country. The earliest statutes passed in 1885 focused on inns, restaurants,
theatres, public transportation, and places of public amusement. Later laws included
barbershops, ice cream parlors, bathhouses, music halls, and cemeteries. Some of these
laws specifically mentioned race. In Colorado, for example, an 1885 act guaranteed full
access to inns, churches, barbershops, theatres, and restaurants for all people regardless of
their race. In New Mexico, a similar statute established a fine of up to $100 for anyone
who denied another person access to inns, public transportation, or public entertainment
based on their race, color, or previous servitude. In Washington, perhaps reflecting the
rising number of Asian immigrants in the western states, an 1890 statute guaranteed full
access regardless of race, color, or nationality. Other states, including California, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, and New York, guaranteed full access to “all persons” with
no mention of race, color, or nationality. Tennessee, the one southern state to pass a law
protecting access to public accommodations during this ten-year period, did give some
room to owners to limit access to their establishments. First, the 1885 law provided
access to theatres, parks, and other types of public amusement for all “well-behaved”
persons. The determination of what constituted good behavior was left up to the business
owners. Second, the statute allowed owners to provide separate accommodations within
their establishments for blacks and whites.164
In the South, there was a greater focus on requiring separate schools for black and
white children. The legislatures in Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
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and South Carolina all passed laws between 1885 and 1895 that made it illegal to
teach black and white children in the same schools. At the same time, states in other
parts of the country were making it illegal to segregate schools. Although the Supreme
Court had not addressed issues of education in the Civil Rights Cases, United States v.
Harris, and Ex parte Yarbrough, southerners likely viewed the establishment of
segregated schools as a way to guarantee the continued separation of the races in future
generations. Furthermore, because the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the
segregation of schools, it was an area where the states could still test the boundaries of
Jim Crow.
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Chapter Four: Railways and Schools

At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court considered two more key areas of
segregation: railways and schools. The justices’ decisions helped to further cement Jim
Crow’s place in the United States. In four critical cases, the Court further weakened the
protections of African Americans’ civil rights and made it increasingly clear that the
federal government would yield to the states on most issues related to racial segregation.
Although Justice John Marshall Harlan again emerged as a potential hero for black
Americans, there was little else coming out of the Supreme Court for them to applaud.
Although these two areas, transportation and education, directly affected different
groups of African Americans, they were important to the black community as a whole.
On the one hand, segregated transportation had a greater affect on black adults. On the
other hand, the issue of education inherently affected African American children. Both
dealt with rights necessary to become full and equal citizens of the United States.
Without the right to travel freely and without the right to obtain an education, African
Americans believed that they would continue to be at a disadvantage for generations to
come. This meant that the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding railways and schools had
the potential to significantly influence their lives and should have drawn the attention of
black Americans throughout the United States.
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In the preceding decades, the African American press had been only sporadic
in its responses to the Supreme Court. Following the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, black
newspapers called for unity and for action in the black community. Specifically, they
asked black Americans to stand strong in their efforts to maintain civil rights guaranteed
them by the Reconstruction Amendments and to show continued support for the
Republican Party at the polls. Following the Slaughterhouse Cases, U.S. v. Cruikshank,
and Ex parte Virginia, however, the black press was virtually silent expressing neither
opposition nor support. Now, as the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth century
began, the African American press once again had the opportunity to educate the black
community about the Supreme Court’s influence on legislation and to help African
Americans realize the importance of working for new laws to protect further their civil
rights.

African American Issues in the 1880s and 1890s
In the decade between Ex parte Yarbrough (1884) and Plessy v. Ferguson [163
U.S. 537 (1896)], African Americans continued to face significant violence. From 1885
to 1895, more than eleven hundred blacks were lynched. In addition, there were race
riots in Carrollton, Mississippi, and in New Orleans. The Carrollton massacre on March
17, 1886, resulted in the deaths of twenty-three blacks. The massacre occurred when
sixty white men stormed into a courtroom where two black men, Ed and Charley Brown,
were testifying against a white man accused of attempted murder. The courtroom was

138
full of black spectators when the white mob rushed in firing their guns. Twenty
African Americans died on the scene and three died later from their injuries. Despite the
fact that the attack took place in a courtroom in front of the judge and several police
officers, no one ever faced charges for the murders. Nine years later, white attackers
killed six black workers in New Orleans on March 11 and March 12, 1895. The fifty
whites were strikers and their supporters who were angered by blacks who reported for
work at a New Orleans levee. The whites fired into the group of black workers killing six
and injuring at least twenty more. This continued violence served as a constant reminder
to African Americans that many whites still viewed them as unequal and inferior.165
Southern blacks also began officially to lose their right to vote when Mississippi’s
constitutional convention approved the Mississippi Plan on November 1, 1890. Under
the plan, potential voters had to pass literacy and “understanding” tests. Although such
tests inevitably deprived some poor, illiterate whites of the vote, the primary goal was to
keep potential black voters away from the polls. To pass the test, prospective voters had
to be able to read and interpret the Constitution. The constitutional delegates designed
the plan to address two key concerns while accomplishing the goal of preventing blacks
from voting. First, there was the question of “How was a suffrage clause to be framed
which would effectively disfranchise the majority of Negroes and, at the same time, not
violate the Fifteenth Amendment or disqualify large numbers of whites from voting?”
The second issue was that “there was a possibility of having the state’s representation in
Congress reduced under the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment if the state’s
electorate was decreased.” To limit the number of whites who would lose their right to
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vote under these tests, white pollsters would administer the test and determine who
qualified under the “understanding” qualification. The convention delegates believed
that their plan would be their best option for addressing these issues and following its
general success other states followed suit.166
The same year Mississippi delegates developed their plan to prevent blacks from
voting, African Americans in Chicago founded the National Afro-American League. T.
Thomas Fortune, editor of the New York Age, led the militant group that originated from
plans he first developed in 1887. Fortune wanted the League to address six key
grievances. First, he wanted to do something about southern attempts to limit black
Americans’ voting rights. Fortune believed such efforts were directed at stopping blacks
from participating in politics in the states where they had the greatest numbers and, thus,
the greatest possibility of making a difference. Second, Fortune hoped to stop the
lynchings taking place throughout the South. He found this issue particularly important
because lynch mobs were so prevalent in areas where law and judicial officers
participated in such extralegal activities. Third, he wanted to establish a better funding
balance for black and white schools. Fourth, Fortune wanted the League to advocate the
reorganization of the South’s penitentiary system. He believed the system was “odious
and demoralizing . . . with its chain gangs, convict leases, and indiscriminate mixing of
males and females.” Fifth, he wanted the organization to challenge the practices of
segregating passengers on the railways and of allowing “white passengers to subject
[black travelers] to indignities.” Finally, Fortune targeted the practice of segregating
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hotels and theatres. Although some of the issues Fortune identified occurred in the
North, most of them transpired primarily in the South.167
One hundred forty-one delegates gathered in Chicago in January 1890 to form the
League Fortune had dreamed about. Most of the delegates came from northern states, but
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia also had
representation. Unlike the later National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the National Afro-American League had only black participants. In her brief
history of the League, Emma Lou Thornbrough notes that even though a few white men
sent “messages of good will . . . such expressions were viewed with suspicion by some of
the delegates, who were convinced that white men interested themselves in the affairs of
[African Americans] only to dominate them.” The constitution adopted by the delegates
reflected the six issues Fortune had raised earlier. The first president and vice-president
hailed from North Carolina and Georgia respectively. By the second convention in
Knoxville in 1891, it had become evident that the League was not attracting the amount
of support for which Fortune had hoped. The group continued to decline and became
essentially extinct by 1893.168
Fortune revived the League in 1898 under the name National Afro-American
Council. Again, however, the organization failed to gain significant support. Under the
leadership of Fortune and Alexander Walters, and the behind-the-scenes presence of
Booker T. Washington, the Council tried to reach out to the public and convince African
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Americans to take action. Nevertheless, Washington’s reputation as a conservative
who took a conciliatory approach to race relations drew the indignation of many
blacks.169 This meant that the Council was sometimes viewed as an extension of debates
over whether Washington should be a leader for the race and the Council’s activities
often went unnoticed.170

Railways and “Separate but Equal” Accommodations
One of the most discussed cases in the Supreme Court’s history is Plessy v.
Ferguson [163 U.S. 537 (1896)] in which the majority decision established the standard
of “separate but equal” that was eventually applied to all forms of public transportation,
as well as to public accommodations, entertainment, and education in large sections of
the country. Six years prior to hearing the Plessy case, however, the Supreme Court
heard a legal action dealing with the impact of railway segregation on interstate
commerce. In Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi [133 U.S.
587 (1890)] the justices heard arguments based on the railroad’s challenge to a
Mississippi law it said placed an undue burden on the company and, thus, would have a
significant impact on interstate commerce.
The case originated with the indictment of the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas
Railway Company for violating a Mississippi state law requiring separate
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accommodations for black and white passengers. According to the first section of the
law, passed on March 2, 1888, “all railroads carrying passengers in [Mississippi], other
than street railroads, shall provide equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and
colored races, by providing two or more passenger-cars for each passenger train, or by
dividing the passenger-cars by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations.” The
second section of the law gave conductors the right and the responsibility to assign
passengers to the appropriate car or compartment to guarantee proper separation of the
races. It also gave the conductor the authority to remove passengers who refused to ride
in their assigned areas. In such instances, “neither [the conductor] nor the railroad
company shall be liable for any damages in and court fees in” Mississippi. Finally, and
most important in the case presented to the Supreme Court, Section 3 of the statute
declared “That all railroad companies that shall refuse or neglect, within sixty days after
the approval of this act, to comply with the requirements of section one of this act, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction in a court of competent
jurisdiction, be fined not more than five hundred dollars; and any conductor that shall
neglect to, or refuse to, carry out the provisions of this act, shall, upon conviction, be
fined not less than twenty-five, nor more than fifty, dollars for each offense.” After
refusing to provide the required separate accommodations, the railroad company faced
charges in the Mississippi courts.171
Once convicted and fined, the railroad appealed its case to the Supreme Court on
the grounds that the Mississippi law, in effect, regulated interstate commerce, which was
a role granted only to Congress by the Constitution. In an 1878 case, Hall v. DeCuir [96
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U.S. 485 (1878)], the Court considered a similar law and determined that it was
unconstitutional. In the earlier case, the law brought into question was a Louisiana
statute requiring that the races have separate sleeping quarters on steamships. Both races,
however, would enjoy full access to all other parts of the ship. The Court determined
unanimously that “this law imposed a burden on interstate commerce and was an
unconstitutional violation of congressional jurisdiction.” Based on this precedent, the
Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Company undoubtedly felt confident about
their challenge to the Mississippi statute.172
In the twelve years since Hall v. DeCuir, however, the makeup of the Court had
started to change and, most importantly, the Court had started to define the role of the
federal government in increasingly narrow terms. The justices were regularly
reevaluating the Reconstruction Amendments and supporting statutes, as seen in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, U.S. v. Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases. It was in light of this
new shift of interpretation that Justice David J. Brewer presented the majority opinion of
the Court.
Just two months after taking his Supreme Court oath, Justice Brewer concluded
that the Mississippi law did not interfere with interstate commerce because it applied only
to trains traveling inside the state of Mississippi. He contended that in order to comply
with the law, a railroad company would simply have to add a couple of passenger cars to
their trains before entering the state. And, despite the railroad company’s claims to the
contrary, he did not believe this was an undue burden. Furthermore, he explains that Hall
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v. DeCuir was not relevant for considering the present case because it “was a civil
action to recover damages from the owner of a steam-boat for refusing to the plaintiff, a
person of color, accommodations in the cabin specifically set apart for white persons; and
the validity of a statute of the state of Louisiana prohibiting discrimination on account of
color . . . was a question for consideration.” In contrast, the case now before the Court
was limited to the question of “the power of the state to compel railroad companies to
provide, within the state, separate accommodations, for the two races.” Because this case
was not a civil action dealing with personal injury, Brewer determined it also had no
relevance to civil rights and the Reconstruction Amendments.173
Brewer was a native of Connecticut and a graduate of both Yale University and
Albany Law School. Although his father was a reverend known for opposing slavery, he
himself had a reputation for defending the interests of businesses and railroads in the
Kansas territory. His opinion in this case was the first evidence of two major trends in
his time on the Court. First, he believed that the Tenth Amendment guaranteed states
freedom from federal interference. Second, he “believed strongly that the court should
limit government interference in the economy and permit the marketplace to distribute
the inevitable rewards produced by capitalism.” These beliefs undoubtedly shaped his
first opinion, which was supported by six of his new colleagues.174
Once again, Justice John Marshall Harlan presented the dissenting opinion.
Joined by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who had written the majority opinion in the Civil
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Rights Cases, Harlan argued that the expectation that railroad companies would attach
additional cars to their trains on the Mississippi border was a clear burden on interstate
commerce. He explained that in his opinion the observations made by the Court in Hall
v. DeCuir that
No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to
himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line
his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy that
same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the
regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his
route is a necessity in his business; and, to secure it, congress, which is
untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive
legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be
should not be ignored by the justices in the current case before them. As with Brewer’s
majority opinion, Harlan addressed the case at hand without any consideration for the
civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, he and Justice
Bradley determined that the Mississippi statute should be voided because of its attempt to
regulate interstate commerce.175
As with most other cases heard by the Supreme Court in the previous two decades
that had the potential to affect the African American community, this case received little
notice from the black press. For example, both the Washington Bee and the Huntsville
Gazette made no mention of the case. The Washington Bee was much more focused on
the upcoming celebrations of the twenty-eighth anniversary of Emancipation Day on
April 16. Other papers, including the Cleveland Gazette, the Indianapolis Freeman, and
the Detroit Plaindealer, briefly mentioned the case in their March 7 and March 8
editions, but did not follow up on it in later editions. The Cleveland Gazette stated, “This
decision deserves to stand with the Supreme Court’s civil rights edict and is a recognition
175
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of the States’ rights doctrine which many supposed to have been wounded unto death,
if not killed, in the rebellion. So it goes.” Rather than echoing the outrage and the calls
for action and unity seen after the Civil Rights Cases holding, this statement sounds more
like a declaration of concession. The Indianapolis Freeman failed to offer even a similar
weak commentary on the decision in its brief summary of the majority opinion. It also
failed to make mention of Harlan’s dissenting opinion. In contrast, the Detroit
Plaindealer stood out in its commentary on the case, or rather on the trend of Republican
judges making anti-civil rights decisions. Declaring, “just so sure as the world moves a
[political] party will arise whose fundamental principle shall be equal justice without
qualifications. The Afro American will be found in that party. It will come for the public
conscience is awakening and the Afro American is helping to sound the alarm,” the paper
briefly reflected the energy of the post-Civil Rights Cases period. With no additional
mention of the case in later editions, however, this paper also fell short of showing the
African American community what was at stake.176
Although the African American press expressed minimal interest in the case of
Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi, it soon became evident that
southern white legislators had taken notice. Seven states passed laws similar to the
Mississippi statute in 1890 and 1891. All seven states were in the South, demonstrating
that white southerners had taken the signal from the Supreme Court that, when phrased
properly, the segregation of public transportation by individual states was acceptable. In
1890, Kentucky and Louisiana led the way with laws requiring railway companies to
provide separate accommodations for their white and black patrons. Both laws allowed
176

Detroit Plaindealer, March 7, 1890; Cleveland Gazette, March 8, 1890; and, Indianapolis Freeman,
March 8, 1890.

147
for fines of $100 to $500 for companies that did not comply and a $25 fine or 20-day
imprisonment for passengers and conductors who failed to respect the law. The
following year Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas added their own
segregation laws to the mix. In Alabama, railroad companies had to have either a
minimum of two passenger cars on each train or adequately partition the passenger area.
Additionally, conductors received the power to assign passengers to certain cars. As a
nod to the issue of interstate commerce, however, Alabama legislators exempted
passengers who rode into the state from areas with no similar law. Arkansas’s law placed
the burden on railroad employees who had to assign all passengers to the proper car and
waiting room. Then, two years later Arkansas began requiring the use of separate waiting
rooms. Georgia required separate cars for black and white passengers, but the restrictions
did not apply to sleeping cars. Finally, Tennessee’s law mirrored those of Kentucky and
Louisiana in its simplicity. According to Kenneth Mack, “Unlike the 1880s legislation
[under which Ida B. Wells had been removed from the train in 1884], the new statute was
drafted in clear terms that required almost complete separation of passengers by race, and
the new statute contained no language asserting that it protected the rights of black
passengers.” Also, the new Tennessee law specifically gave conductors the power to
remove passengers from the train for riding a car designated for the other race and
“prohibited such passengers from challenging the conductor’s decision in any Tennessee
court.” Texas established requirements for separate passenger cars and sleeping cars.
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Although each state varied somewhat in its criteria, the overall goal of keeping the
races apart prevailed.177
This new trend of segregation laws faced challenges almost immediately. The
most well known challenge resulted in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson when
Homer Adolph Plessy challenged Louisiana’s 1890 law. The case developed from
Plessy’s arrest and conviction for violating the state’s separate caw law on June 7, 1892.
Plessy, who was one-eighth black, refused to move to the car designated for black
passengers when ordered to do so by the train’s conductor. The origins of the case
demonstrate an awareness of the significance of these new laws that had not been shown
by the black press after the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi
decision. A group of African Americans and Creoles in New Orleans formed the
Citizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law. When Homer
Plessy boarded the train and sat in the white car, he did so hoping to be arrested so that
the group could have the opportunity to challenge the law, and Jim Crowism in general,
in front of the Supreme Court.178
The Citizens’ Committee, organized in September 1891, included Republicans,
writers, ex-Union soldiers, a jeweler, and a former Louisiana lieutenant governor in its
ranks. They prepared for their test case by raising money both locally and from other
cities throughout the nation. They also held rallies to gain support and printed their
opinions in Crusader, a Republican newspaper run by attorney Louis Martinet. The
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Citizens’ Committee declared in one pamphlet that challenging the separate car law
before the Supreme Court was the only option left before them and that they “must have
recourse to it or sink into a state of hopeless inferiority.” It was with this fear of losing
all hopes of equality that the Citizens’ Committee chose Homer Plessy to ride in the
whites-only car on June 7, 1892.179
Plessy was a man who did not clearly fit into the distinct definitions of black and
white in New Orleans. Unlike many members of the city’s African American
community, he was not born into a slave family. Rather his father was a freeman who
had been allowed access to wages, property, and education. Plessy’s ancestors had been
“property-owning blacksmiths, carpenters, and shoemakers” and his “genealogy was not
found in dusty, plantation, breeding books, but in the city-records room.” The thirtyyear-old shoemaker further stood out from the other Citizens’ Committee members, many
of whom were older and had more political experience than Plessy, as a strong candidate
for the test case because of his skin choice. The Committee members agreed his skin was
fair enough to make it possible for him to board the white section of the train, but dark
enough to be arrested once he was discovered. As other members prepared legal
strategies, finances for his defense, and forums for publicity, Plessy’s task was simple.
He needed to board the East Louisiana Railroad’s local train, which was not scheduled to
leave the state and, thus, was directly affected by the state’s 1890 separate car law, and
get arrested.180

179

Keith Weldon Medley, We as Freemen: Plessy v. Ferguson (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing
Company, 2003), 13-16.
180
Medley, We As Freemen, 16-17; Elliott, “Race, Color Blindness, and the Law,” 308; Howard, The
Shifting Wind, 144; Sidney Kaplan, “Albion W. Tourgée: Attorney for the Segregated,” The Journal of

150
With his successful completion of that task, the plan developed by the
Citizens’ Committee to challenge the separate car law, and segregation laws in general,
before the United States Supreme Court was set into motion. Following his arrest, Plessy
stood before Judge John H. Ferguson in the Criminal District for New Orleans Parish for
his arraignment. Over the next several months, the case was fought out in the state courts
until 1893 when Plessy finally requested that the Supreme Court review his case.
Although the Citizens’ Committee included lawyers Louis Martinet and James C.
Walker, who had represented Plessy at the local and state levels, the case was going to be
handled at the national level by Albion Tourgée.181
Tourgée was a former Union soldier and native of Ohio who had served as a
judge in North Carolina during Reconstruction and had since become a well-known
advocate for black rights and equality. At various times, he edited two radical
newspapers in North Carolina, the Denver Evening Times, and a weekly literary
magazine titled Our Continent in Mayville, New York. More notably, he wrote three
books, Toinette: A Tale of the South, A Fool’s Errand, and Bricks Without Straw, which
all dealt with race relations. The first of these, Toinette addressed the difficult subjects of
race prejudice and caste prejudice with “much subtle persuasiveness and candor.” Five
years later, in 1879, Tourgée wrote A Fool’s Errand about how little Reconstruction had
done for racial justice. The story centered on the character Comfort Servosse who had
fought for the Union in the Civil War and then moved his family to the South. Once
settled in the South, Servosse became known as a radical Yankee who openly opposed
Negro History, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Apr. 1964), 128-129; and, Bernard R. Boxill, “Washington, DuBois, and
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the Ku Klux Klan and supported equality for the former slaves in the community.
Largely autobiographical, A Fool’s Errand quickly became a bestseller. The following
year Tourgée completed Bricks Without Straw, which became another popular novel
based in Reconstruction and dealing with prejudice.182
Before the presentation of the case before the Supreme Court began, Tourgée
demonstrated his understanding of the potential significance of Plessy’s case. He
declared in a letter to Louis Martinet dated October 31, 1893, that “it was of the utmost
consequence that we should not have a decision against us.” Also, although he could
have asked the Supreme Court to move the case forward on its overcrowded docket to
hear it in 1893, he chose to wait with the hope that some of the judges he believed would
vote against them would leave and be replaced by judges more like Justice Harlan in their
opinions on race issues. He recognized that if the Supreme Court decided against Homer
Plessy segregationists would view the decision as giving legitimacy to their cause.
Furthermore, he acknowledged, “it is a matter of boast with the Court that it has never
reversed itself on a constitutional issue.”183
By 1896, when the Supreme Court finally heard the case, there were two new
justices, Edward D. White and Rufus W. Peckham. Peckham was a dedicated Democrat
who would be known as an ultraconservative throughout his tenure as a justice, but had
little in his background to indicate whether he would be for or against Plessy. White,
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however, was a native of Louisiana who had fought for the Confederacy during the
Civil War. Prior to his 1894 Supreme Court nomination, he served as a Democratic
Louisiana state senator, as an associate justice on the Louisiana Supreme Court, and as a
U.S. senator for one term. He was also rumored to have been a one-time member of the
Ku Klux Klan, although there is no surviving evidence to support this claim. While this
background undoubtedly influenced his opinion in cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, little
of his personal papers survived, so there are no clear records of his opinions on race
issues. What mattered to Albion Tourgée and his client was that the changes to the
Supreme Court that had occurred by 1896 did not sufficiently change the makeup of the
Court enough to guarantee victory as they had hoped.184
To the Louisiana Supreme Court, Plessy petitioned for a writ of prohibition and a
writ of certiorari against the Louisiana judge, John H. Ferguson, who had upheld his
arrest and conviction. In essence, he wanted the court to order Ferguson to supply
records of the case and then to prevent Ferguson from overstepping his jurisdiction by
upholding an unconstitutional law. Plessy based his petition on the fact that he had been
forced to move to a passenger car designated for non-whites “for no other reason than
that [he] was of the colored race.” Plessy then contended that his arrest should be
vacated because the Louisiana separate car law under which he was charged was
unconstitutional. The state court determined that the writ of prohibition was not needed
and that the law in question was constitutional. It was with this determination that the
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case moved on to the United States Supreme Court where seven justices decided
against Plessy and Justice Harlan again stood alone in dissent.185
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Henry Billings Brown, who had replaced
Samuel F. Miller in January 1891, focused first on the constitutionality of Louisiana’s
1890 law establishing the requirement of separate passenger cars on trains traveling
within the state (Louisiana Acts 1890, No. 111). Section One of the statute was nearly
identical to the law that the Court considered in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas
Railway Co. v. Mississippi. The section required “that all railway companies carrying
passengers in their coaches in this state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations
for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each
passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure
separate accommodations. . . . No person or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats in
coaches, other than the ones assigned them, on account of the race they belong to.” The
second section established the power of the railroad’s officers and conductors to enforce
this regulation and established penalties for its violation. Finally, the third section
established penalties for officers of the company who failed to enforce the regulations.
Overall, the language of the law was very similar to that seen in the Louisville case just a
few years earlier.186
Justice Brown noted that Plessy’s petition challenged the law’s constitutionality in
two areas. First, Plessy argued that the law violated the Thirteenth Amendment that
abolished slavery. Second, he claimed that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
185
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prohibition of state laws that restricted the civil rights of American citizens. Brown
quickly dismissed the claim regarding the Thirteenth Amendment declaring “A statute
which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races – a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color – has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude”
as prohibited by the amendment. In reaching this conclusion, Brown referred to the
opinions presented in both the Civil Rights Cases and the Slaughterhouse Cases.187
Brown’s dismissal of Plessy’s challenge to the law in light of the Fourteenth
Amendment took longer to develop and made up most of his opinion. Again, he looked
to earlier cases, including the Slaughterhouse Cases, Strauder v. West Virginia, Virginia
v. Rives [100 U.S. 313 (1879)], Neal v. Delaware [103 U.S. 370 (1880)], Hall v. DeCuir,
the Civil Rights Cases, and Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi,
for support. He explained that with the earliest of these, the Slaughterhouse Cases, the
Court showed that “The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either.” Brown argued, therefore, that a law that required the separation
of the races in certain settings did not consequentially imply that one race was superior to
the other. He pointed to the establishment of separate schools for the races throughout
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the country as evidence of this. He also noted that laws prohibiting miscegenation
were common and generally accepted. In his viewpoint, laws related to schools and
marriage, as well as those related to accommodations and amusement, related to issues of
social equality, not political.188
Brown drew the closest parallel between Plessy’s case and the Louisville case
from 1890. In the earlier case, Justice Brewer had determined that the law in question did
not affect interstate commerce and, therefore, the state legislature had the power to
require railroads within the state’s boundaries to provide separate cars. In the case at
hand, Brown explained, “A like course of reasoning applies to the case under
consideration, since the supreme court of Louisiana . . . held that the statute in question
did not apply to interstate passengers, but was confined in its application to passengers
traveling exclusively within the borders of the state.” Because Homer Plessy boarded a
train that never left the state of Louisiana, there was no issue of interstate commerce
involved in the case. Brown noted that similar laws had been upheld as constitutional by
courts in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Tennessee, and New York, among others.189
Brown pointed out that Plessy claimed, “that, in a mixed community, the
reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is ‘property,’
in the same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property.” Brown explained,
however, than even if the justices were to agree with this claim, it would have no bearing
on the case being considered. He argued that if Plessy were indeed a white man who had
been assigned to a car for blacks he would have grounds to seek damages for his loss of
social “property.” Because Plessy was a black man who had been assigned to a car for
188
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black passengers, however, he had not lost any such “property.” In summary, Plessy
could not seek damages for the loss of a reputation he would have never had based on his
race.190
Furthermore, Brown expressed his disagreement with Tourgée’s claims in the
petition that allowing states to require segregated railway cars would open the possibility
of other forms of segregation. According to Brown, Tourgée claimed
that the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring
railways to provide separate accommodations for the two races will also
authorize them to require separate cars to be provided for people whose
hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain
nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one
side of the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white
men’s houses to be painted white, and colored men’s black, or their
vehicles or business signs to be different colors, upon the theory that one
side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle of one
color is as good as one of another color.
Brown’s reply was that states would only be allowed to enact laws that were for the
public good, not ones that would simply be “for annoyance or oppression of a particular
class.” He pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins [118 U.S. 536
(1886)]191 in which the majority determined that a San Francisco ordinance regulating
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public laundries within the city’s boundaries was unconstitutional. In this case,
Brown explained, the ordinance did not consider the skills of those running the laundries
and, therefore, was a “covert attempt on the part of the municipality to make an arbitrary
and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race.” Brown clearly did not view the use
of separate passenger cars as arbitrary or as an unjust discrimination against African
Americans.192
Finally, Brown addressed the question of whether the Louisiana separate car law
was reasonable. He claimed that “In determining the question of reasonableness, [the
legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the
preservation of the public peace and good order.” This interpretation allowed for
legislatures to take instances of de facto segregation that developed from years of
customs and make them into law. Brown again compared the use of separate railway cars
to the use of separate schools, a practice that was widely used at the time without its
constitutionality being questioned. Brown noted that the “underlying fallacy” of Plessy’s
argument was that it assumed separating the races on trains highlighted African
Americans as an inferior race to which he responded, “If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.” Brown believed that legislation cannot create inequality just as it
cannot create social equality. With that, the Supreme Court upheld Plessy’s conviction
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and presented the concept of “separate but equal” that would become a centerpiece of
Jim Crow.193
As in the Civil Rights Cases of the previous decade, John Marshall Harlan stood
alone in his dissent. In his dissenting opinion, he quickly summarized the requirements
of the law and determined that it was an effort by the Louisiana state legislature to
regulate “the use of a public highway by citizens of the United States solely upon the
basis of race.” He proceeded to address the question of whether such a restriction was
constitutional. He established the common belief that although private companies
constructed and managed railroads, they did so for public use and, thus, the railroads
constituted public highways.194
Regarding the issue of civil rights, Harlan argued that all people should show
pride in their race and that “the constitution of the United States does not . . . permit any
public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment” of
their civil rights. He believed the Louisiana separate car law, and others like it, infringed
not only on the equal rights of citizenship, but also on the personal liberty championed
for all Americans. Unlike Brown, who strictly interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment,
Harlan argued, “It not only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing in
the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that
constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this
country.” He further claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment “added greatly to the
dignity and glory of American citizenship.” Harlan believed that the men who framed
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these amendments intended for them to protect the freedom and civil rights of all
American citizens regardless of their race.195
Referring to several of the same cases mentioned by Brown in his majority
opinion, including Strauder v. West Virginia, Neal v. Delaware, and Virginia v. Rives,
Harlan expressed his belief that the Reconstruction Amendments had previously been
viewed by the Supreme Court as guaranteeing “that the law in the states shall be the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the states; and in regard to the colored race . . . that no discrimination
shall be made against them by law because of their color.” He also noted that in Gibson
v. State of Mississippi [162 U.S. 565 (1896)], decided just months earlier by an identical
Court, the majority opinion referred to the above cases and “declared that ‘underlying all
of those decisions is the principle that the constitution of the United States, in its present
form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the
general government or the states against any citizen because of his race. All citizens are
equal before the law.” Harlan argued, therefore, that precedent established that the
Reconstruction Amendments were far-reaching and that they were meant to protect black
Americans and other minorities from discriminatory laws.196
Harlan also debunked claims from defenders of the Louisiana law that it was not
discriminatory because the requirement to occupy separate cars applied to both black and
white passengers. He argued that no one familiar with the law could honestly claim that
its intent was to equally restrict blacks and whites. Rather, he explained, “the statute . . .
had its origins in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
195
196

Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537 (1896)].
Plessy v. Ferguson [163 U.S. 537 (1896)]; and, Gibson v. State of Mississippi [162 U.S. 565 (1896)].

160
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or
assigned to white persons.” This separation effectively limited the movement of black
passengers and forced them to isolate themselves. In Harlan’s opinion, these restrictions
interfered with the personal freedom of African Americans traveling in Louisiana.197
He conceded that states could require railroads to provide equal accommodations
for all of their passengers, but to restrict passengers from choosing their seat went too far.
He foresaw that if such a law was upheld the state would be set for other restrictions of
personal liberties. Like Tourgée, Harlan was able to see the possible progression from
requiring separate cars on a train to requiring the races to walk on different sides of the
street, to ride in separate vehicles on public roads, or to sit on opposite sides of a
courtroom. He also questioned the limits of such laws and whether they would one day
be extended to restrict the personal liberties of Roman Catholics, naturalized citizens, and
other groups viewed as inferior by the dominant members of society. Countering Justice
Brown’s argument that such laws would not be upheld because they would be deemed
unreasonable by the courts, Harlan pointed out that “A statute may be unreasonable
merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment,” but the courts should not
“have anything to do with the policy or expediency of legislation.”198
Whether whites made up the dominant race in the United States, and whether they
would continue to maintain that status in the future, was irrelevant in Harlan’s opinion.
He believed that the United States Constitution is color-blind and that the passage and
interpretation of laws should not be influenced by who is, or is not, a dominant member
of society. To this end, he proclaimed that “The law regards man as man, and takes no
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account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved” and expressed his concern that the majority’s
opinion in this case would one day rival the Dred Scott decision in its negative effects on
society.199
Harlan agreed that the Court’s decision was, in essence, reinvigorating some of
the beliefs presented in the Dred Scott decision which had presumably been eradicated by
the Reconstruction Amendments. He believed that in some states Brown’s words would
“not only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted
rights of colored citizens, but [would] encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of
state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States
had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the constitution.” He
expressed his belief that the sixty million white citizens of the United States should not
fear being dominated by the eight million black Americans. Also, he explained, the races
were going to be ever linked in America’s future and, therefore, state governments should
not be allowed to enact laws that would contribute to racial hated. He proclaimed the
Louisiana separate car law to be such a law because it “proceed[ed] on the ground that
colored citizens [were] so inferior and degraded that they [could not] be allowed to sit in
public coaches by white citizens.”200
Harlan believed it was critical to the peace of the United States that the
government secure equality for all citizens regardless of their race and that the Court’s
decision to uphold the Louisiana law was contrary to this goal. Each attempt by the
individual states to regulate “the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race . . .
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[with] the pretense of recognizing equality of rights” would move the nation
backwards one step closer to the pre-Civil War status of race relations. Harlan explained,
furthermore, that he was not advocating social equality because he did not believe that
could, or even should, exist between white and black Americans. His focus was purely
on the existence of equality before the law for both races. Despite Harlan’s lack of
support for social equality between the races, many African Americans believed that the
first step toward absolute equality was equal legal rights and, therefore, they viewed
Harlan’s support from the bench as a significant opportunity to make gains.201
Noting that, as the Louisiana law was worded, Chinese men, who were widely
viewed as inferior and not recognized as citizens, could ride in the same car as white
passengers, Harlan concluded that black Americans should continue to protest such laws
until their legal equality was fully recognized. Otherwise, they would forever be forced
to follow laws that branded them with “a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the
civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution.” Such a
situation could not be legally justified in Harlan’s opinion.202
Prior to this case, the Supreme Court had determined that it was unconstitutional
to prevent qualified blacks from serving on a juries with white men. If, however, the
Court now believed, as Brown’s majority opinion indicated, that states could prevent
black citizens from sitting with white citizens on trains, what would prevent white men
from encouraging their legislators to enact statutes requiring a partition between blacks
and whites in the jury box and in the deliberation room? Harlan believed that such laws
would be enacted on the basis of hostility and with the goal of humiliating African
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American citizens, but that the Supreme Court would consider them “consistent with
the constitution” based on the majority’s current opinion.203
Finally, Harlan noted that many of the state cases noted by Justice Brown had
been decided before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and before it would have
been safe to push for equality for African Americans and were, therefore, inapplicable to
the case at hand. By 1896, he believed a new era had begun in which “the recent
amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil freedom, gave
citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United States, and . . . obliterated the race line
from our systems of government, national and state, and placed our free institutions upon
the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law.” In this new era,
Harlan thought the Supreme Court had a responsibility to all American citizens to find
the Louisiana separate car law unconstitutional.204
While today Plessy v. Ferguson is one of the first cases mentioned when
discussing the Supreme Court and civil rights, both the majority opinion and Harlan’s
dissent received very little attention at the time. Despite Harlan’s own comments that the
decision would have far-reaching consequences to rival those of the Dred Scott decision,
few Americans recognized the case’s significance in 1896. In The Shifting Wind, John
Howard notes that the New York Times mentioned the decision only in passing several
days later and that it was not “perceived at the time that a formula had finally been
adduced for reconciling the egalitarian language of the Civil War amendments to the
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reality of an evolving caste system.” Howard makes no mention of a black response
to the landmark case.205
In the days following the Supreme Court’s May 18, 1896, decision, most African
American newspapers directed their focus elsewhere. In the several months prior to the
Court’s consideration of the case, many African American journalists focused on antilynching campaigns throughout the country. In the Cleveland Gazette, the journey of
Ohio’s Anti-Lynching bill (H.B. No. 123) gained front-page coverage throughout March
and April. The bill gained initial passage in the House on March 24 and an amended
version attained final approval on April 8. In the March 28 edition of the Gazette, the
bill’s author, H. C. Smith, recounted with elation the outcome of the House’s vote. The
final vote was 61 yeas and 22 nays. The primary goal of the bill was to hold counties
responsible for allowing lynchings and mob violence to occur. The bill defined what
made up a mob and declared, “that any person suffering serious injury at the hands of
such an assemblage shall be entitled to receive $1,000 from the county where the act is
committed, and $5,000 if death ensues.” The money was intended to help victims
provide for their families and pay for their children’s education. In addition, the bill
allowed the responsible counties to take action against individual members of the mob to
recover the fines. 206
This law was significant in two ways. First, it made it possible for the victims of
mob violence to avoid having to directly confront their attackers to gain payment for their
injuries. Second, it allowed, “the decent people of a community [to] see to it that there
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were no lynchings in the various communities, for no appeal is so potent as that
which touches the pockets of the taxpayers.” The Cleveland Gazette also noted support
for the bill from mainstream white newspapers including the Ohio State Journal and the
Cleveland Daily Leader.207
Although Representative H. C. Smith of Cuyahoga County presented the bill, he
based it upon a proposal presented at the state’s recent constitutional convention. The
author of that proposal was none other than well-respected Ohioan Albion W. Tourgée,
whose petitions on the behalf of Homer Plessy were before the Supreme Court at the time
of the bill’s passage. The Cleveland Gazette’s editors noted that Tourgée was currently
editing a magazine, The Basis, and encouraged their readers to subscribe as a show of
“practical appreciation” for his work. The paper described the bill as the leading piece of
anti-lynching and anti-mob violence legislation in the nation. Other bills on the same
issue under consideration in South Carolina and Virginia were declared not “even an
approach to the Ohio law, the author of which is that sterling and constantly aggressive
friend of the race, Judge Albion W. Tourgée.”208
Despite the newspaper’s apparent respect for Tourgée and for his work on behalf
of African Americans, the decision based on his work before the Supreme Court went
virtually ignored. In the May 23 edition of the Cleveland Gazette, the first published
after the decision was handed down, there was no mention of the case. Focus continued
to be placed on the anti-lynching movement based on Tourgée’s opinion of South
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Carolina’s anti-lynching law. The newspaper agreed with Tourgée that “the South
Carolina law [was] more likely to prove an incentive to mob violence than assistance in
its suppression.” This opinion was based on the fact that the newly passed law applied
only to lynchings in which the victim was removed from the custody of officers. Several
other articles in the edition focused on the debate between free silver and gold that
dominated national politics leading up to the 1896 presidential election.209
It was not until May 30 that the Cleveland Gazette mentioned the Plessy v.
Ferguson case. The article contained two brief paragraphs. The first addressed Justice
Brown’s opinion that upheld the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision that the Louisiana
separate car law was constitutional. The second paragraph briefly discussed Harlan’s
“very vigorous dissent” and his belief that “no power in the land had the right to regulate
the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race.” The only commentary in the article
came in its last sentence: “And Justice Harlan is right.” Beyond that, the newspaper
made no mention of this case that Harlan believed would prove to be as important as the
Dred Scott decision.210
Articles in The Freeman of Indianapolis followed a similar pattern. On February
15, the newspaper ran a letter to the editor titled “The Anti-Lynching Bill: Congress
Should Legislate Against Such Crimes” that filled nearly the entire front page. The
letter’s author, D. Augustus Straker, questioned the editor’s recently expressed opinion
that anti-lynching laws should fall within the jurisdiction of the states. Straker argued
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that Congress should make it a federal crime to murder any United States citizen. He
wrote,
To lynch is more, Mr. Editor, than to murder. It is the law of the
revolutionist, against good government and constitutional rights. He who
slays his brother, violates the law, but the usual murderer does not use the
method of the lyncher. Against him the indictment charges malice
aforethought, if we give the lyncher the benefit of this he can only be
convicted of manslaughter, because of sudden passion; but he is more than
the violator of a statute, he is the defier of the right of trial by jury, and
when the State fails to punish him, it disregards its own constitution, and
the organic law of the land. . . . Our citizenship is dual. It is that of the
state, as well as the general government. A denial of the rights there under
is the legitimate business of either or both jurisdictions, and it is giving
away our cause to say Congress has no power. Why? Because it is not
expressed in the constitution?
He also warned that anti-lynching laws, like the one recently considered in South
Carolina, could provide false hope to black Americans.211
In the following months, The Freeman continued to focus heavily on the debate
over anti-lynching, but on May 23, the newspaper included an article about the Plessy
decision that offered more commentary than most other papers. In “The ‘Jim Crow’
Case,” which appeared on the second page, the writer proclaimed that the Court’s
“decision [would] have a demoralizing effect” and that it would “do much towards
destroying the faith that Negroes may have in any institutions that white men control.”
The author also predicted that African Americans would respond by pondering their
current status – a far cry from the expectations for action seen after the Civil Rights
Cases. With a declaration that “If the race is debased in this latent tribute of contempt it
will be but momentarily,” the paper suggested black Americans would survive the
decision and move forward. With that, the newspaper moved on to an article about the
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first class of graduates from Lincoln High School in Fayetteville, Tennessee, and
made no further mention of the Plessy decision in future editions.212
The Washington Bee, published in the shadow of the Supreme Court chambers,
also offered only a brief mention of the justices’ decision. In an article about the
importance of African Americans casting their votes for candidates sympathetic to their
cause, the newspaper noted, “The separate coach law has been sustained by a Republican
Supreme Court” and asked, “Where do we stand?” Concluding that blacks needed to
insist on a constitutional amendment that would protect their rights and hold up to the
scrutiny of the Supreme Court, the newspaper appeared ready to protest the decision and
rally the community for further action. Future editions of the paper, however, failed to
make any mention of the case and presented no calls for group meetings and unity.213
In one final example of how the African American press failed to recognize the
significance of the Court’s opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, The Richmond Planet made no
mention of the decision. On February 8, 1895, the newspaper devoted nearly a full
column to a United States Circuit Court’s decision in another test case that Kentucky’s
separate car law was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it ignored the Supreme Court’s
contrary decision regarding Louisiana’s separate car law one year later. In the
intervening months, the paper published articles about voting rights, lynchings, the
growing anti-lynching movement, the decision of an Ohio judge not to release a black
prisoner accused of murder to Kentucky officials, and the case of Pokey Barnes, Mary
Abernathy, and Solomon Marable. All three stood accused of murder, but the
newspaper’s editors strongly pled the women’s innocence and offered detailed coverage
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of their case from the time of their arrest in July 1895 through their last appeals in
1896. The case became a central fixture in the newspaper for nearly a year and
superceded the Plessy opinion, which garnered no mention.214
The lack of attention given to the Supreme Court’s decision, although surprising
from our current perspective, was not astonishing at the time. The African American
press had demonstrated in the previous twenty-five years that it did not deem every civil
rights case important enough to dedicate significant space to. In light of the high number
of lynchings that occurred across the nation in the early 1890s, black journalists and
editors likely found the developing anti-lynching movement to be more newsworthy than
a case about segregation in the South. In 1892 and 1893, the number of African
Americans lynched peaked at 241 and 240 respectively. Shortly before the Plessy
decision, Ida B. Wells published A Red Record in which she “profoundly and
systematically attacked the false beliefs that resigned southerners to the acceptance of
lynching as a necessary part of the culture.” Despite the fact that in 1887 she had gone
all the way to the Tennessee Supreme Court with her own challenge to segregated
railroads, her focus had now turned towards lynching as a more immediate concern. At
the same time, Mary Church Terrell took the lead of the National Association of Colored
Women’s Clubs, which was committed to its anti-lynching campaign, and British
reformers turned their focus towards the lynching problem in the United States.215
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In addition, with a presidential election on the horizons, black newspaper
editors apparently felt an obligation to keep their readers informed about the key issues
being debated by Republicans, Populists, and Democrats. Thus, their decision to dedicate
significant space to the free silver versus gold debate served their goal of making sure
African American voters made informed decisions at the polls. While the segregation of
public transportation was undoubtedly an important issue for many African Americans, it
was not at the political forefront in 1896.
Although many historians, following in the footsteps of C. Vann Woodward, have
claimed that the Plessy decision sparked a flood of new segregation laws, it is evident
that this trend had begun well before 1896. A large number of states, for example, had
already passed railroad segregation laws in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi in 1889. In the years
immediately following Plessy, there actually was a lull in new segregation legislation.
Between 1896 and 1900, only fifteen states passed laws related to segregation, but five of
those actually banned certain forms of segregation and discrimination. In Illinois, an
1896 statute prohibited school officials from turning away students on the basis of color
and an 1897 statute strengthened a twelve-year-old law banning segregation in public
accommodations. The new law added places such as bicycle rinks, elevators, railroads,
stages, cafes, bathrooms, hotels, and concert halls to places that had to be available to all
people regardless of their race. In 1899, Michigan legislators passed a law reconfirming
the state’s 1883 anti-miscegenation law that had made all marriages between whites and
anyone with African blood legal. Both New Jersey and Minnesota passed laws
prohibiting certain forms of public accommodation segregation. In Minnesota, the state
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legislature added soda fountains and ice cream parlors to a previous law preventing
segregation in 1897 and in New Jersey it became illegal for a cemetery to refuse to bury
someone because of his/her race. Finally, New York repealed its 1864 school
segregation law. In a unique incident for the period, North Dakota’s 1899 constitution
granted the state’s legislature the power to institute an educational qualifying test for
voters, but the legislators chose not to do so.216
The majority of states passing segregation laws were, once again, in the South.
The rate at which they passed these laws had slowed somewhat since the sudden increase
after the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi decision. In
addition, several states shifted their focus from transportation to education. Only four
states, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and South Carolina, passed new laws
addressing segregation on public transportation. All of them waited between two and
four years after the Plessy opinion before doing so, which suggests that their decisions
were hardly reactive. Three of the states focused solely on railroads while Virginia
required the separation of passengers on both trains and steamboats. The new focus,
however, was on education with six states passing legislation requiring separate schools
between 1896 and 1898. The first two states to do so were South Carolina and
Mississippi, followed the next year by Arkansas and Oklahoma and finally by Louisiana
and Kentucky in 1898. Each state required separate schools for black and white children,
with the exception of Arkansas that focused on establishing separate teachers’ colleges
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for the races. Thus, at the turn of the century, legislators passing segregation
legislation began to turn their focus away from areas that black Americans could avoid if
necessary to areas, such as schools, where there was no such choice. The desire to send
one’s child to school for an education was nearly universal among Americans by 1900,
but African Americans soon found out that doing so would not be easy.217

Education in Black and White
The shift by some southern states towards legislating school segregation proved to
be another attempt to see what the federal government would allow. In 1899, a case
dealing with an African American high school in Augusta, Georgia, which was in
Richmond County, had reached the Supreme Court. Although this case was not directly
related to one of the newer pieces of legislation, it helped to set the stage for future court
challenges to school segregation. In Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education
[175 U.S. 528 (1899)], black students and their parents wanted to prevent the county
board from using tax dollars to support white high schools after it closed Ware High
School for financial reasons. The black families argued that the county’s claims of not
having adequate financial resources to keep Ware High School open while helping white
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students to attend segregated schools constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.218
The case originated before the Richmond County Superior Court, which decided
in favor of the students and their parents. Based in part upon the standards set forth in the
Plessy opinion, the superior court ordered the school board to “provide or establish equal
facilities in high school education as are now maintained by them for white children for
such colored children of high school grade . . . as may desire a high school education.”
Following this decision, the board of education appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court,
which reversed the lower court’s decision. The students and their families appealed, thus
bringing the case before the United States Supreme Court.219
In the petition presented and argued before the Supreme Court on October 30,
1899, the plaintiffs explained that when the Richmond County Board of Education levied
a $45,000 tax on residents “for the support of primary, intermediate, grammar, and high
schools” they refused to pay the portion of the tax designated for high schools. They did
so because with the recent closure of Ware High School, which had served the black
community since 1880, they believed that “the tax for the system of high schools was
illegal and void for the reason that that system was for the use and benefit of the white
population exclusively.” They argued that the law granting the board power to levy taxes
also prevented it from levying “any tax for the support of a system of high schools in
which the colored school populations of the county were not given the same educational
facilities as were furnished the white school population.” The complainants declared that
218
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of the $45,000 levied in taxes, $4,500 was designated for such high schools. In
addition, they proclaimed that
although the board was not authorized by law to use any part of such funds
or property for the support and maintenance of a system of high schools in
which the colored school population were not given the same educational
facilities as were furnished for the white school population, it was using
such funds and property in support and maintenance of its existing highschool system, the educational advantages of which were restricted wholly
to the benefit of the white school population of Richmond county to the
entire exclusion of the colored school population, and that by such use of
those funds and property a deficiency of educational purposes would
inevitably result.220
Making it even more difficult for the plaintiffs to accept the use of tax money on a
high school system devoted solely to the education of white children was that, until the
day the $45,000 tax was levied, there had been a public high school widely used by
African Americans. On that same day, however, the school board announced its decision
to close Ware High School. The decision reportedly came from the county’s need to
devote additional funds to an elementary school designated for black students.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs found that their children who had already been enrolled at
Ware were now being denied access to additional education. Their petition declared “that
the action of the board of education was a denial of the equal protection of the laws
secured by the Constitution of the United States, and that it was inequitable, illegal, and
unconstitutional for the board to levy upon or for the tax collector to collect from them
any tax for the educational purposes of the county from the benefits of which [they] in the
persons of their children of school age were excluded and debarred.” On the basis of
these complaints, the petitioners proceeded to court.221
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In response to the petitioners’ complaint, the Board of Education discussed
several schools available in their county and recounted the events leading up to their
decision to close Ware High School. According to the board, it was not responsible for
establishing a system of high schools in the county, but it did have the authority to set up
individual schools as needed by the people of the community. In this role, the board
established Neely High School in 1876; this school became Tubman High School in 1878
after a significant donation from a private citizen. The purpose of this school was to
provide an education for female students alongside the already existing Richmond
Academy for male students. In 1876, the board also established Hephzibah High School
in a corner of the county previously not serviced by a high school. Finally, in 1880,
“there being no high school in the county for the colored race, the funds of the board
justifying it, and other schools of lower grade having been established by the local
trustees in Augusta sufficient to accommodate the colored children, the board deemed it
wise and proper to establish the Ware High School.” The board’s account was made in
an effort to demonstrate to the Court that its decisions were based on the most prevalent
needs of the community, not on a responsibility to manage a comprehensive system of
high schools.222
In defense of its decision to close Ware High School in June 1897, the board
summarized the findings of a special committee established to research the status of the
county’s high schools, the condition of each school, and the overall usage of each school.
Based on this committee’s findings, the board decided to close Ware. They declared that
they based their decision on “purely economic reasons in the education of the negro
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race.” It was not a question of white versus black, however, according to the board.
Rather it was a question of how best to serve the largest number of African American
students. The board explained their decision was made
Because 400 or more negro children were being turned away from the
primary grades unable to be provided seats or teachers; because the same
means and the same building which were used to teach 60 high-school
pupils would accommodate 200 pupils in the rudiments of education;
because the board at this time was not financially able to erect buildings
and employ additional teachers for the large number of colored children
who were in need of primary education, and because there were in the city
of Augusta at this time three public high schools – the Haines Industrial
School, the Walker Baptist Institute, and the Payne Institute – each of
which were public to the colored people.
Thus, the board decided to close Ware High School with the intent of using its facilities
and resources to educate a greater number of black children at the elementary level.
Additionally, the board left open the option to reinstate the high school should additional
funds become available.223
In response to the board’s claim that there were three public high schools
available to black students in Augusta, the plaintiffs declared that the Payne Institute, the
Walker Baptist Institute, and the Haines Industrial Institute “are purely private and pay
educational institutions under sectarian control, and have been in existence for years past,
and have no connection, whatsoever, with the public-school system” run by the board.
Confronted with this claim, the board admitted that the mentioned schools were, in fact,
private schools under sectarian control and were not part of the public school system
under its supervision. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that if there was a shortage of
financial resources available to maintain a high school for black students in Augusta, it
was the result of “the illegal action of said board in appropriating to the white school
223
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population of said city largely more of the public-school fund than it is legally
entitled to, to the corresponding detriment of the colored school population of said city,
and but for such illegal action there would be no such deficiency as said board avers.” To
this claim, the board responded that the lack of funds for the Ware High School was not
the result of any actions it had taken.224
Nearly seven weeks after listening to both sides of the case, the U.S. Supreme
Court presented its unanimous decision. In the opinion, surprisingly written by Justice
Harlan, the Court upheld the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in favor of the board of
education. According to Harlan, the plaintiffs in the case argued that the board of
education had used a disproportionate amount of available funds for white schools and
they requested “an injunction that would either impair the efficiency of the high school
provided for white children or compel the board to close it . . . . [and] the result would
only be to take from white children educational privileges enjoyed by them, without
giving to colored children additional opportunities for the education furnished in high
schools.” He explained that this option would not benefit either group of high school
students in Augusta. Furthermore, Harlan summarized the board’s claim that it could
educate several hundred black students at the elementary level with the same funds used
to educate only sixty students at the high school. He concluded that the board made the
decision that was “in the interest of the greater number of colored children, leaving the
smaller number to obtain a high-school education in existing private institutions” for not
much more than it cost them to attend the public school.225
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Harlan further explained that the evidence before the Court did not allow the
justices to consider whether the board’s decision came out of racial hatred. He stated that
if the board of education had been wrong to decide to try to educate three hundred black
children at one level rather than sixty black children at a higher level, “that was not an
error which a court of equity should attempt to remedy by an injunction that would
compel the board to withhold all assistance from the high school maintained for white
children.” In order for such an injunction to be justified, the Court would need to see
evidence that the plaintiffs had asked the board to create and maintain an African
American high school with available funds and that the board refused to do so because of
its hostility towards blacks. Such evidence was not available for the Court.226
Therefore, Harlan and the other Supreme Court justices agreed with the Georgia
Supreme Court’s view that the board of education’s actions did not justify an injunction
that would negatively affect the white high schools as well. They also agreed with the
lower court, which “rejected the suggestion that the board proceeded in bad faith or had
abused the discretion with which it was invested by the statute under which it proceeded
or had acted in hostility to the colored race.” Based on the evidence presented to them,
the justices determined that the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws or by
denying them any privileges guaranteed by the Constitution for citizens of the United
States. Finally, and most importantly in the message it sent to the people of the South,
Harlan declared, “the education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective states, and any interference on the part of Federal
226
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authority with the management of such school’s cannot be justified except in the case
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.”
With that, the Supreme Court signaled to the states, the southern ones in particular, that
the requirement of “separate but equal” alluded to in the Plessy decision was flexible and
that the federal authorities would not prevent them from spending a disproportionate
amount of available funds on schools for white children.227
Once again, the African American press provided minimal comments on the
Supreme Court’s decision. Popular newspapers, including Baltimore’s Afro-American,
Indianapolis’s The Freeman, and Chicago’s The Broad-Ax, failed to make any mention of
the Cumming decision. The newspapers that did mention it did so only in passing.
In “No Negro Need Apply: The Courts Say No,” published on December 23,
1899, just five days after Harlan presented the majority opinion, The Washington Bee
summarized the Court’s decision. With the exception of one sentence, “The court failed
to see that this was a violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution,” the
article offered no commentary, only summary. Even that one sentence could have been
read as either a reaction to Harlan’s opinion or a summary of it.228
Likewise, The Cleveland Gazette presented only a brief summary of the case in its
December 30, 1899, article “Georgia School Case: The Supreme Court Sustains the
Action of the Richmond County School Board.” Following a brief summary of the facts
of the case, the article explained that Justice Harlan believed “the supreme court was not
permitted from the record to assume” that the actions of the school board were “based
upon opposition to colored schools or the colored race,” but that they were “taken for
227
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financial reasons and [were] within the just discretion of the board.” The article’s
author failed to show any reaction to the decision and made no effort to rally the African
American community behind the issue of equal education for black children.229
Thus, the black press failed again either to recognize the potential significance of
the Supreme Court’s influence or to draw attention to an issue that was likely to affect
many members of the black community. Rather than focusing on an issue that appeared
too many nonexistent prior to Cumming, many African American newspapers continued
to focus on national politics and on lynching. The latter, obviously, was an important
issue for African Americans throughout the United States and was a high profile subject
for activists such as Ida B. Wells-Barnett to speak out about. Nevertheless, as shocking
and objectionable as lynchings were, they had little direct effect on the lives of most
black Americans. The debate between a Democrat and a Republican presidential
candidate also was unlikely to have a significant effect on the lives of most black citizens,
or most whites for that matter. For most Americans, state and local ordinances were
more likely to affect their future and their children’s future. Thus, the Supreme Court’s
decision effectively granting states permission to spend tax money disproportionately on
schools for white and black students warranted much more coverage and reaction from
the black press than it received.
In the five years following the Cumming decision, from 1900 to 1905, the number
of states prohibiting black and white children from attending the same schools nearly
doubled suggesting that the decision served as a signal to state legislators that the federal
government would not prevent such segregation. Meanwhile, only four states passed new
229
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or updated legislation banning such racial discrimination. In one example of a state
banning segregation, New York repealed an earlier law in 1900 to make it illegal for
anyone to refuse a student admission to a school based on the child’s race. The following
year, New Mexico passed a similar law banning discrimination because of race or
nationality. Those convicted of violating the New Mexico law faced fines,
imprisonment, and were “forever barred from teaching school or from holding any office
of honor or profit” in the territory. New Jersey and Minnesota each strengthened
previous bans of segregation in 1903 and 1905, respectively.230
Meanwhile, ten states primarily in the South but spreading into the Midwest and
West, passed legislation strengthening or instituting school segregation during the same
five-year period. In 1901 alone, North Carolina, Alabama, West Virginia, and Tennessee
redefined and clarified their requirements for keeping students of different races
separated in the classroom. In North Carolina, the state used codes prohibiting interracial
marriage from the 1875 state constitution to define how children should be separated.
According to the codes, “persons of Negro descent to the third generation inclusive” were
black. Two years later, the state went even further and declared that no child who had
“Negro blood in its veins, however remote the strain, shall attend a school for the white
race, and no such child shall be considered a white child.” In Alabama, a clause of the
state’s new constitution clarified that no child of either race would be allowed to attend a
school intended for the other race. In addition, West Virginia amended an 1873 law to
change the number of African American students needed to require a district to establish
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a separate school for blacks from fifteen to ten. Finally, Tennessee’s 1901 law
expanded the 1873 requirement that “white and colored persons shall not be taught in the
same school, but in separate schools under the same general regulations as to
management, usefulness and efficiency” from including not only elementary and high
schools, but colleges as well.231
The influence of the 1901 Tennessee law, sometimes called the Maryville College
Law, was particularly noticeable in East Tennessee’s Knoxville where two schools
supported by the United Presbyterian Church had maintained open enrollment policies
for decades. Maryville College, founded in 1819, and Knoxville College, founded in
1875, each had a majority student population of one race, white and black respectively,
but had traditionally offered an education to both races. They had been able to do so
because previous state laws regarding education had been focused on public schools and
on schools for children, not colleges. Maryville College had started to admit students
regardless of their race after the Civil War ended with assistance from the Freedmen’s
Bureau. Following the passage of the Tennessee Education Segregation Act of 1901,
however, both schools had to turn away students for the first time or face fines.
Individuals who violated the new law by allowing white and black students to enroll at
the same school also faced imprisonment for up to six months. Once forced to segregate
in 1901, Maryville College contributed one-fourth of its endowment to Knoxville College
as a show of its support for educating African Americans. Both schools immediately
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integrated again after the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education [347 U.S. 483 (1954)].232
Farther west, two states passed education segregation laws to address their unique
needs. Alaska had a more sparse population and, thus, allowed for white children and
“children of mixed blood who lead a civilized life” to attend school together. This
allowed districts to maximize use of their resources while still preventing full blood black
students, Native American students, or mulatto students with questionable backgrounds
from attending schools with white children. The most unique segregation law instituted
between 1900 and 1905 was in California. The state’s 1902 statute did two things. First,
it repealed an 1880 law that declared students from ages six to twenty-one could attend
public schools regardless of their race. Second, the new law made it illegal for not only
black students, but for Japanese and Chinese children as well, to enroll in schools
designated for white children. These two laws demonstrated that the form of racial
segregation often related to the needs and makeup of the state’s population.233
The next education segregation law challenged in the Supreme Court, however,
came in 1904 in Kentucky. According to Section 1 of the Day Law, passed March 22,
1904,
it shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, or association of persons
to maintain or operate any college, school, or institution where persons of
the white and negro races are both received as pupils for instruction, and
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any person or corporation who shall operate or maintain any such college,
school, or institutional shall be fined $1,000, and any person or
corporation who may be convicted of violating the provisions of this act
shall be fined $100 for each day they may operate said school, college, or
institution after such conviction.
The law, however, did allow private schools and colleges to maintain separate and
distinct branches for the exclusive education of each race. To guarantee that these
branches were independently operated, they had to be located at least twenty-five miles
from each other.234
On October 8, 1904, a grand jury in Madison County, Kentucky indicted Berea
College for “unlawfully and willfully permit[ting] and receiv[ing] both white and negro
races and pupils for instruction” in violation of the new statute. Founded in 1855, Berea
College was the creation of the Reverend John G. Fee and the noted abolitionist Cassius
M. Clay, who both favored gradual emancipation before the Civil War. In 1866, the
school was incorporated and opened its doors with 187 students, of whom 91 were white
and 96 were black. Until the 1904 law requiring segregation, Berea College continued to
have a student body divided equally between the races. Many of the school’s graduates
went on to teach at schools for African American students.235 The composition of Berea
College’s student body changed, however, after Representative Carl Day’s bill became
law.236
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When Day, a Democrat, presented his bill to the Kentucky House of
Representatives, groups both in favor of and against it traveled to Frankfort to express
their opinions. The first to address the committee considering the bill was a group of
Berea citizens who supported it. Among them was J. M. Early who was a white
merchant and president of Berea’s Democrat Club. According to Early, who claimed to
speak on behalf of the town’s business interests, segregating Berea College would “be in
the best interests of the community as well as of the State.” State Superintendent of
Education Marry McChesney argued that Day’s bill would simply force Berea College to
comply with the state’s constitution and laws that already regulated enrollment at public
schools. McChesney also mentioned Booker T. Washington’s recent visit to the White
House as evidence that “if the Berea ideas were carried out to logical conclusion, there
would be social equality of the races in Kentucky.” Day defended his bill to the
committee by explaining that it was meant to prevent “the contamination of the white
children of Kentucky.”237
In contrast, Berea College President William G. Frost, his wife Eleanor Frost, and
members of the college’s faculty spoke to the committee in opposition to the bill. The
delegation “presented an historical overview of the College, striving to show how racial
coeducation had been maintained for four decades without harm to white or black
students.” The college’s supporters also tried to convince moderate Republicans and
Democrats to defeat the bill. Frost and the others were no match, however, for the law’s
supporters who organized a public meeting at the Richmond Courthouse and told citizens
that they “should support the bill because Berea was teaching African-Americans to be
237
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the social equals of the white man and woman.” Despite the claims of James A.
White, a black alumnus of Berea, that the school stressed not social equality but the
importance of becoming “accustomed to each other as fellow human beings,” Day’s bill
made it through the legislature and became law.238
Following its indictment by the grand jury of Madison County and conviction in
the circuit court, Berea College appealed first to the state court of appeals and then to the
United States Supreme Court. After hearing arguments for the case on April 10 and 13,
1908, Justice David Josiah Brewer delivered the opinion of the Court on November 9,
1908. Brewer, who had also written the majority opinion in Louisville, New Orleans &
Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi, began his opinion by establishing that the facts of the
case were not being disputed. Both parties of the case agreed that the Day Law did not
violate Kentucky’s constitution as was decided by the state’s highest court. The only
question before the Supreme Court, according to Justice Brewer, was whether the law
conflicted with the U.S. Constitution. One portion of the state court’s decision held that
“as a corporation created by this state, [Berea College] has no natural right to teach at
all.” In response to this, Brewer explained that issues of what powers a state conferred
upon its corporations was a local issue and that states had the right to decide if they
would treat corporations and individuals differently. He concluded that “In granting
corporate powers the legislature may deem that the best interests of the state would be
subserved by some restriction, and the corporation may not please that, in spite of the
restriction, it has more or greater powers because the citizen has.” Based on this
conclusion, Brewer explained that the 1904 Kentucky law might be considered in conflict
238
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with the Constitution regarding its limitations on the actions of individuals, but did
not violate the Constitution regarding corporations created by the state.239
Based on the belief that the state had the right to regulate corporations it created
and on evidence that Berea College was incorporated under an act that allowed the state
to amend its provisions, the Court decided to uphold the judgment of the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky. The Kentucky court had declared that the wording of the law
would have allowed the same school to teach the different races at different times in the
same place. Therefore, Brewer wrote, “an amendment to the original charter, which does
not destroy the power of the college to furnish education to all persons, but which simply
separates them by times or place of instruction, cannot be said to ‘defeat or substantially
impair the object of the grant.’”240
Justice Harlan, once again, took on the role of dissenter.241 Harlan’s primary
concern with the majority opinion was that it suggested the Kentucky law may be illegal
when applied to individuals, but was lawful when applied to corporations. Harlan wrote,
Upon a review of the judgment below this court says that the statute is
‘clearly separable, and may be valid as to one class, while invalid as to
another;’ that ‘even if it were conceded that its assertion of power over
individuals cannot be sustained, still the statute must be upheld so far as it
restrains corporations.’ ‘It is unnecessary,’ this court says, ‘for us to
consider anything more than the question of its validity as applied to
corporations. . . . We need concern ourselves only with the inquiry
whether the 1st section can be upheld as coming within the powers of a
state over its own corporate creatures.’ The judgment of the state court is
now affirmed, and thereby left in full force, so far as Kentucky and its
courts are concerned, although such judgment rests in part upon the
ground that the statute is not, in any particular, in violation of any rights
secured by the Federal Constitution. In so ruling, it must necessarily have
been assumed by this court that the legislature may have regarded the
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teaching of white and colored pupils at the same time and in the same school
or institutions, when maintained by private individuals and associations, as
wholly different in its results from such teaching when conducted by the
same individuals acting under the authority of or representing a
corporation. But, looking at the nature or subject of the legislation, it is
inconceivable that the legislature consciously regarded the subject in that
light. It is absolutely certain that the legislature had in mind to prohibit
the teaching of the two races in the same private institution, at the same
time, by whosoever that institution was conducted. It is a reflection upon
the common sense of legislators to suppose that they might have
prohibited a private corporation from teaching by its agents, and yet left
individuals and unincorporated associations entirely at liberty, by the same
instructors, to teach the two races in the same institution at the same time.
It was the teaching of pupils of the two races together, or in the same
school, no matter by whom or under whose authority, which the
legislature sought to prevent. The manifest purpose was to prevent the
association of white and colored persons in the same school. That such
was its intention is evident from the title of the act, which . . . was ‘to
prohibit white and colored persons from attending the same school.’ Even
if the words of the body of the act were doubtful or obscure, the title may
be looked to in aid of construction.
He continued to explain that the Court did have the power to strike down one part of a
statute as unconstitutional while leaving another part intact; it could only do so if the
sections were distinct and separable. In this case, however, the law in question included
restrictions on individuals, corporations, and associations in the same section making it
impossible to separate them.242
Harlan also pointed to earlier cases to show that, in this case, the Court had a
responsibility to strike down the Day Law in its entirety. He showed that in Huntington
v. Worthen [120 U.S. 97 (1887)] Justice Stephen J. Field had written that if one segment
of a statute was invalid the entire statute should be declared unconstitutional “where ‘it is
evident the legislature would not have enacted one without the other.’” He identified two
other examples, Spraigue v. Thompson [118 U.S. 90] and Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark
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[143 U.S. 649 (1892)] where the Court made similar points. Finally, he referred to
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [184 U.S. 540 (1902)] as “a case very much in point
here.” In that case, which dealt with promissory notes and an open account, the Court
determined that Section 9 of the law in question was unconstitutional because it
exempted agriculturalists from the requirements of the law. In response to the question
of whether the Court could then allow the remaining portions of the law to stand, the
Court wrote, “If different sections of a statute are independent of each other, that which is
unconstitutional may be disregarded, and valid sections may stand and be enforced. But,
if an obnoxious section is of such import that the other sections, without it, would cause
results not contemplated or desired by the legislature, then the entire statute must be held
inoperative.” Based on these criteria, the Court determined that it “must hold that the
legislature would not have entered upon or continued the policy indicated by the statute
unless agriculturalists and live-stock dealers were excluded from its operation and
thereby protected from prosecution. The result is that the statute must be regarded in its
entirety, and, in that view, it must be adjudged to be unconstitutional as denying the equal
protection of the laws to those within its jurisdiction who are not embraced by the 9th
section.” In view of established precedent, therefore, Harlan concluded that the Day Law
should be declared unconstitutional in its entirety. He did, however, note that his opinion
had “no reference to regulations prescribed for public schools, established at the pleasure
of the state and maintained at the public expense,” because such schools were not
included in the case before the Supreme Court.243
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The significance of this case was that it cemented the states’ rights to regulate
both public and private education. On the one hand, the entire Court, including Harlan in
his dissenting opinion, upheld the states’ rights to legislate public education. As
demonstrated in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, the Court believed
the control of public schools was a local issue. In Berea, the justices confirmed this
decision. On the other hand, the Court granted control of private schools to the state in
the Berea decision with its determination that states had the power to regulate
corporations.
Unlike the Cumming decision, the Berea decision garnered wide attention from
the African American press, showing once again that the press was inconsistent in the
message it sent to the black community about the influence of the Supreme Court. Now
that the number of states with school segregation laws had already increased in the wake
of Cumming, black newspapers chose to bring the issue to the forefront. The coverage
ranged from a single article to as many as seven articles published over five weeks as
seen in The Freeman and The Cleveland Gazette.
The Washington Bee offered only a single article on November 14, 1908. In
“Separate School Law,” the newspaper offered strong opinions and little summary.
According to the article, “The decision of the United States Supreme Court, upholding
the Kentucky Separate School law, was no surprise to the Bee [because] to prevent a state
from passing laws of a discriminatory nature, there must be an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.” Such an amendment, the article declared, was
necessary to put an end to the doctrine of state’s rights. Asking “What right has a state to
say that certain citizens will not be permitted to vote for president and vice president of
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the United States?” and “If the Constitution guarantees rights to citizens what right
has a state to say mixed schools shall not exist, and such laws are upheld by the United
States Supreme Court?” the article raised important issues for the African American
community’s consideration. The only answer, according to The Washington Bee, was for
black Americans to find enough liberal allies in the legislature to guarantee equality of
citizenship in the future. Despite raising such important issues in response to the Berea
decision, the paper made no further mention of the decision in subsequent editions and
made no further effort to rally Washington’s black population around the issue of equal
education.244
Baltimore’s Afro-American also expressed its discontent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in its November 14 edition only to ignore the issue afterwards. The
headline of the newspaper’s front page article left no question as to the editor’s opinion:
“Jim Crowism Spreading: As Invaded the Sacred Precincts of the Supreme Court of the
United States, According To A Recent Decision States can do Almost Anything To The
Negro It Likes – State Can Prevent The Coeducation Of White And Colored People –
Grants Even More That The South Has Ever Asked – Berean College Loses Its Case –
Justice Harlan Dissents.” The article itself, however, offered no comment on the decision
and only summarized the facts of the case, Brewer’s majority opinion, and Harlan’s
dissent. More reactionary articles and statements appeared on the paper’s second page
where one sidebar declared, “No disfranchisement law, no ‘Jim Crow’ law, no Supreme
Court decision, no discriminatory laws of any kind can keep the Negro down unless he
himself decides to state down. He can, if he will, rise superior to them all and become a
244
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factor that the whole country will have to reckon with; but he will have to do it
himself.” Two other segments applauded Justice Harlan for being a friend to African
Americans.245
The issue’s primary editorial focused more on the Supreme Court’s “tradition” of
decisions against civil rights and equality for black citizens. Quoting Justice Harlan who
characterized the majority opinion as “mischievous and cruel, and inconsistent with the
great principle of the equality of citizens before the laws,” the author exclaimed that the
decision had effectively given all states the authority to discriminate against blacks. The
possibility of states requiring blacks to walk on the opposite side of a street, to use
separate doors to a building, and to shop in separate stores now existed. The article
concluded that “Only white men made [the Declaration of Independence], and it was
made only for white men, for even at that time the Negro, no matter how much of his
blood had been shed to assist in making it possible that men should meet in the State
House in Philadelphia without having the fear of having their heads cut off for daring to
promulgate such a treasonable paper as was this very same declaration of independence.”
Once again, the Supreme Court had showed that it believed black men were inferior to
whites.246
It was not until a month later that the Afro-American mentioned Berea College
again. In a one paragraph article titled “For Berea College,” the newspaper reported that
a woman had donated $35,000 to the school to help build a new school for black students.
Building the new school was the only option for Berea to continue providing an
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education for all students following the Supreme Court’s decision. Beyond this
mention, however, the Afro-American followed in the footsteps of The Washington Bee in
its failure to further discuss the decision and to rally the African American community on
the issue.247
Meanwhile, the Court’s decision continued to be an important topic for several
weeks in other newspapers. The New York Age ran articles about Berea for three weeks.
The first article simply summarized the Court’s majority opinion and Harlan’s dissent,
but the following week an article discussing the potential impact of the decision ran. As
the Afro-American had argued, the New York Age declared that the decision was
“consistent with that high tribunal’s past evasion on technical grounds of the grave issue
of Negro protection.” The author argued that the Supreme Court was too cowardly to
uphold the promises of equality spelled out in the Reconstruction Amendments.
Furthermore, he declared, “The consequences of Berea, damning to the Negro and
disgraceful to America, will bring their own reaction. Built on the shifting sands of race
prejudice, in future storms this whole wicked structure will pass away. Judge Brewer,
like Judge Taney, has not settled the question of human rights in this republic. Judge
Brewer has simply postponed the dreadful day of reckoning between human rights and
race wrongs.” On the same day, the newspaper reported Berea College’s plans to build a
new school exclusively for black students. Finally, on December 10, the newspaper
published a speech given by the Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones248 in which he condemned
the Court’s decision. Although the New York Age continued to discuss the Berea
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decision for several weeks, it too failed to seize the opportunity to gather African
Americans together for a common cause.249
The Freeman from Indianapolis also ran a number of articles about the case from
November 14 to December 26, 1908. While most of the articles simply discussed the
primary points of the case and the decision, one printed on December 12 proclaimed,
“The decision of the Supreme Court in the Berea College case simply illustrates that the
nation’s highest tribunal can always manage somehow to keep in line with the anti-Negro
sentiment of the country and yet square itself with the law. That antiquated makeshift,
the doctrine of state’s rights, is seldom appealed to except to do things to the black folks
without doing damage to the constitution.”250
One of the African American newspapers that was most vocal about the Berea
decision was The Cleveland Gazette, which had contributors and readers from the
Oberlin College community. Berea College had been modeled largely on Oberlin where
black students had been admitted since well before the Civil War began. In its first
article on the subject, the paper accused the Supreme Court of “simply carrying out
President ‘Brownsville’ Roosevelt’s policy toward our people which President-elect Taft
unqualifiedly endorsed.” This “dig” referred to the Brownsville, Texas incident in which
thirteen African American soldiers rioted against segregation on August 13, 1906. A few
months later, President Theodore Roosevelt discharged the three companies of the black
soldiers involved in the riot and at the time of the Berea decision that incident was being
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replayed in the press because several of the accused rioters were standing trial. The
article concluded with a plea for African Americans to realize that there was no real
difference between the Republicans of Roosevelt’s and Taft’s administrations and the
southern Democrats of the time.251
Two weeks later, The Cleveland Gazette accused Berea College president
William Frost of encouraging Representative Day to introduce his bill that led to the
Supreme Court case. The paper claimed that after arriving in Kentucky from Oberlin
Frost was “like all other northern white men who find themselves suddenly elevated to
positions which are out of all proportion to their ability to grasp and qualify and
harmonize with southern traditions, straightaway proceeded to out-herod Herod in
proscription, discrimination, and a degree of general cussedness never dreamed of my
southern ‘white folks.’” His attitude and belief that Berea could develop into an
outstanding whites-only institution allegedly led to the Supreme Court case.252
Although the African American press devoted more space to the Berea decision
than it had to most cases since the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the coverage lacked any
real sense of purpose. For the most part, the newspapers simply summarized the case and
its decision. Those that did offer a commentary or critique of the decision tended to
introduce issues that could have been strongly debated in African American community
only to drop the topic by the next edition. This meant that, once again, black Americans
missed an opportunity to unify in support of a common cause that was more likely to
have a significant and direct effect on their lives than railroad transportation or even
lynching.
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Conclusion: The Post-Plessy and Post-Berea Period
After Berea, there were only a handful of states left to pass statutes related to
school segregation. By 1915, twenty-three states and territories required some form of
separation of the races in schools. Fifteen states specifically banned school segregation
while eleven had no specific laws addressing the issue. The same year as the Berea
decision, North Carolina passed a law requiring separate schools not only for blacks and
whites, but for descendants of the Croatan Indians as well. In 1909, the Arizona
legislature gave school districts the authority to create separate schools when there were
at least eight African American students in the district. In Florida, a 1913 law extended
the requirement of separating students based on their race to teachers. The new law made
it illegal for black teachers to instruct white students and for white teachers to instruct
black students. Violators of the law faced fines and imprisonment. Finally, in 1915,
Delaware became the only state in the northeast to require racially segregated schools.
Parts of the South, however, had already moved on to the next area of segregation to be
tested on a national stage – segregation districts for residential areas.253
This last flurry of school segregation legislation was yet another example of how
Supreme Court decisions could serve as an indicator to legislators of what the federal
government was willing to accept. In the period of twelve years, the Court had opened
the doors to increased segregation in two areas that affected the lives of many African
Americans. In order to travel and in order to ensure their children received an education,
black Americans now had to contend with laws that limited their access to institutions
253

Carr, Federal Protection of Civil Rights; Johnson, The Development of State Legislation Concerning the
Free Negro; and, Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law.

197
designed for the benefits of citizens. Despite their initial hopes that the
Reconstruction Amendments had ushered in a period of equality, it was increasingly
evident that equality would not be achieved. In the next decade, the Supreme Court
would address one last area of African Americans’ lives: where they lived.
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Chapter Five: “A Law Which Forbids a Negro to Rise is Not
Made Just because It Forbids a White Man to Fall”

Beginning in the 1890s, African Americans faced another form of segregation as
whites sought to regulate where blacks lived. Although throughout the South the two
races had lived in close proximity to one another for generations, the nature of growing
cities led to new tensions. In a rural setting, whites often accepted blacks who lived near
them because the blacks worked for them, worked their land, or, quite simply, “knew
their place.” As Edward L. Ayers notes in The Promise of the New South, however,
“Increasing residential segregation accompanied the emergence of more modern cities. . .
. [and] the newer a Southern city, the more likely it was to be consistently segregated by
race.” By the beginning of the twentieth century, several southern cities, including
Richmond and Atlanta, already consisted of a patchwork of all-white and all-black
blocks. By the 1910s, the belief that spending too much time around African Americans
would be detrimental to a white person’s character, morality, and health seemed to
pervade certain areas of the country. In response to this growing concern, local
legislators introduced resolutions to separate the races within their cities. It no longer
seemed to be enough to segregate the exceptional aspects of life, such as travel. Now
white America felt the need to segregate the mundane as well.254
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America in the First Ten Years of the Twentieth Century
The advent of the twentieth century in the United States brought with it more than
just growing cities. From 1900 to 1910, the country’s black population grew from 8.8
million to 9.8 million, yet blacks made up a decreasing percentage of the overall
population. This resulted, in part, from heavy migration by Europeans and by efforts by
some whites to have large families as a way of offsetting the growing African American
population. For example, during the same ten-year period, more than two million Italians
arrived in the United States. There were more than 300,000 Greek immigrants in the
country before the outbreak of World War I and nearly 150,000 new immigrants from
Portugal in the opening decades of the twentieth century. Overall, the foreign-born
population of the United States increased from 10,341,276 in 1900 to 13,515,886 in 1910,
with the majority of the new immigrants coming from Europe. Thus, although most of
these European immigrants settled in the northern United States, the increase of the white
population through migration negated the increase in the African American population.
In addition, white Americans from the north became increasingly focused on racial purity
as they dealt with these immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.255
The new century also brought with it a further decline in African American
representation in the federal government. Following several decades of black
participation, albeit small, in Congress, a twenty-eight year absence of blacks began in
1901 after George H. White gave up his seat. White, a Representative from North
Carolina and graduate of Howard University, served two terms in Congress from 1897 to
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He did not run for reelection for the next term and realized that in making

this decision he was ending an era of southern black representation in the federal
government.
Nevertheless, in his January 1901 farewell address to Congress, White expressed
his belief that African Americans had made great strides since Reconstruction. Speaking
to his fellow congressmen, he said,
I would like to advance the statement that . . . what the Negro was thirtytwo years ago, is not a proper standard by which the Negro living on the
threshold of the twentieth century should be measured. Since that time we
have reduced the illiteracy of the race at least 45 percent. We have written
and published nearly 500 books. We have nearly 800 newspapers, three of
which are dailies. We have now in practice over 2,000 lawyers, and a
corresponding number of doctors. We have accumulated over
$12,000,000 worth of school property and about $40,000,000 worth of
church property. We have about 140,000 farms and homes, valued in the
neighborhood of $750,000,000 and personal property valued about
$170,000,000. We have raised about $11,000,000 for educational
purposes, and the property per-capita for every colored man, woman, and
child in the United States is estimated at $75. We are operating
successfully several banks, commercial enterprises among our people in
the South land, including one silk mill and one cotton factory. We have
32,000 teachers in the schools of the country; we have built, with the aid
of our friends, about 20,000 churches, and support 7 colleges, 17
academies, 50 high schools, 5 law schools, 5 medical schools and 25
theological seminaries. We have over 600,000 acres of land in the South
alone. The cotton produced, mainly by black labor, has increased from
4,669,770 bales in 1860 to 11,235,000 in 1899.
White’s pride in the accomplishments of his fellow African Americans was obvious.257
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White further noted that the accomplishments made by black Americans since
the Civil War had been made under extremely adverse conditions. He declared, “We
have done it in the face of lynching, burning at the stake, with the humiliation of ‘Jim
Crow’ laws, the disfranchisement of our male citizens, slander and degradation of our
women, with the factories closed against us, no Negro permitted to be conductor on the
railway cars. . . . Labor unions – carpenters, painters, brick masons, machinists, hackmen
and those supplying nearly every conceivable avocation for livelihood – have banded
themselves together to better their condition, but, with few exceptions, the black face has
been left out.” In response to this adversity, White expressed both pride and indignation.
He continued his speech and exclaimed, “With all these odds against us, we are forging
our way ahead, slowly, perhaps, but surely . . . You may use our labor for two and a half
centuries and then taunt us for our poverty, but let me remind you we will not always
remain poor! You may withhold even the knowledge of how to read God’s word and . . .
then taunt us for our ignorance, but we would remind you that there is plenty of room at
the top, and we are climbing!”258
White concluded his farewell address by proposing a “recipe” for further
improving the states of African Americans. According to White, the American black
asks no special favors, but simply demands that he be given the same
chance for existence, for earning a livelihood, for raising himself in the
scales of manhood and womanhood, that are accorded to kindred
nationalities. Treat him as a man. . . . open the doors of industry to him . .
. Help him to overcome his weakness, punish the crime-committing class
by the courts of the land, measure the standard of the race by its best
material, cease to mold prejudicial and unjust sentiment against him, and .
. . he will learn to support . . . and join in with that political party, that
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institution, whether secular or religious, in every community where he lives,
which is destined to do the greatest good for the greatest number.
Obliterate race hatred, party prejudice, and help us to achieve nobler ends,
greater results and become satisfactory citizens to our brother in white.
Finally, White predicted that he would not be the last African American to serve in
Congress: “phoenix-like he will rise up some day and come again.”259
Just months after White’s farewell address to Congress, the nation became
embroiled in debate over an event involving the nation’s top politician, President
Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt, a supporter of the growing eugenics movement in the
United States agreed with many whites who believed African American were responsible
for their own predicament and opposed interracial marriage because of the need to
preserve racial purity. Nevertheless, Roosevelt respected Booker T. Washington whom
he considered “the most useful, as well as the most distinguished member of his race in
the world.” Roosevelt asked Washington to come to the White House on October 16,
1901, to advise him on the issue of race in America. During their meeting, the two took a
break and ate dinner together, along with Edith Roosevelt and Philip S. Stewart, a friend
of the Roosevelt’s. News of the dinner went out across the Associated Press wire:
“Booker T. Washington, of Tuskegee, Alabama, dined with the President last
evening.”260
The reaction to news of Roosevelt’s dinner with Washington was particularly
strong in the South. According to the Memphis Scimitar, “The most damnable outrage
which has ever been perpetrated by any citizen of the United States was committed
yesterday by the President, when he invited a nigger to dine with him at the White
259
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House.” The newspaper continued to accuse Roosevelt of disgracing his mother, a
native of Georgia, and the South. The editorial declared, “By inviting a nigger to his
table he pays his mother small duty. No Southern woman with a proper self-respect
would now accept an invitation to the White House, nor would President Roosevelt be
welcomed today in Southern homes. He has not inflamed the anger of the Southern
people; he has excited their disgust.” Roosevelt’s actions also drew the outrage of
segregationists in Congress, such as Senator James K. Vardaman from Mississippi.
Expressing his disgust, Vardaman exclaimed, “the White House was so saturated with the
odor of the nigger that the rats have taken refuge in the stable” Senator Ben Tillman of
South Carolina claimed, “The action of President Roosevelt in entertaining the nigger
will necessitate killing a thousand niggers in the South before they will learn their place
again.” In response to the outrage, Roosevelt reinvented the truth with stories that the
men had worked through lunch and that his wife had not sat at the table with them.
Although Roosevelt continued to consult Washington on issues of race, he never again
offered Washington a meal.261
The first years of the 1900s also saw the growth of debate between W.E.B.
DuBois and Booker T. Washington. In 1903, DuBois published The Souls of Black Folk
in which he discussed the effect of emancipation on African Americans and the roles he
believed black leaders should play. In response to Washington’s idea of gradualism,
DuBois wrote that Washington’s “doctrine has tended to make the whites, North and
South, shift the burden of the Negro problem to the Negro’s shoulders and stand aside as
critical and rather pessimistic spectators; when in fact the burden belongs to the nation,
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and the hands of none of us are clean if we bend not our energies to righting these
great wrongs.” DuBois also expressed his belief that Washington’s approach and
teachings were, at least in part, responsible for the declining status of African Americans.
DuBois believed that the right to vote, social equality, and education were all necessary
for African Americans to continue to progress.262
Just two years later, DuBois joined with other black leaders at a meeting on the
Canadian side of Niagara Falls.263 All of the participants opposed Washington’s
accommodationism and hoped to form an organization that would offer an alternative
approach for black Americans. The first meeting of the Niagara Movement took place
July 11-13, 1905, with twenty-nine delegates. The participants published a “Declaration
of Principles” that spelled out the basic rights of black citizens to vote, to not be
segregated on public transportation and in public accommodations, and to enjoy the same
civil liberties as white Americans. The manifesto reflected the ideals of the Declaration
of Independence and the hope that the federal government would protect the rights
guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. According to the
manifesto, the members of the Niagara Movement “refuse[d] to allow the impression to
remain that the Negro-American assents to inferiority, is submissive to oppression and
apologetic before insults. Through helplessness we may submit, but the voice of protest
of ten million Americans must never cease to assail the ears of their fellows, so long as
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America is unjust.” Known as the “Negro Declaration of Independence,” this
manifesto served as the foundation of the Niagara Movement.264
At this first meeting, the Niagara Movement created a formal organization and
developed eight primary objectives. First, the group emphasized the importance of
freedom of speech and criticism. They believed that to obtain the same civil liberties as
whites, they needed to be able to openly express and disseminate their ideas. Their
second objective, which was closely related to the first, was that the black press should be
able to operate without restrictions and without subsidies from groups that may expect a
certain attitude or opinion in the newspaper’s coverage of events. Next, the Niagarists
wanted to obtain suffrage for black men as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Their fourth and fifth objectives were to achieve “the abolition of all caste distinctions
based simply on race and color [and] the recognition of the principles of human
brotherhood as a practical present creed.” The organizers also wanted to show
Americans that being educated, talented, and deserving of recognition was not the
monopoly of a single class or race. Furthermore, African Americans needed to be shown
that they should take pride in their work and that it should be carried out with dignity, not
in a constant state of oppression and degradation. Finally, members of the Niagara
Movement expressed their hope that achieving each of these objectives under the
leadership of wise and courageous individuals was possible.265
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From 1906 to 1909, the Niagara Movement held four more annual
conferences. In 1906, the meeting took place in Harper’s Ferry, West Virginia, where the
participants walked barefoot across the same land John Brown has crossed during his
infamous raid. DuBois presented an “Address to the Country” in which he declared, “We
will not be satisfied to take one jot or tittle less than our full manhood rights. We claim
for ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn American, political, civil and
social; and until we get these rights we will never cease to protest and assail the ears of
America. The battle we wage is not for ourselves alone but for all true Americans. It is a
fight for ideals, lest this, our common fatherland, false to its founding, become in truth
the land of the thief and the home of the Slave – a by-word and a missing among the
nations for its sounding pretensions and pitiful accomplishments.” DuBois’s address
reflected the ideals of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the objectives
spelled out by the Niagara Movement at its inaugural meeting a year earlier. Although he
had many supporters, DuBois also faced criticism from both blacks and whites who
preferred Washington’s approach to race issues. One northern philanthropist, George
Foster Peabody, expressed his concern that DuBois was belittling others and encouraging
black Americans to follow “false views.” In his letter to DuBois, Peabody also suggested
that DuBois was harming his own work and reputation by coming across as petty and
ashamed of his race. A southern African American, Ben Davis, wrote that DuBois was
“simply one of those over-educated theorists. . . . In fact, the poor devil is crazy and
ought not be taken seriously.” Despite this criticism of DuBois, however, the Niagara
Movement garnered a relatively large amount of support from African Americans and
experienced increasing membership in its first two years with nearly two hundred active
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members. As a means of disseminating the ideas and objectives of the movement,
DuBois founded a weekly newspaper, The Moon, and a monthly newspaper, The
Horizon. The group then held meetings in Boston (1907), Oberlin, Ohio (1908), and Sea
Isle City, New Jersey (1909).266
Although the Niagara Movement attained some measure of success, it failed to
become the strong national movement its founders had wanted. The movement’s failure
to achieve its objectives stemmed from several factors, including disagreements within
the organization, lack of money, the deep-rooted racism of many white Americans at the
turn of the century, and the ultimate inability of the movement to reach the African
American masses. Nevertheless, the importance of the Niagara Movement cannot be
denied. According to sociologist and historian Elliot Rudwick, “The men of Niagara
helped to educate Negroes to a policy of protest and taught the whites that there existed a
growing number of Negroes who were dissatisfied with anything less than a full measure
of manhood rights. The Niagara men came from the wilderness and hewed a spiritual
path for younger men to follow.” Most importantly, the Niagara Movement laid the
groundwork for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) with nearly all of the Niagarists becoming members of the new group. The
creation of the Niagara Movement also effectively divided African American intellectuals
into those who supported DuBois and those who supported Washington.267
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In February 1909, the same year as the last Niagara Movement meeting, the
NAACP formed on Abraham Lincoln’s one hundredth birthday. The group emerged, at
least in part, as a response to a race riot the previous year in Lincoln’s hometown of
Springfield, Illinois. The riot began on August 14, 1908, and lasted for three days. The
initial cause of the riot was the accusation of a white woman that a well-spoken, young
African American man, George Richardson, had raped her. The extent of riot, however,
likely resulted from tensions between whites and a growing black population in the area.
Springfield’s sheriff attempted to transfer Richardson out of the city in an effort to protect
him, but when whites found out about this perceived deception it only fueled their anger.
A group of white men gathered outside the jail and was encouraged to act by
boardinghouse keeper Kate Howard. According to historian David Levering Lewis,
Howard yelled at the men, “What the hell are you fellas afraid of? . . . Women want
protection!” By the end of the riot, the men Howard had goaded into action had caused
two lynchings, six fatal shootings, over eighty injuries, the flight of thousands of African
Americans from the city, and more than $200,000 in damages. Although the National
Guard was able to restore order, African Americans continued to fear for their safety and
their businesses suffered from white boycotts.268
The riot gained attention from across the country, with one of the most widely
read commentaries coming from William English Walling. Walling was a socialist who
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had rushed to St. Petersburg, Russia, following the “Bloody Sunday” massacre.
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the September 3, 1908, edition of the Independent, Walling wrote, “Either the spirit of the
abolitionists, of Lincoln and Lovejoy, must be revived and we must treat the negro on a
plane of absolute political and social equality, or Vardaman and Tillman will soon have
transferred the race war to the North.” He further warned that if the South’s ways of
dealing with African Americans spread to the North, “every hope of political democracy
will be dead, other weaker races and classes will be persecuted in the North as in the
South, public education will undergo an eclipse, and American civilization will await
either a rapid degeneration or another profounder and more revolutionary civil war,
which shall obliterate not only the remains of slavery but all other obstacles to a free
democratic evolution that have grown up in its wake.” With this appeal, Walling
contributed to the founding of the NAACP.270
In response to Walling’s article and the reactions of others who supported equal
rights for African Americans, Oswald Garrison Villard distributed an invitation to a
national conference to develop solutions to the ever-growing race problem. Villard, the
grandson of fames anti-slavery activist William Lloyd Garrison, believed that Abraham
Lincoln would be disappointed by the condition of black Americans at the time. In the
meeting announcement, Villard asked “all the believers in democracy to join in a national
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conference for the discussion of present evils, the voicing of protests, and the renewal
of the struggle for civil and political liberty.” The two-day National Negro Conference
commenced on May 31, 1909, in New York City and its participants included both white
and black reformers. Out of the conference emerged the NAACP whose early members
included DuBois, Villard, Mary Talbert, Mary Church Terrell, Ida Wells-Barnett, George
White, Mary White Ovington, Charles Darrow, and Lincoln Steffans. Several
participants from the Niagara Movement joined the NAACP; eight of them served as
board members in the new organization. The primary goals of the NAACP were “To
promote equality of rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among citizens of the
United States; to advance the interests of colored citizens; to secure for them impartial
suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts, education
for their children, employment according to their ability, and complete equality before the
law.” These goals, as well as the plans for achieving them, were very similar to those
used by the Niagara Movement. First, the NAACP planned to present facts about racism
to the public through the press, other publications, and rallies. The purpose of spreading
this information would be to change public opinion and to convince Americans they
needed to support change. Their second means of achieving their goals would be to
convince state and federal legislators to pass legislation correcting the wrongs committed
against African Americans by Jim Crow laws. Finally, and most important for the
purposes of this study, the NAACP planned “to litigate at all levels of the judicial system
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to assure African Americans equal opportunities in voting, housing, education, and
public accommodations.271

Residential Segregation
The organization’s opportunity to use the court system to attain equal
opportunities in housing quickly showed itself. Once the states believed they had
received permission from the Supreme Court to regulate how black citizens traveled,
where they sought entertainment, and where they could attend school, it was only logical
that the states would try to control where African Americans lived. Thus, on December
10, 1910, Baltimore became the first city to pass a residential segregation law. The
ordinance designated the boundaries of white and black neighborhoods throughout the
city. Over the next several years, numerous cities including Dallas, Texas, Greensboro,
North Carolina, Louisville, Kentucky, Okalahoma City, Oklahoma, Norfolk and
Richmond, Virginia, and St. Louis, Missouri enacted similar pieces of legislation. A new
trend of residential segregation had taken hold. Many of these laws simply turned de
facto segregation that had been largely self-imposed for decades into de jure segregation.
The decisions of several cities to require such segregation demonstrated two things.
First, as Edward Ayers noted in The Promise of the New South, as the South became
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increasingly urbanized whites felt a greater need to establish boundaries that had not
been as necessary in rural living. Second, following decades of the Supreme Court
upholding Jim Crow legislation, white legislators once again hoped to test the boundaries
of the federal government’s commitment to what they viewed as state and local
matters.272
A new Virginia statute declared, “The preservation of the public morals, public
health and public order, in the cities and towns of this commonwealth is endangered by
the residence of white and colored people in close proximity to one another.” With this,
the state gave its cities and towns the authority to create “Segregation Districts.” For
each of these districts, the city would create a map showing where whites lived and where
blacks lived. If, at the time of the district’s creation, whites occupied a majority of the
district’s residences it would be designated a “white district.” Districts with a higher
percentage of black residents would be designated “colored districts.” One year after the
creation of such segregation districts, it would become illegal for African Americans to
move into a white district and for whites to move into a black district. Violators of this
law faced progressive fines. One effect of this law was that it guaranteed a shrinking
minority in all such districts. For example, each time African Americans moved out of a
white district he or she would be replaced by white citizens. This meant that over time
the district would, in the hopes of the legislators, become fully segregated. In instances
where a member of the minority group in a segregated district refused to move, there was
often an increasing chance of racial tension. The first two cities in Virginia to make use
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of segregated district legislation were Norfolk and Richmond where whites felt
threatened by growing black populations.273
Rather than focusing on pre-existing residences, the legislators of Louisiana
focused on the construction of new houses. The state’s 1912 law prohibited the building
of houses for black citizens in white districts and the building of houses for white citizens
in black districts. Again, the ultimate goal of this law was to create fully segregated
neighborhoods. Violators faced fines from $50 to $2,000 and each town maintained “the
right to cause said building to be removed and destroyed.”274
In Kentucky, a similar law gave individual cities the authority to regulate
residences within segregation districts. Based on this, Louisville passed an ordinance in
1914 prohibiting blacks from living in houses where a majority of homes in the area were
occupied by whites and vice versa. The legislators attempted to design the ordinance to
satisfy constitutional requirements. The title of the ordinance was “An ordinance to
prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the city of
Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare, by making
reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks, for
residences, places of abode, and places of assembly by white and colored people
respectively.” The first section of the ordinance made it illegal “for any colored person to
move into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a
place of public assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater number of
houses are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by white
273
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people than . . . by colored people.” The second section created the same restrictions
for whites in predominantly black neighborhoods. Another section of the ordinance
made it illegal to force people from their home if they had lived there prior to the law
taking effect. It also declared that if a landlord currently rented a residence to the
minority race in that district he could continue to do so, but once they rented the
residence to someone of the majority race they lost the option of renting to the minority
in the future.275
As historian Loren Miller explains in The Petitioners: The Story of the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Negro (1966), the Louisville legislation attempted to
address not only weaknesses of other city ordinances, but also to fit within the criteria
laid out by the Supreme Court in earlier decisions. First, the Louisville law endeavored
to avoid the constitutional flaw of a San Francisco ordinance that had been overturned.
The law in question had singled out the Chinese as a unique group and placed restrictions
on just them, whereas the Louisville law appeared to place the same restrictions on both
blacks and whites. Second, the Louisville ordinance “ embodied the curious concept that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s command for equal protection of the law was satisfied if
both Negroes and white persons were equally discriminated against in the same statute . .
. [an] ingenious interpretation [that] was first announced by the Court in an opinion
written by Justice Field in 1883, upholding an Alabama statute which punished adultery
for both participants more severely when one of the adulterers was white and the other
colored than when both were members of the same race.” In his opinion, Field explained
that because both whites and blacks were punished uniformly, there was no violation of
275
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the equal protection clause of the amendment. The authors of the Louisville law
clearly hoped that by allowing both whites and blacks to buy property anywhere, within
the rules for use and occupancy, they would avoid claims from opponents that the law
violated property rights and that it unjustly singled out African Americans for less
protection under the law.276
Shortly after the passage of the Louisville ordinance, members and allies of the
city’s NAACP chapter set up a test case with hopes of making it to the Supreme Court.
Charles Buchanan, a white man, agreed to sell a lot to William Warley, a black man.
Buchanan was a well-respected realtor in the community and an ally of the NAACP who
owned a piece of property on a block where there were eight white residences and two
black residences. Warley was the editor of Louisville News, which he founded in 1913,
and president of Louisville’s NAACP chapter. On October 31, 1914, the two men
entered into a contract with each other. The contract of sale, written by Warley, stated,
“It is understood that I am purchasing the above property for the purpose of having
erected thereon a house which I propose to make my residence, and it is a distinct part of
this agreement that I shall not be required to accept a deed to the above property or to pay
for said property unless I have the right under the laws of the state of Kentucky and the
city of Louisville to occupy said property as a residence.” Buchanan accepted these
terms. Then, as arranged by the two men in advance, Warley refused to pay Buchanan
for the property because Section 1 of the new Louisville ordinance would prevent him
from occupying a house at the address in question.277
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Buchanan proceeded to sue Warley for payment in the Jefferson County
Circuit Court and requested a court order requiring Warley to honor the terms of their
agreement. Buchanan’s primary argument before the court was that the Louisville
ordinance was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, could
not be used by Warley as a defense for failing to pay him for the property. On the basis
of the Louisville ordinance and the Kentucky statute, however, the local court and the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decided in favor of Warley. Judge J.B. Hannah of the state
court expressed the court’s unanimous opinion on June 18, 1915. He explained that, as
its framers had hoped, the Louisville ordinance was consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment because “It bore equally on both races, it had a rational basis related to the
maintenance of racial peace, and it entailed the exercise of zoning powers which,
undeniably, the state had.” He further pointed to the Supreme Court’s holding in Berea v.
Kentucky that “the Fourteenth Amendment is not offended where ‘the State is fully
committed to the principle of the separation of the races whenever and wherever
practicable and expedient for the public welfare.’” Thus, Buchanan appealed to the
Supreme Court, making the argument that the Louisville ordinance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution “in that it abridge[d] the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States to acquire and enjoy property, [took] property
without due process of law, and denie[d] equal protection of the laws.” Throughout the
South, blacks and city officials looked on and waited for the Supreme Court to decide the
fate of residential segregation.278
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The irony of this legal challenge was that it placed a white realtor in the
position of challenging the constitutionality of Louisville’s ordinance while a black man,
in essence, sided with the Louisville City Counsel and used the segregation ordinance as
his defense for not paying for the property. Essentially, the NAACP had created a
situation where the challenge to an anti-black law came from a respected white man.
Nevertheless, all of the parties involved understood what was at stake. Even
representatives from other cities with similar laws filed supporting briefs on behalf of
Louisville with the Supreme Court in hopes of persuading the justices to uphold the law.
In The Shifting Wind, John Howard explains that Baltimore referred to Justice Field’s
opinion in its brief. The city “contended that there was ‘no such discrimination as is
prohibited by the Constitution or statutes securing civil rights’ to be found in racial
zoning ordinances. What was denied one race was denied the other. What was allowed
one race was allowed the other. Blacks could not buy or live in white zones, but then,
whites could not buy or live in black zones. Hence, both races were being treated
equally.” Furthermore, those who supported Louisville’s ordinance argued that it passed
the Court’s reasonableness test because it was designed to create racial peace and it was
necessary for the safety of all Americans to require the residential separation of the
races.279
Moorfield Storey, who had served as the first president of the NAACP from 1909
to 1915, argued the case on behalf of Charles Buchanan. Storey was a graduate of
Harvard Law School and, at the time of this case, was president of the national AntiImperialist League. More important for this case was his dedication to civil rights for
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African Americans, immigrants, and Native Americans. He once said, “When the
white man governs himself that is self-government, but when he governs himself, and
also governs another man, that is more than self-government – that is despotism.” With
his participation in the NAACP and his work to protect civil rights for all Americans,
Storey had repeatedly proven his dedication to achieving the goals of the NAACP.280
With assistance from Clayton Blakely and Harold Davis, Storey strove to
differentiate residential segregation from other types of Jim Crow laws because it dealt a
direct blow to a central tenet of the United States government: property rights. The
attorneys for Buchanan explained, “The general assumption is that a law is enacted in
good faith for the purposes declared, but where, as in this case, it is obvious that the real
purpose was very difference, the courts will determine the purpose for the natural and
legal effect of the language employed when put into operation.” According to Storey, the
effect of the Louisville ordinance was to prevent Buchanan from selling his property. He
elaborated that, because the lot Buchanan contracted to sell to Warley was situated
between two lots occupied by blacks, if he were not allowed to sell the land to a black
man he would never be able to sell it because “the lot is so situated . . . that no white man
would buy it.” Furthermore, Storey pointed out that even if Warley did pay Buchanan for
the property, he would not be able to live on it or rent it to another black, even though he
would face the same problems as Buchanan in finding a white buyer or renter for the
property. The Louisville ordinance had turned Buchanan’s property into something that
he could not sell or use. By focusing on the issue of property rights, something had
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nearly always been fundamentally protected by the federal government, Storey
distinguished this case from the civil rights cases heard earlier by the Supreme Court.281
After hearing the arguments of both sides, the Court reached a unanimous
decision that was presented by Justice William Rufus Day. Justice Day, a Republican
who joined the Court in 1903 as a nominee of Theodore Roosevelt, had written only one
key opinion prior to Buchanan v. Warley.282 In McLean v. Arkansas [211 U.S. 539
(1909)] he had represented the Court’s majority in upholding mining safety regulations.
Originally from Ravenna, Ohio, where he was born in 1849, Justice Day spent the first
forty years of his life in the state, except for his time at the University of Michigan as an
undergraduate and as a law student. His family had a strong judicial background with
three generations before him serving as prominent justices in Connecticut and Ohio. As a
lawyer in Canton, Ohio, Day focused on litigation. His partner introduced him to his
future wife and to William McKinley who became governor of Ohio and then president
of the United States. Day followed McKinley to Washington and served as Assistant
Secretary of State, Secretary of State, and as head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris
Peace Conference at the end of the Spanish-American War. From 1899 to 1903, when he
was chosen by Roosevelt to replace Justice George Shiras, Jr., Day served as a judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth District. His focus throughout his career as a
justice was on the federal government’s commerce power, which he believed should be
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limited. As a liberal formalist, he believed that “within limits . . . government
regulation of economic and social activity” was acceptable and that the states should
yield greater police power than the federal government.283
In his Buchanan v. Warley decision, Day opened with a summary of the pertinent
sections of Louisville’s ordinance and of the contract between Warley and Buchanan.
After establishing that the case came before the Court on an assignment of error that
condemned the city ordinance for violating the privileges and immunities clause and the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Day proceeded to summarize the
determinable issues before the Court. In response to an argument that Buchanan’s writ of
error should be dismissed because he, as a white man, was not included in the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Day explained, “This court has frequently held that while
an unconstitutional act is no law, attacks upon the validity of laws can only be entertained
when made by those whose rights are directly affected by the law or ordinance in
question. Only such person, it has been settled can be heard to attack the constitutionality
of the law or ordinance. But this case does not run counter to that principle.” Rather, the
lower courts had determined that Buchanan was directly affected because, if it were not
for the city ordinance, Warley would have been compelled to purchase the property.
Based on this determination, the Supreme Court decided not to dismiss the case.284
In considering the merits of the case, Day discussed the city’s claim that “such
legislation tends to promote the public peace by preventing racial conflicts; that it tends
283
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to maintain racial purity; [and] that it prevents the deterioration of property owned
and occupied by white people, which deterioration, it is contended, is sure to follow the
occupancy of adjacent premises by persons of color.” Referring to the state’s authority to
exercise its police power, Day brought up one of the themes most commonly seen in his
work. He explained that the states should have the authority to exercise such power for
protecting public safety, welfare, and health. He concluded, however, “that the police
power, broad as is it, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter
to the limitations of the federal Constitution . . . [which] are by the express terms of that
instrument made the supreme law of the land.” Focusing on the Fourteenth Amendment,
he explained that its purpose was to protect the life, liberty, and property of citizens from
being infringed upon by the states without due process of law. According to Day, the
right to property was more than just the right to ownership. It was “the right to acquire,
use, and dispose” of property as one saw fit.285
The central question before the Supreme Court, according to Day, was “May the
occupancy, and, necessarily, the purchase and sale of property of which occupancy is an
incident, be inhibited by the states, or by one of its municipalities, solely because of the
color of the proposed occupant of the premises?” Making a reference to the
Reconstruction Amendments, Day explained that since the Civil War they had become an
integral part of American law that guaranteed certain fundamental rights for citizens and
that placed certain limits upon state legislatures. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court
had decided that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment was broad enough to protect
the civil rights of all citizens, not just African Americans. In Strauder v. West Virginia,
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Justice Strong had declared that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed both
citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to African Americans. He also explained,
however, that the Fourteenth Amendment was in effect “declaring that the law in the
states shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the states.” In addition to discussing the
previous Supreme Court decisions that supported the idea that the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to apply to all citizens, Justice Day also drew attention to
legislation passed in support of the Reconstruction Amendments. One stated, “All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property.” Another declared, “All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce
contracts to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” On
this foundation of legislation and judicial decisions, Justice Day reached the Court’s
preliminary conclusion that the Louisville ordinance did, in fact, violate Buchanan’s
rights because it prevented him from disposing of his property to Warley for the sole
reason that Warley was black. According to Day, the legislation mentioned dealt not
with social rights, but “with those fundamental rights in property” viewed as so important
by American citizens. The combination of the Fourteenth Amendment and these
supporting laws was meant to guarantee the right of African American citizens to acquire
property without interference from state legislators.286
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Day proceeded to briefly discuss the precedents of Plessy v. Ferguson and
Berea College v. Commonwealth of Kentucky. He explained that in Carey v. City of
Atlanta, the Supreme Court of Georgia had dealt with those two cases in such a way, as
he did not feel the need to use his own words. Rather he quoted the lower court’s
decision from the case that had dealt with similar principles as those now facing the U.S.
Supreme Court. According to the Georgia court,
In each instance the complaining person was afforded the opportunity to
ride [Plessy] or to attend institutions of learning [Berea], or afforded the
thing of whatever nature to which in the particular case he was entitled.
The most that was done was to require him as a member of a class to
conform to reasonable rules in regard to the separation of the races. In
none of them was he denied the right to use, control, or dispose of his
property, as in this case. Property of a person, whether as a member of a
class or as an individual, cannot be taken without due process of law. In
the recent case of McCabe v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 [35
Sup. Ct. 69], where the court had under consideration a statute which
allowed railroad companied to furnish dining cars for white people and to
refuse to furnish dining cars altogether for colored persons, this language
was used in reference to the contentions of the Attorney General: ‘This
argument with respect to volume of traffic seems to us to be without merit.
It makes the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who
may be discriminated against, whereas the essence of the constitutional
right is that it is a personal right.’ . . . The effect of the ordinance under
consideration was not merely to regulate a business or the like, but was to
destroy the right of the individual to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of his
property. Being of this character, it was void as being opposed to the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Day added that while “there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a feeling
of race hostility which the law is powerless to control,” the solution to the problem was
not to deprive citizens of their constitutionally protected rights and privileges.287
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Although the Supreme Court had upheld legislation requiring separate but
equal accommodations on public transportation and in public schools, Day argued there
had to be limitations to such concessions in order to protect the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. He maintained that “such legislation . . . cannot be sustained
where the exercise of authority exceeds the restraints of the Constitution.” The Supreme
Court, he declared, “think[s] these limitations are exceeded in laws and ordinances of the
character now before us.” Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Kentucky Court
of Appeals. Day concluded that laws such as the Louisville residential ordinance existed
for the express purpose of separating the races in order to maintain the purity of the races.
Nevertheless, the ordinance expressly allowed black servants to work in the homes of
white families and for current black residents to continue living on “white blocks,” which
brought into question the motivation for separating the races. Furthermore, the case of
Buchanan v. Warley, as it was presented to the Court, dealt with the civil rights of a white
man as much as with the civil rights of a black man. It was, after all, Buchanan who was
unable to sell his property to the buyer of his choice. Finally, Day explained that the
claim that having African Americans move into a neighborhood would depreciate the
value of property owned by white persons was faulty because property values were just
as likely to decrease in value if “undesirable white neighbors” moved in. Ultimately, Day
returned to his favorite topic and declared that the law in question could not stand
because “this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of
color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state” and was a clear
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.288
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Elation in the African American Press:
For the first time in several decades, the Supreme Court had presented an opinion
that seemed to favor African Americans over Jim Crow and the black press responded
accordingly. Despite Justice Day’s focus on property and his argument that the right to
property included not only ownership, but also the ability to sell one’s property freely,
many African Americans viewed his opinion as a decision focused on racial segregation.
Throughout the country, African American writers and editors quickly told their readers
about the decisions, popular among the black community, in articles with headlines such
as “Supreme Court Declares Segregation Void” and “Segregation Annulled.” The
general response to the decision was one filled with elation and with hope that it signified
a change in the Court’s treatment of black citizens.
Just days after the decision, Baltimore’s Afro-American published four articles
related to the case. On the front page of its November 10 edition, “Supreme Court
Declares Segregation Void: Renders Sweeping Decision Regarding Property Rights of
American Citizens” offered the text of Day’s decision. It also pointed out that while the
decision dealt directly with the Louisville ordinance, it meant that all similar laws passed
to segregate white and black residences were also void. Another front page article told
the story of a black man, Sidney Burrell, who had appeared in court two days after the
Supreme Court’s decision to face charges of violating Baltimore’s own residential
segregation law. According to the article, a white man complained after Burrell moved to
a street that already had a mixed population. One black resident, Mrs. Dickerson, had
lived on the street for almost thirty years. Nevertheless, when Burrell moved to the street

226
it violated a Baltimore ordinance which made it illegal for blacks to move onto a
street where the majority population was white. In light of the new Supreme Court
decision, Burrell told the Afro-American that he was “going to stand pat and let the courts
decide the question.”289
Inside the same edition, two other articles addressed the Court’s decision. An
article titled “Segregational Ordinance Illegal” opened with a declaration that “The joy in
Bunkville when home run Casey came to bat in the final inning of a famous game with
the bases loaded, is nothing compared with the rejoicing in Baltimore, Richmond, St.
Louis, and several other Southern towns over the outcome of the Louisville Segregation
decision handed down by the Supreme Court last Tuesday.” The author praised the
NAACP and Moorfield Storey who “in his splendid fight before the Court, set forth
arguments on this case which will stand as long as human rights are in jeopardy.” He
further noted that Day’s opinion represented a great step forward from the Dred Scott
decision, but that it would not result in a huge shift of the African American population
from “colored districts” to “white districts.” On the contrary, he expected very little to
change in the makeup of most neighborhoods because most black Americans would
prefer to live among their family and friends. He likely expressed this opinion which,
while true, would hopefully help to calm the fears of white Americans concerned that
blacks would being rushing to move into their neighborhoods. The option to move,
however, now existed for those who wanted it. Finally, the article that opened with an
expression of jubilation closed with a declaration of hope: “Let us hope it is but a
forerunner of the future decree which shall declare all discrimination between citizens as
289
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contrary to the principles of free democracy as set down in our constitution and its
amendments.”290
One final article, that was again likely intended to, in part, calm white Americans’
fears while also unifying black Americans, beseeched Baltimore’s African American
community to take things slowly. Following an expression of satisfaction that the current
residential segregation laws had been voided, the author warned that “To rush headlong
into white neighborhoods, simply for the sake of getting back at the white folks is not
good policy. Rather, blacks should move forward at a reasonable pace so as not to cause
unnecessary friction.”291
In Chicago’s The Broad Ax the decision only captured one article in the
November 10 edition, but its large and eye-catching headline declared, “The United
States Supreme Court, the Majority of Its Members Being Dyed in the Wool Democrats,
Has Handed Down a Decision to the Effect That Segregation Laws or Ordinances of
Baltimore, Maryland; Richmond, Virginia; St. Louis, Missouri; Louisville, Kentucky,
and Many Other Southern Cities Are Unconstitutional.” The newspaper offered this
decision as proof that if the ten million African Americans in the United States would
pool their political and financial resources they would be capable of ridding the South of
all of its Jim Crow legislation. Apparently missing the focus on property rights in Justice
Day’s opinion, the article declared, “The members of the Supreme Court . . . [have] dealt
all kinds of ‘Jim Crow’ legislation a staggering blow and the narrow minded race
prejudice ridden whites residing throughout the southland will never be able to
completely recover from its effect.” The author praised the black citizens of Louisville
290
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for standing up and fighting for their rights and encouraged others to follow their
example.292
Another example of the fast response by the African American press appeared in
The New York Age only three days after Justice Day presented his opinion. According to
a front page article, “Segregation was given a black-eye by the United States Supreme
Court” in its far-reaching opinion. The article also explained that one of the primary
complaints made by the black citizens of Louisville had been that the ordinance forced
them to live in neighborhoods with “disagreeable and worthless neighbors” and that it
barred them from moving into areas that were more desirable. Another article in the
same edition discussed the significance of the decision for African Americans throughout
the United States. It declared, “The segregation movement was of wider scope [than
Oklahoma’s attempts to limit voting with a grandfather clause] and if its validity had
been established, there was no limit to the evils following its propagation.”293 The
author, while supporting the decision, also recognized that the Court had couched its
decision in terms that only literally applied “to the civil rights of a white man to dispose
of his property to a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a
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white person.” Nonetheless, the decision imparted a sense of hope for legal equality
long missing from the African American community.294
The Washington Bee took a somewhat different approach than most of the black
press in its first edition after the decision. Rather than publishing articles that directly
referred to the opinion and that expressed excitement for the Supreme Court’s apparent
impartiality, the newspaper ran an article discussing the positive aspects of “colored
colonies.” While admitting that the passage of residential segregation legislation by
white legislators was insulting and unjust for black citizens, the journalist argued that
such colonies, or neighborhoods, were in some ways better for black Americans.
Pointing to Washington, D.C. as an example, he noted that twenty years earlier when
there had been no true separation of the races it had been difficult for blacks to buy or
rent homes in better neighborhoods at a fair price. Over time, however, “colored people
gradually controlled more money and took on more refinement,” which made it possible
for them to buy nicer homes. Rather than living next to blacks who appeared to view
themselves as their equals, many white families responded by moving to suburbs on the
outskirts of town. The result was that entire areas previously occupied by whites became
so-called “colored colonies.” In the opinion of the article’s author, there were “no more
orderly sections in the city than these self-same colored colonies and the surroundings
[were] usually refined.” Furthermore, he noted that once blacks moved into
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neighborhoods such a Ledroit Park,
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housing prices became much more manageable

than the costs of living in white neighborhoods.296
Over the next several weeks, most African American newspapers continued to
discuss the importance of the Court’s decision. Surprisingly, in the shadow of the
Supreme Court, The Washington Bee dedicated little space to the case. On November 17,
it printed Justice Day’s opinion in its entirety but offered absolutely no commentary. A
bigger issue for the African Americans in the nation’s capital appeared to be the
recruitment and treatment of black soldiers for World War I.
Nearby in Baltimore, the Court’s opinion remained a hot topic of discussion for
over a month, largely because Baltimore had a similar ordinance in place. A unique
article in the city’s Afro-American included a review of Day’s opinion written by Warren
T. McGuinn. McGuinn was a well-known member of the Maryland bar. He argued that
when Day concluded, “that the police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a
law or ordinance which runs counter to the limitations of the Federal Constitution,” he
had effectively ended segregation in the United States. McGuinn believed that although
segregationists would respond with anger towards the Court and with promises to create
even stronger Jim Crow laws, segregation was dead. He explained, “the right of personal
295
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security, the right of personal liberty, and the rights of private property are original
rights” that were not created by the Constitution, but that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended to protect those rights.297
A week later, the Afro-American told the story of a man who faced charges of
violating Baltimore’s residential segregation law after city official failed to recognize the
Supreme Court’s decision. The case of Dr. William T. Coleman went before the United
States District Court. Coleman faced charges for moving to a white block in violation of
Baltimore’s ordinance. His attorney was none other than Warner T. McGuinn whose
interpretation of Justice Day’s opinion had appeared in the newspaper only a week
earlier. In a petition for habeas corpus proceedings filed on Coleman’s behalf, McGuinn
argued that Coleman had “bought the property sometime ago but did not move therein,
being advised that the segregation law prevented such.” He contended that Coleman
moved into the residence only after the Supreme Court annulled Louisville’s ordinance.
Although the outcome of Coleman’s case was not yet available, the fact that he faced
charges at all suggested that white southerners did not view the Court’s decision as the
death of segregation.298
Other black newspapers throughout the North and South also expressed joyous
reactions to the decision. William Warley’s own newspaper, the Louisville News,
exclaimed, “It is a glorious victory for the colored people of the city of Louisville, and a
fitting reward for the sacrifices we have made to test this case in the highest court in the
land.” Nashville’s Globe, again demonstrating that many African Americans failed to
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take notice of Justice Day’s focus on property rights, expressed the belief that
segregation laws had borne nothing but hatred and that the Court’s decision was likely to
end the racial tensions that threatened many American cities. In Savannah, Georgia, the
Tribune declared that the Supreme Court had finally, and correctly, dealt with the issue of
segregation. A voice of caution emerged from Shreveport, Louisiana, however, where
the News Enterprise warned, “Don’t jump to conclusions and don’t try to move too fast.
Do not hurrah too loud or talk or act too fast. We are coming into what belongs to us and
by prudence we can retain it.” Such words of caution were rare, nonetheless, in a
community of Americans that had been searching for hope for a long time.299
Although it had offered detailed coverage of the decision in its November 8
edition, a week later The New York Age noted that other national and world issues had
taken “the public attention away from one of the most important decisions ever rendered
by the Supreme Court.” One issue that had drawn attention away from the opinion was
women’s suffrage. In November 1917, the effort to gain the vote for women
strengthened as Arkansas, Indiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, and Rhode Island
approved statewide women’s suffrage. In the newspaper’s own backyard, the state of
New York, which was the largest state in the nation, also passed women’s suffrage. In
New York City, there were 100,000 votes in favor of the issue. Events in other parts of
the world also drew the attention of New Yorkers away from the Supreme Court’s
decision. From Italy, news of the country’s largest military disaster in history emerged.
The Italians lost 10,000 soldiers and the Austro-Hungarians captured an additional
293,000 in the Battle of Caporetto, putting Italy on the defensive in World War I. Even
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more captivating for many Americans were the events taking place in Russia where,
in less than a month, the Bolsheviks overthrew Alexander Kerensky’s Provisional
Government and took control of Moscow.300
Despite these key events, The New York Age hoped to make certain that its
readers knew about the decision in Buchanan v. Warley and understood its significance.
The newspaper declared, “The decision was vital because so much for the Negro
depended upon it. Had the case been lost, there is no doubt that eventually segregation
ordinances would have been passed by every city in the country where there was a
considerable proportion of colored population, North and South.” Once again, a voice of
the black press indicated a belief that the Supreme Court had effectively put an end to Jim
Crow legislation. As evidence of how many white Americans were expected to react to
the decision, however, The New York Age also ran an article that originally appeared in
New York’s Evening Mail. According to that newspaper, “If there was any
discrimination in the [Louisville] law, the whites were discriminated against as much as
the blacks. . . . An ordinance like this of Louisville should never be declared invalid,
based as it is upon the deepest race instincts – and race instincts which in this case have
merely a social aim.” The New York Age countered that line of reasoning with a quote
from Moorfield Storey’s pleadings before the Supreme Court: “A law which forbids a
Negro to rise is not made just because it forbids a white man to fall.”301
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Rays of Hope:
Regardless of whether black journalists failed to recognize Justice Day’s focus on
property rights, the fact is that many African Americans viewed the decision in Buchanan
v. Warley, as evidence that a new day was dawning. Blacks throughout the United States
seemed to believe that the Supreme Court had finally made a decision that favored blacks
and went against Jim Crow. For them, this meant there was hope that Jim Crow
legislation would soon become a thing of the past and African Americans would finally
attain the equality promised to them by the Reconstruction Amendments. The growing
strength of the NAACP, African-American participation in the war effort during World
War I, and the 1918 introduction of the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill to the House of
Representatives all contributed to this feeling of hope in the African American
community. As the country prepared for a new decade, African Americans prepared for
what many believed would be the beginning of a new era.
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Conclusion: A Look Forward

For fifty-six years, from the Supreme Court’s first civil rights decision in Blyew v.
United States to its decision in Buchanan v. Warley, African Americans watched as the
Court continually influenced the status of black Americans in the United States.
Although the Supreme Court was not a legislative body, its decisions often served as
indicators to white legislators, many of whom wanted to maintain a superior status over
black Americans, that the federal government would allow them to pass restrictive
legislation. When the Court announced its opinion in Buchanan just months after the
United States entered World War I, African Americans were at a critical point in their
history.
Black Americans debated among themselves, publicly and privately, about the
merits of participating in the American war effort in World War I to “make the world safe
for democracy.” As the debate within the African-American community developed,
black leaders and African American newspapers vocalized both sides of the debate. The
debate, however, extended beyond such leaders and included citizens of all walks of life
both as active participants and as observers influenced by the words of their respected
community leaders. Supporters of black participation in the war effort tended to argue
that this was an opportunity for African Americans to improve their position in the
United States and that such patriotic participation would benefit the African American
community as a whole. On the other hand, those opposed to black participation claimed
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that assertive avoidance was necessary to gain the attention of government and social
leaders who could work to help improve their overall situation. This side tended to
believe it would be contradictory for African Americans to fight to protect democracy
and freedom abroad while they were increasingly unable to participate in the democratic
process at home and faced increasing restrictions on their own rights and freedoms. The
questions raised in the debate forced African Americans to choose not only where they
stood in regards to the American war effort, but also how they wanted to affect change in
the status of African Americans in the years to come. In the previous decades, they had
already come out on both sides of the accomodationism debate. Now, these Americans
who were regularly dishonored and largely disenfranchised had to decide what role, if
any, they should play in the war effort. Leaders of the African-American community
including newspaper editors and writers, as well as average citizens, faced the dilemma
of balancing patriotism and support for the war with the need to assert more personal
demands that the United States government protect African Americans from lynching,
disenfranchisement, and segregation. Their positions in this debate helped to set the
stage for both the struggles and triumphs experienced by black Americans in the decades
following World War I.
For those who supported African American participation in the war effort as a
means to prove their patriotism and to gain the respect of white citizens, the Buchanan
decision reflected another cause for hope. There was a sense, as was seen in the African
American newspapers, that the Supreme Court had finally decided a case in favor of
blacks’ civil rights and that this would be the start of a new judicial trend. Many
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members of the African American community, therefore, ended the year 1917 with a
general feeling that their status was finally on the verge of improving.
By the following year, one of the most prolific African American leaders of the
period had come out in support of black participation in the war effort. In his “Close
Ranks” editorial, which appeared in the July 1918 Crisis, DuBois wrote
This is the crisis of the world. For all the long years to come men
will point to the year 1918 as the great Day of Decision, the day when the
world decided whether it would submit to military despotism and an
endless armed peace – if peace it could be called – or whether they would
put down the menace of German militarism and inaugurate the United
States of the World.
We of the colored race have no ordinary interest in the outcome.
That which the German power represents today spells death to the
aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for equality, freedom and
democracy. Let us not hesitate. Let us, while this war lasts, forget our
special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own
white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for
democracy. We make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly and
willingly with our eyes lifted to the hills.302

In this single, short editorial, DuBois summed up the argument that patriotic participation
in the war effort was the right thing for African Americans.
The publication of DuBois’s editorial in the Crisis exposed thousands of black
Americans to the pro-participation side of the debate and suggested to many that one of
the most prominent and respected leaders of the national African American community
supported patriotic participation in the war effort. Although there has been some debate
about whether DuBois had an underlying intention in the writing the editorial, he
inevitably contributed to the decisions of many to participate in whatever ways they
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could.
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His request that black Americans “close [their] ranks shoulder to shoulder

with [their] white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy”
likely convinced many young black men to volunteer to fight in the war and other blacks
to support the war effort from the home front. By war’s end, approximately 400,000
black men had served in the war, almost 40,000 in combat positions.304
Robert Abbott, editor of the Chicago Defender, likewise encouraged African
Americans to support and participate in the war effort. By the beginning of America’s
involvement in World War I, Abbott had successfully turned the Defender into one of the
most largely circulated African American newspapers in the country, selling close to
200,000 copies a week. More than two-thirds of these were read outside of the Chicago
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area. According to Emmett Scott in his 1920 work Negro Migration during the War,
the Defender “voiced the unexpressed thoughts of many [southern African Americans]
and made accusations for which they themselves would have been severely handled.”
Early in the war, the Defender published articles suggesting that the South controlled the
government and, thus, contributed to widespread discrimination by the government.
According to one article, the newspaper was “loathe to believe that it is the sentiment of
the majority to belittle and discredit one-eighth of the entire population. The South being
in the saddle, we can expect anything from that source, however.” Nevertheless, Abbott
ultimately called for blacks to support the war effort; he did so, however, while
continuing to push for racial equality. Throughout the war period, Abbott’s paper
continued to publish lynching statistics and to encourage black migration, thus keeping
major issues of black Americans on the forefront. Before the United States entered the
war, in an article titled “How Much Longer,” the Defender responded to lynching
statistics from 1914, 1915, and 1916. During that three year period, 153 African
Americans lost their lives to lynch mobs. The article stated “As ghastly as are the horrors
of the European war, man’s inhumanity to man is not confined to our brethren across the
sea.” Under pressure from the federal government, however, Abbott tempered his calls
for racial equality, an end to lynching, and northern migration by also encouraging blacks
to support the American war effort. He did so, in large part, to ensure the continued
presence of the Chicago Defender as a voice for African Americans.305
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On the other side of the debate, A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen of the
Messenger stood out in their strong opposition to black participation in the war. The
socialist pair published the first edition of their journal in August 1917, several months
after the United States entered the war. In the same month that DuBois published his
“Close Ranks” editorial, Randolph responded to claims by some whites that black refusal
to participate in the war effort reflected a pro-German stance when he wrote “the Negro
may be choosing between being burnt by Tennessee, Georgia or Texas mobs or being
shot by Germans in Belgium. We don’t know about this pro-Germanism among
Negroes. It may be only their anti-Americanism – meaning anti-lynching.” Because of
this and other outspoken comments that questioned the war itself as well as the need for
blacks to participate in the war effort, the federal government viewed Randolph and
Owen as a threat to the government’s efforts in the war. 306
Randolph and Owen directed most of their writings and speeches towards what
they dubbed the “New Crowd Negro” which historian Theodore Kornweibel, Jr.
identified as a group of “young blacks [who] had freed themselves from Bookerite
restraints and were determined to prevent the ascendancy of a new national
accommodationist leader and to forthrightly criticize the remaining generation of
conservative spokesmen. . . . [and] would demand much more meaningful alterations to
the racial status quo that the incremental requests begged by the previous generation.” In
the summer of 1918, the two men even scheduled a national speaking tour in which they
planned to inform the black public about the exploitive nature of the war effort in relation
to African Americans. Their tour was temporarily cut short, however, when Bureau of
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Investigation agents arrested them on August 4 for two disloyal editorials in the
Messenger. The first suggested that there should be a tax on war profits so that there
would be no economic motivation to go to war. The second was the “Pro-Germanism
among Negroes” article in which Randolph had written that perhaps blacks were more
“anti-American” than “pro-German.” Randolph and Owen raised the question of why
African Americans should fight to “make the world safe for democracy” when they did
not have access to “economic, political, educational and civil democracy” at home. The
Bureau agents arrested the two men under Title 1, Section 3, of the Espionage Act. The
two men “escaped trial through an ironic expression of racism. He refused to believe that
the two twenty-nine-year-old ‘boys’ were intelligent enough to have written such
articulate, if inflammatory, editorials, and was convinced others must have used their
names so as to conceal their own nefarious deeds.” After the judge released them, the
two men continued with their speaking tour and continued to publish provocative articles
in the Messenger. 307
Ultimately, African Americans participated in nearly every aspect of the war
effort. Thousands of black men, such as those who joined the Fifteenth New York
Voluntary Infantry Regiment, or the Harlem Hell Fighters, answered President Wilson’s
call for citizens to fight in the war to make the world safe for democracy. Black citizens
in America also did what they could to support the fight from the home front.
Nevertheless, few African Americans could ignore the irony of their situation. While
blacks gave their lives in the fight for democracy overseas, African Americans at home
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continued to face discrimination and violence. Additionally, black soldiers faced
mistreatment from both officers and white citizens, and the government initially refused
to train black officers to command African American units. The rays of hope seen after
the Court’s Buchanan decision seemed to quickly disappear.
In the months after World War I ended, the loss of hope became even more
apparent as African Americans faced increased violence at the hands of whites. In 1918,
the final year of the war, sixty African Americans were lynched. That number increased
to seventy-six in 1919. In addition, there were more than twenty race riots throughout the
country in the summer of 1919, which was dubbed “Red Summer.” Among them were
riots in Charleston, South Carolina (May 10), Washington, D.C. (July 19), Chicago (July
27 through August 2), Knoxville, Tennessee (August 30), Omaha (September 28), and
Elaine, Arkansas (October 1). In Chicago, thirty-eight people died, twenty-three African
Americans and fifteen whites, and another 537, of whom 342 were African Americans,
suffered injuries. In Elaine, Arkansas, the riot began when a white deputy sheriff and a
railroad detective interrupted a meeting of black sharecroppers who had gathered to
discuss the possibility of joining the Progressive Farmers and Household Union of
America. The deputy and detective both carried guns and, when they interrupted the
meeting, a fight broke out in which the detective died and the deputy was wounded. The
violence spread and continued for the next three days. White citizens in neighboring
states believed that there was an insurrection taking place. The governor, Charles
Hillman Brough, received a request that he help squelch the “Negro uprising.” He
contacted the federal government and, after a delay, six hundred federal troops arrived in
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the city. It took several days for the troops to restore order and by the time they did
as many as eight hundred African Americans were dead.
More details of the events in Elaine spread after a member of the NAACP who
was able to pass for white, Walter F. White, managed to interview Governor Brough and
published his findings in the Chicago Defender and Crisis. At the end of October, a
grand jury indicted 122 African Americans on multiple charges including murder,
conspiracy, and insurrection. A month after the riot, the trial began in a courthouse
surrounded by armed whites. The black defendants were not put on the stand by their
lawyers and twelve of them faced death by electric chair after being convicted of murder.
At this point, the NAACP stepped in to assist the convicted blacks with their appeals.
The cases reached the Supreme Court as Moore v. Dempsey (261 U.S. 86 [1923]) and, in
a departure from its typical avoidance of overseeing the actions of state courts, the Court
reversed the convictions and ordered new trials for the defendants. According to Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in the majority opinion, “the case is that the whole proceeding is
a mask-that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of
public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in
the machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no
other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.”308
Although this Court’s decision in Moore v. Dempsey was somewhat of a victory
for African Americans and for the NAACP, it did not represent a wholesale shift in the
treatment of black Americans by the Court. There was a greater scrutiny in later criminal
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cases, such as the trials of the Scottsboro boys in Powell v. Alabama, but the Court
continued to uphold segregation legislation for several more decades. It was not until
1941 and 1946 respectively that the Supreme Court began to encourage the desegregation
of the railways with its decision in Mitchell v. United States (313 U.S. 80 [1941]) and the
desegregation of other public transportation with its holding in Morgan v. Virginia (328
U.S. 373 [1946]). In each of these cases, the Court focused more on the economic issues
of interstate commerce than on the social issues of race relations but nevertheless the
outcome was a loosening of restrictions on African Americans’ ability to travel. In 1948,
the Court began the process of desegregating neighborhoods when it decided in Shelley v.
Kraemer (334 U.S. 1 [1948]) and Hurd v. Hodge (334 U.S. 24 [1948]) that restrictive
covenants turned to by whites after the Court’s decision in Buchanan v. Warley were
unconstitutional. For thirty years, white property owners used restrictive covenants as
private agreements between buyers and sellers to guarantee that property was not sold to
blacks. In 1950, the Supreme Court took the first steps towards desegregating schools
when it determined that a university that required a black student to sit only at designated
tables was making it more difficult for the black student to obtain his degree. In the
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents fro Higher Education (339 U.S. 637 [1950]), the
Court explained that although it appeared on the surface that McLaurin received the same
education as his classmates, the state school could not treat him differently. On the same
day, the Court decided Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629 [1950]) with a similar conclusion
regarding a Texas law school. The Court’s move towards desegregating schools
culminated in its 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision (347 U.S. 483 [1954]).
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As much as they had misread the significance of Plessy v. Ferguson, African
Americans misinterpreted the impact that Buchanan v. Warley would have on their lives.
Despite their apparent expectations that the Supreme Court’s decision in the housing case
signaled a shift in favor of black Americans and that they were finally going to attain the
equality they had sought since the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, it was
still another three decades before the Supreme Court finally took on the task of undoing
what it had begun with its decision in Blyew v. United Sates in 1871.
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